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2 Foreword 
Although much of Europe's time and  energy seem  to be taken up at the 
moment with the internal challenges it has to face,  it cannot afford to think of 
itself as an  island of stability in  a world in disarray. 
That is why I am glad that the Forward Studies Unit has decided to devote 
this first  issue  of a new series  of publications,  the 'Cahiers',  to exploring  the 
European view of the future of North-South relations, after the tremendous up-
heaval  which followed the ending of the Cold  War.  That great turn  in  events, 
symbolized  by  the fall  of the Berlin  Wall,  not only brought about a drastic  re-
shaping of European geopolitics, it also opened up a new era  in world relations. 
This 'Cahier' prescribes no particular course of action. It sets out ways for-
ward which will potentially clarify the tasks that are bound for a long time to be 
on the agenda of an international community, a community which is still proving 
slow to form itself and to which Europe  has  its own experience to offer and  its 
own contribution to make. 
I believe three messages come over loud and clear in the report. 
The first is  how important it is to carry out a global overhaul and  renewal 
of the multilateral world economic order,  in  terms of both effectiveness and  le-
gitimacy. This  is the new trade-off the North owes the South. As far as the coun-
tries  of the  South  are  concerned,  the  end  of  East-West  confrontation  now 
creates an obligation to apply the rules of good governance. 
The second  is that we must stress the benefits to Europe of maintaining a 
comprehensive  development  cooperation  policy  which  goes  beyond  the  eco-
nomic and  financial  spheres to encompass  science,  technology,  social  develop-
ment and the environment. 
Thirdly and  lastly,  the paper emphasizes  how useful  a tool development 
contracts can  be in  incorporating the rights and duties of a variety of players into 
a relationship of mutual respect. 
This report will also help people in Europe work out the changes that have 
still to be made in their relations with the countries of the South to take account 
of  the  new  worldwide  context.  The  ideas  in  it  have  already  provided  the 
Commission  with  food  for thought about the  current  reforms  of the  United 
3 Nations, the development of relations between the European Union and the ACP 
countries  and  the  search  for  a  way  of fostering  sustainable  development  in 
Europe which is  consistent with the defence of its interests on the world stage. 
They have also  been  heard  in  international think-tanks such  as  the Commission 
on  global governance co-chaired by lngvar Carlsson and Sridath Ramphal. 
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118 Introduction 
'Le  reel  est etroit 
le possible est immense' 
Lamartine 
The  European  Commission  mandated  the  Forward  Studies  Unit  on 
27 November  1991  to  establish  a  report  on  the  prospects  of  North-South 
relations (see mandate in Annex 3).  In accordance with this mandate, the report 
concentrates on the analysis of the evolution of North-South interdependencies 
in a changing geopolitical situation and attempts to outline the parameters of a 
global  strategy  to  avoid  the  risks  resulting  from  a  mishandling  of  these 
interdependencies on  the basis  of common concepts of good governance and 
global  governance  for  the  promotion  of  sustainable  social  and  economic 
development.  The  report  further  formulates  strategic  priorities  for  the 
Community in  contributing to a more coherent global approach, in  line with its 
specific  geopolitical  interests  and  an  adequate  internal  division  of  tasks. 
However, the report does not contain a detailed analysis of relevant Community 
policies or specific proposals for their reform. 
The  report  is  largely the result  of intensive  discussions  within a team  of 
members of the Forward  Studies  Unit headed  by  Christoph  Bail  and composed 
of Carlos Camino,  Kees van  Rij,  Michael Roberts and David Wright. Members of 
the team  have  individually and  collectively discussed  the subjects of this report 
with colleagues within the Commission as well as members of research  institutes 
within the Community and  independent experts.  Three  members of the team 
spent a week in Washington and New York talking to a variety of experts within 
international  institutions  (World  Bank,  IMF,  United  Nations)  and  research 
institutes. Members of the team went individually to Geneva and Paris to discuss 
issues  of the  report  with  staff  members  of Unctad,  GATI,  OECD,  the  OECD 
Development Centre and independent experts. A draft of the report, finalized in 
December  1992, was circulated within the Commission and  revised  in  the light 
of comments  received.  The  report  remains,  however,  a document established 
under the sole  responsibility of the Forward Studies Unit. It engages neither the 
European Commission nor its services. 
9 Executive summary 
The report entitled 'The future of North-South relations- towards sustain-
able economic and social  development' contains five chapters.  Starting with re-
flections on  the changed  geopolitical situation  it goes on to analyse  the evolu-
tion of North-South relations and the development prospects, interdependencies 
and  risks.  On  this  basis,  a  global  strategy  for  the  promotion  of sustainable 
economic and social  development is  proposed which in  turn provides the back-
ground for suggestions for strategic priorities of the Community and its Member 
States. 
I.  Geopolitical outlook: the changing nature of 
North-South relations 
North-South relations are at a turning point after the end of the East-West 
conflict. A new multipolar system  is  emerging at the same time as the South  as 
such  is disappearing as a political entity.  Certain values such  as  democratic gov-
ernment, the rule of law and a free market economy are becoming more univer-
sally acceptable facilitating new forms of cooperation.  However, the concept of 
a 'new world order' remains unclear.  While the post-cold-war era offers greater 
opportunities for the promotion of stability and  security globally,  local  and  re-
gional  conflicts,  contradictions  and  tensions  are  also  gaining  ground.  To  deal 
with  the  latter  and  address  more  effectively  the  long-term  global  challenges 
requires a strengthening of multilateral approaches. 
The European Community, in particular, has a strong interest in promoting 
better  global  management  of  interdependence  through  a  strengthening  of 
multilateralism. It is at a crossroads between continued introspection and mount-
ing external  challenges  requiring stronger international engagement and  coop-
eration. It will, in  particular,  have to shoulder greater burdens in  confronting re-
gional  instability in  its  eastern  and  southern  proximity.  However,  in  spite of its 
economic strength, the Community remains politically weak and will have to face 
resistance  from  Member States  following divergent bilateral  policies for which 
the  possibilities  have  increased.  This  situation  - and  the  necessity  for  the 
Community, in view of its geographical vulnerability, to ensure adequate burden-
sharing  notably with the other members of the triad - increases  its  interest in 
supporting  multilateral  approaches  to overcome  structural  problems  in  North-
South relations. 
11 II.  The experience of North-South relations: lessons 
from the past 
This  chapter  attempts  to draw the  principal  lessons  of the  experience 
(summarized  in  Annex 1) of North-South relations since the Second World War. 
A review of the evolution of development thinking suggests that there has been 
a somewhat circular evolution of theories and  strategies  moving  in  and  out of 
fashion,  but also a considerable learning process towards the integration of po-
litical, economic, social and environmental dimensions of development into com-
prehensive concepts. There is now a sense of crisis which, however, concerns not 
so  much  development thinking as  the capacity of political  systems to translate 
concepts into action. 
It has  become evident that the determining factors which  have  led  to a 
widely divergent evolution  of the economies of developing  countries  must  be 
sought primarily in the way that the domestic policies of these countries have ad-
justed to local conditions and responded to their situation in the global economy 
and the geopolitical arena.  Judging from past experience,  developing countries 
need to assume  more responsibility for their own development and adopt strat-
egies guided by three principles: their policies must be centred on  people, satis-
fying their needs and enlarging the range of their choices; they should adopt co-
herent economic policies promoting macroeconomic stability and  improving the 
competitive environment for business; they should concentrate on better govern-
ance  in  terms of accountable political  institutions, efficient administrations and 
budgets reflecting consistent long-term development priorities. 
Development  cooperation  remains  a  positive  and  necessary  concept. 
However, it generally does not seem to have had a decisive influence on the evo-
lution of developing countries.  Moreover, there is  a sense of failure as far as the 
efficiency of traditional development aid  is  concerned. This  has  become evident 
by the shift to structural adjustment policies which, however, were also open to 
criticism in terms of their short-term focus on correcting external and budgetary 
imbalances,  their negligence of sustained growth and their negative social  and 
environmental  side-effects.  Past  experience  would favour  an  intensified  policy 
dialogue with developing countries, more effective donor coordination and con-
centration of economic assistance  on  countries demonstrating a will and  a ca-
pacity  to  pursue  credible  economic,  social  and  environmental  policies. 
Concessional aid should be concentrated on the poorest countries and targeted 
to  people-centred  development  improving,  in  particular,  education,  training, 
sanitary conditions, family planning, food security and the preservation of natu-
ral  resources. 
The evolution of developing countries has been strongly influenced by the 
political strategies of the two superpowers and their allies to gain and  maintain 
influence. Moreover, in the context of an  increasingly globalized economy which 
developed  spontaneously  in  a climate of growing deregulation,  the trade and 
macroeconomic  policies  of  industrialized  countries  and  the  Organization  of 
12 Petroleum  Exporting  Countries (OPEC)  had  decisive effects on  the evolution of 
developing countries. The so-called North-South dialogue, due to an atmosphere 
of ideological confrontation, has produced few meaningful results.  The multilat-
eral trading system,  because of its many loopholes, has done too little to ensure 
that developing  countries  benefit from  their comparative  advantages  and  the 
international division  of labour.  Policies  addressing  the problems of the deteri-
orating terms of trade for developing countries have  not sufficiently taken  into 
account the characteristics of the goods and  markets concerned. The  monetary 
and financial  systems,  due to systemic shortcomings, have  not ensured  an  ade-
quate flow of capital and  investment to developing countries. Their failures  re-
late,  in  particular,  to the international allocation  of savings,  the emergence of 
negative financial transfers from the South to the North, the inadequate mecha-
nisms  to coordinate  macroeconomic policies  and  to regulate  financial  markets 
and an  insufficient stimulation of productive investments. 
Ill. Development prospects, interdependencies and risks: 
lessons from the future 
This  chapter attempts to draw some  lessons from an  evaluation of long-
term development prospects,  interdependencies and  risks.  It looks,  in  particular, 
at how the deep  underlying trends in  population growth, poverty and  environ-
mental degradation are likely to interrelate and influence the future of both the 
North  and  the  South.  An  extrapolation  of  present  trends  reveals  that  the 
chances  of a  major  part of the world's  population  'catching  up'  is  becoming 
more remote unless there is  fundamental change.  The combined effect of pov-
erty and population growth will intensify such  global challenges as the spread of 
disease,  the drug trade and,  in  particular,  refugees and  migration.  Global envi-
ronmental  threats will increase  as  the result of a combination of rising  poverty 
and overconsumption; atmospheric and water pollution are expected to increase, 
the degradation of the marine environment and of the soil  to continue, tropical 
forests to disappear and biodiversity to be substantially reduced. 
These  deep trends can  to some  extent be  influenced through a reorien-
tation of economic, social and environmental policies. The economic outlook for 
the different regions of the world is extremely diverse.  It is  particularly bleak for 
sub-Saharan  Africa.  In  turn, economic forecasts  are  influenced  by a number of 
factors such  as access to capital and markets, demand pull from industrial coun-
tries,  adjustment  to  globalization,  peace  dividends  and  political  stability.  The 
chapter closes with two scenarios,  one highlighting the risks  for the North and 
the South  as  a consequence of an  extrapolation of a 'business as· usual'  trend, 
the other highlighting possible gains for all  as a consequence of gradual change 
to sustainable economic and social  development. 
13 IV.  A global strategy for the promotion of sustainable 
economic and social development 
The global strategy proposed in the fourth chapter attempts to respond to 
the changed geopolitical situation and face  up to the future challenges of inter-
dependence in  the light of past experience. 
It is  based  on: 
(a)  the concept of good governance of the southern,  northern and  eastern 
countries which must accept their responsibilities for the internal, external 
and  'boomerang' effects of their policies; 
(b)  the  concept  of  global  governance  to  deal  more  adequately  with  the 
opportunities  unleashed  by  economic  globalization  and  the  increase  in 
global risks;  and 
(c)  the concept of sustainable economic and  social  development combining 
the ideas underlying such  notions as  human development, sustained eco-
nomic  growth  and  environmental  sustainability  in  a  multidimensional 
approach. 
The  strategic  orientations  suggested  consist  firstly  in  the  promotion  of 
deep economic integration in  the context of the establishment of a multilateral 
trade organization and a more comprehensive regulatory multilateral framework 
for trade and  investment beyond  the General  Agreement on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
(GATI),  including the establishment of objective criteria for market access,  em-
phasis on  regulatory convergence in  the interest of combining the reduction of 
distortions of competition with the necessity to achieve public policy objectives, 
multilateral rules on investment and competition including, in the long term, the 
establishment of an  international competition agency and coordinated actions to 
correct  structural  problems  in  certain  commodity  markets.  In  the  short  term, 
measures are necessary to ensure a more stable flow of financial resources to de-
veloping countries, including alleviation of debt servicing repayments and reduc-
tion of debt stock overhang for heavily indebted low-income countries as well as 
an  improvement of prudential,  fiscal  and accounting rules.  In  the longer term, 
the  establishment  of  new  regulatory  mechanisms  to  influence  international 
liquidity and a strengthening of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are envis-
aged. The World Bank system,  including regional development banks, should be 
provided with additional resources to channel  more effectively concessional  aid 
and to act as  an  intermediary between the international financial  markets and 
developing countries in order to guarantee the latter financing on favourable and 
stable terms. 
14 Secondly,  certain measures to stimulate sustainable economic growth are 
suggested, namely: 
(a)  better  coordination  of  the  macroeconomic  policies  of  industrialized 
countries; 
(b)  incentives in favour of new environmentally friendly growth sectors; 
(c)  support for strengthening South/South,  South/East and  East/East  econo-
mic  links  through  regional  integration  schemes,  financing  of triangular 
trade transactions, the establishment of a clearing system  covering trade 
within and between these regions, the facilitation of triangular technolog-
ical  cooperation and the promotion of interregional networking; 
(d)  a reinsurance scheme covering foreign investments against certain  politi-
cal  and  legal  risks  and a multilateral facility to overcome prohibitive costs 
for small  and  medium-sized  companies to identify investment opportu-
nities. 
Thirdly,  a new range  of policies  is  necessary  to implement Agenda  21, 
adopted  at  the  1992  United  Nations  Conference  on  Environment  and 
Development  (UNCED)  in  Rio.  A  number of suggestions  are  made  to help  re-
orient  development  towards  environmental  sustainability  through  increasing 
knowledge of the ecological  costs  and  benefits of different development pat-
terns and policies on the basis of 'green' accounts, appropriate pricing to reflect 
external costs,  ecological tax reforms and transfers of resources and technologi-
cal  know-how to developing countries. 
Fourthly, the central concept of establishing long-term development con-
tracts  between  major  donors  and  recipient  countries  is  outlined.  These  policy 
frameworks, building on the experience under the Lome Convention and within 
the  Bretton  Woods  institutions, would contain  commitments for both sides  as 
suggested  in  Chapter II  and aim  at securing coordinated financial and technical 
support  for  policies  ranging  from  family  planning,  development  of  human 
resources and capacity-building to the stabilization of the macroeconomic foun-
dation, structural  adjustment,  rural  development and  the protection of natural 
resources. 
To facilitate global governance, suggestions are made to transform gradu-
ally the international  institutions in  order to strengthen  global  policy initiation, 
legitimization and  implementation. To  ensure  global policy coherence,  it is  pro-
posed to clarify the tasks of the various institutions and to strengthen the mech-
anisms of coordination and global policy orientation. This would preferably lead 
to a revitalization of the role of the United Nations (UN) and its specialized agen-
cies  in the economic and social  areas,  implying either a redefinition of the man-
date, composition and functioning of the Security Council or the establishment 
15 of a UN sustainable development council.  Finally,  it is  suggested to promote and 
strengthen regional cooperation and  integration in  order to conciliate the neces-
sity for better management of interdependencies with the specific needs and fea-
tures of proximity reflecting the diversity of cultural values and models of society. 
V.  A strategy for the European Community and its Member 
States 
The  last chapter looks at the priorities of the Community and its Member 
States  in  contributing  to  the  global  strategy  outlined  in  Chapter  IV.  The 
Community, which by its own nature tends to define policies reflecting a diver-
sity of interests and which possesses some of the key elements of 'soft power', 
should  be  in  the best  position to promote such  a strategy.  A  definition of the 
Community's geopolitical priorities on the basis of risk avoidance and an efficient 
internal  division  of competences  and  tasks  leads  to an  emphasis  on  systemic 
issues  related to the management of global  interdependencies and  on  regional 
responsibilities in  terms of managing its geographical proximity. 
On  this basis,  it is  suggested that the Community concentrates on policy 
areas where it clearly has an  added value in comparison with individual Member 
States and not simply act as  a 13th donor.  It should become a full participant in 
the multilateral organizations that regulate trade, finance and monetary relations 
and  exercise  leadership  in  defining global  priorities in  such  areas  as  peace  and 
security,  democracy,  protection of human rights,  demography,  poverty,  environ-
ment,  migration,  pandemics  and  drugs,  as  well  as  initiate  and  coordinate 
common actions. It should concentrate its efforts on the initiation and coordina-
tion  of systemic  policies to overcome  structural  shortcomings and  increase  its 
budgetary means for common actions  in  support of such  policies.  In  return,  it 
could  leave the implementation of its development cooperation policies largely 
to Member States and, where appropriate, specialized domestic and multilateral 
agencies.  This  would imply a progressive  shift from  geographically defined co-
operation policies to horizontal and systemic policies and multilateral approach-
es.  The  Community should assume a leading role  in  promoting a coherent mul-
tilateral strategy based on  'development contracts'. Such  a multilateral approach 
should, in particular, concentrate and increase efforts to overcome the structural 
problems  faced  by  sub-Saharan  Africa  whose  development  prospects  are 
bleakest. It would imply a fundamental reorientation of the Lome scheme. 
The  Community's second  main geopolitical interest is  to promote peace, 
stability and  development in  its  direct neighbourhood.  It should  therefore  up-
grade  its  policies  towards the countries  in  Central,  Eastern  and  South-Eastern 
Europe  and  the  Mediterranean  region,  including  the  countries  of the former 
Soviet  Union,  Turkey  and  the  Middle  East.  Vis-a-vis  the  Central  and  East 
European  countries,  this would mean  'deep' integration on  the basis  of a pro-
gressive implementation of the four freedoms leading eventually to full member-
ship. Vis-a-vis the non-Community southern Mediterranean countries, this would 
16 mean  the creation  of an  economic cooperation zone  progressively leading to a 
free  trade area  with the Community.  Economic  integration within each  region 
through  free  trade  areas  (FTAs)  customs'  unions  or  cooperation  agreements 
should  be  encouraged  as  steps  towards  integration  into the economy of the 
Community. In terms of assistance policies, existing financial protocols should be 
gradually replaced  by structural funds. 
The  Community would also  have to ensure greater internal policy coher-
ence with respect to the objectives of sustainable economic and social  develop-
ment. This concerns primarily agricultural and trade policies to eliminate progres-
sively trade restrictions and  distortions affecting developing countries,  and  also 
industrial,  R&D,  fiscal,  energy and environmental policies as  well as  the genera-
tion  of  additional  resources  for  the  financing  of  sustainable  development 
strategies (e.g.  through energy taxes). 
Finally,  a number of suggestions  are  made  to involve  European  citizens 
and increase public awareness of global interdependencies and risks  because,  in 
the final analysis,  nothing less  than a profound reorientation of the production 
and consumption habits and social values underlying Western society is required. 
These suggestions include a greater political role for non-government organiza-
tions (NGOs);  planning for the adoption and implementation of long-term strat-
egies  when  risk  awareness  in  the public  is  high;  the formation  of a voluntary 
Community  service  of qualified  young  citizens  of all  Member  States  serving 
together in developing countries; a code of conduct for EC  companies; the float-
ing of a Community-wide solidarity loan  and twinning between  EC  and  south-
ern cities. The shift towards new patterns of consumption and production will be 
greatly aided  if new technological choices and  economic analysis tools become 
available. The development of such tools would require action to direct basic and 
applied  technological  research  towards  the  advancement  of environmentally 
friendly products, the reduction  of energy consumption, appropriate technolo-
gies suitable to be  transferred and  diffused  in  developing countries and  instru-
ments to measure the real  social and environmental costs of economic activities. 
17 I.  Geopolitical outlook: 
the changing nature of North-South 
relations 
1.  North-South relations at a turning point 
The  world that is  emerging after the sea  changes  of recent years  is  very 
different from the world as it has developed after the Second World War and the 
process  of decolonization.  The  East-West  conflict and  North-South dualism  no 
longer provide an  adequate framework in  which to understand global  political 
trends.  The  defeat of communism obliges countries to reposition themselves  in 
the light of increasing transnational interdependence, both in  terms of benefit-
ing from the opportunities offered and of containing the risks involved. It heigh-
tens their awareness of deep destabilizing trends such  as population growth, ris-
ing poverty and the depletion of natural resources  interacting with political dis-
order and economic mismanagement, to produce international chaos.  The  pos-
sible  further  destruction  of the  tropical  forest,  the  danger  of malfunctioning 
nuclear power stations in  Eastern  Europe, the threats of the use of atomic, bio-
logical and chemical (ABC) weapons in  the Middle East,  and the possibility of a 
coup d'etat in  Moscow are all  perceived as  having similar planetary significance. 
Under the dynamism of economic globalization, a new division of labour is  re-
placing traditional East-West and  North-South divisions.  Consequently, the divi-
sion  of the world along  political  lines  is  being  replaced  by  a categorization  of 
countries and regions in accordance with their stages of development. Moreover, 
existing structures and  practices in  international relations rooted  in  the concept 
of sovereignty of nation States and favouring bilateralisms are  no longer adapt-
ed to the realities of interdependence, globalization and regionalization. Against 
this background, this chapter describes the main geopolitical trends and vulner-
abilities resulting from increasing interdependencies and argues that a strength-
ened  multilateralism  corresponds  to  the  Community's  interest  in  promoting 
stability in  international relations. 
1.1.  The emergence of a multipolar system 
The collapse of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe and the for-
mer Soviet Union has led to the abrupt termination of the cold war in Europe and 
other parts of the world. The  traditional bipolar world, mainly characterized  by 
security considerations and  military power,  has ended. The world is  increasingly 
characterized by multipolarity, a situation in  which different poles are exercising 
different kinds of power in  safeguarding their interests, cooperating in  order to 
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nological and environmental interdependencies. From a military/security point of 
view, the United States of America remains the only superpower.  From  an  eco-
nomidfinancial perspective,  the  EC  (with a strong emphasis on  Germany),  the 
USA and Japan constitute the main poles of a multipolar system that had already 
strongly developed  before the end  of the East-West  conflict.  Russia,  although 
threatened by continuing internal disintegration, will remain  for the time being 
an  important military pole and Third World countries such as China and India re-
main  formidable  demographic  poles  with  considerable  military and  economic 
potential. But within this multipolar conglomerate, the balance of power is dra-
matically changing, not only because of the disappearance of the Soviet Union, 
but also because of the relatively diminished economic power and indebtedness 
of the USA to the benefit of Japan, the newly industrialized Asian countries and 
China,  and  a more integrated and  enlarged  European  Community. The  signifi-
cance of this evolution towards multipolarity is  increased by a broadening of the 
concept of security to include new risks of a non-military nature. The  emerging 
new poles are,  however,  not simply a continuation of the old poles.  The  com-
plexity of the distribution of power and  the role  of public opinion make it in-
creasingly difficult for governments to impose unilaterally policies on their own 
people and  on  other countries.  Therefore,  multipolarity will be  less  hegemonic 
and less hierarchical, and leadership will increasingly be based on the exercise of 
soft  power,  by  stimulating  and  convincing  other  actors  to  go  in  a  certain 
direction. 
It has been argued1 that the emerging system of international relations is 
apolar rather than multipolar, leading to an absence of order rather than a limited 
degree of disorder.  However, whatever the qualifications attributed to the post-
cold-war international system,  in  essence it will be,  more than in the bipolar era, 
dependent on  the interactions between  the different poles  in  managing  their 
interdependences and  avoiding potential conflicts.  On  the other hand,  it seems 
highly improbable that the world will move towards unipolar stability,  based  on 
the exclusive primacy of the USA,  as  has been suggested by commentators2 and 
a recent Pentagon study. Indeed, one of the main trends in the new global arena 
is that no single country is any longer able to exercise power and influence every-
where.  Increasingly,  international  coalitions  of  cooperating  nations  seek  to 
assume  specific  collective  responsibilities,  such  as  in  the Gulf War,  the former 
Yugoslavia and Somalia. 
1.2.  The disappearance of the South as a political entity 
While  the  former  Eastern  bloc  countries  attempt to find  their place  as 
close  as  possible  to the West,  and  some  Asian  countries of the former Soviet 
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Rethmkmg Amencan secunty: Beyond cold war to new world order, New York,  Norton, 1992. Union seek closer cooperation with Turkey or Iran,  in  the South the disappear-
ance of Soviet communism has  reinforced the trend to growing heterogeneity. 
The  South  as  a separate  category  hardly exists  any  more and  the term  'Third 
World' seems  to be justifiable only in  the sense  that,  like the tiers etat in  pre-
1789 France,  it is  a highly diverse class that is  chiefly characterized by being ex-
cluded  from  the  political  decision-making  process.  Developing  countries  are 
increasingly divided  between  newly industrializing countries (the four Asian  ti-
gers,  some countries of ASEAN  but also countries like Mexico and Turkey) that 
are in  a process of transition to 'northern' status, and underdeveloped countries 
fighting  against  decades  of economic  stagnation,  uncontrolled  demographic 
growth and an  increasingly marginal status in the world economy.1 Several  for-
mer Eastern bloc countries (in  particular the Asian republics of the former Soviet 
Union, but also Albania, and, arguably,  Romania) find their place increasingly in 
the  South,  and  show characteristics  of underdevelopment such  as  economic 
backwardness and severe poverty. This trend could lead to what J.-C.  Rufin2 calls 
'un nouveau grand schisme' between North and South in  which the North inte-
grates  certain  economically  promising  southern  countries,  creates  a  'limes' 
between North and South composed of a number of buffer States,  and  leaves 
the rest of the South cut off and isolated (mainly sub-Saharan Africa).  However, 
the territorial and political boundaries of such  a limes are  difficult to define and 
also cut right through countries.  Moreover, this schism resulting from the exclu-
sion of entire regions from the global economy is at least partially checked by the 
vital interests of the North in solving such long-term problems as saving forests, 
reducing greenhouse gas  emissions,  managing transnational migration, enforc-
ing (nuclear) non-proliferation, fighting terrorism, drugs and pandemics such  as 
AIDS.  These  global  problems  give  the  developing  countries  growing  leverage 
over rich countries because of their nuisance value. 
1.3.  The rise of democracy and free market economies 
There is  a global movement towards the introduction of democratic gov-
ernment, the rule of law and free market economy, not only in the former com-
munist regions of Europe and Eurasia, but also in  Latin America, Asia, Africa and 
South Africa. The acceptance of the market economy by most countries in the 
Third  World  is  one of today's  major ideological  shifts,  and  coincides with the 
emergence of new elites that have buried traditional anti-Western attitudes. By 
radically reforming economic and financial policies, a country like Mexico, which 
was considered a difficult case  a few years ago, has reversed  negative trends by 
curbing the inefficiencies of strong government interventionism and protection-
ism.  Similar  developments  are  visible  in,  for  instance,  India,  Vietnam,  China, 
Brazil and Argentina. 
Kahler,  M., 'The international political economy', Foreign Affa1rs,  autumn, 1990. 
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sive  dictatorships (South  Korea,  Philippines),  lost wars (Argentina/Falklands) and 
economic pressures  (isolation  of South  Africa),  the most important impetus to 
change towards more democratic rule  has  been  the globalization and  intensifi-
cation of communication (which  includes the increased  role  of the press,  non-
governmental organizations and private pressure groups) and the effects of inter-
national  economic  exchanges  which  cannot  be  stopped  at  borders  and  leads 
people to demand  more  representational  government structures  and  freedom 
oriented policies. The Western culture of consumerism has long attracted south-
ern and eastern citizens and pulled them away from repressive governments and 
planned economic systems.  Although the global trend towards democracy is far 
from consolidated and from being irreversible, its breakthrough is also closely re-
lated to the breakdown of the power systems  in  Eastern  Europe and the former 
Soviet  Union  and  the  disappearance  of  the  ideological  opposition  between 
Western and communist alternatives for development and justice, notably in the 
Third World. 
Although democracy is gaining ground, it should be emphasized that it is 
not a uniform Western-style democratic model that is applied in  most countries. 
The  Confucian-flavoured  democracies  in  North-East Asia  demonstrate that de-
mocracy can  be  combined with collectivistic traditions and  a certain  degree of 
authoritarianism.  In  other words,  democracy is  generally strongly influenced by 
specific  local  traditions and  challenges.  In  countries where democracy rule  has 
been  introduced, the rule of law, respect for minorities and human rights are still 
far from being  respected.  There also  seems  to be  a growing consensus  among 
the  international  community  that  there  is  a  kind  of  collective  'right  of 
interference'  in  situations  where  acute  humanitarian  crises  occur  and  basic 
human  rights  are  suppressed  in  a context  of civil  war,  such  as  in  the former 
Yugoslavia and Somalia. 
1.4.  Technological revolution and globalization of markets 
The  technological  revolution  and  the  globalization  of markets  are  pro-
foundly affecting international relations. Technological change, the communica-
tions revolution, the role of multinational corporations and private-sector strate-
gies transcend national borders and  reduce the influence of the nation state as 
an  international actor.  This  process  is  widening the gaps  not only between the 
rich  industrialized and  the poor underdeveloped  countries,  but also  within the 
developing  world.  Most southern  countries  are  falling  increasingly  behind  the 
North because they have  less access to capital, technology and qualified person-
nel.  This  consequently  increases  inequalities  between  rich  and  poor,  both 
between and within countries, cutting through national borders and  creating a 
North in  the South and a South in  the North.1 In  the North, this social exclusion 
has evident dangers of increasing social tensions, particularly of an ethnic nature. 
Emmerij,  Lou1s.  La grenade degoupil/ee,  Paris,  1992. 
22 Reactions  against artificially imposed and  mishandled Western-type moderniza-
tion  in  some southern countries have  led,  and  are  likely to continue to lead,  in 
several  cases to a revival  of anti-Western ideologies. 
2.  New forms of cooperation and tensions 
2.1.  The phantom of a 'new world order' 
Some commentators have suggested that several  of the abovementioned 
trends,  some of which were already visible  before the developments in  Eastern 
Europe, are now formulated in the concept of a 'new world order'. This concept 
was launched by President Bush, during the Gulf crisis in September 1990, short-
ly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and was increasingly discussed in the North and 
South, as the Central and East European countries started their long and painful 
march towards the establishment of democracy and free market economies. The 
Gulf War, which occurred at a crucial point in time, was the first occasion for the 
international community in  the post-cold-war era  to deal  with a major conflict. 
The result was that Saddam  Hussein's aggression was condemned international-
ly (countries from the South included) and contained by force under US  leader-
ship under the aegis of a UN mandate. However, this war also opposed northern 
and southern countries in the sense that many countries and people in the South 
saw the conflict as a war between rich and  poor, Christianity and Islam,  modern 
Western technology and values and southern cultures.  As such,  the 'new world 
order' is as much a northern concept to define 'new ways of working with other 
nations towards peaceful  settlements of disputes,  solidarity against aggression, 
reduced  and  controlled  weapons'  arsenals  and  just treatment of all  peoples' 
(President Bush),  as  it is  seen  by  many countries in the South  as  a concept des-
tined to serve  Western  self-interests. 1  In  any event,  it is  clear that the concept 
President Bush had in mind is largely limited to security in a traditional sense, and 
does not extend to economic, social and environmental risks. The United Nations 
Conference on  Environment and  Development demonstrated  the  limitation of 
this US  concept of world order. 
This  Conference in  Rio  was another culminating point in  addressing  glo-
bal  issues  in  the new international context in which North-South relations were 
severely  tested.  Although  a  number of agreements  were  signed  and  general 
commitments were made,  the North, divided on  important issues,  failed  to re-
assure  the South  about the even-handedness of its commitment to sustainable 
development, since financial aid remained limited and largely uncommitted and 
In fact, many Third World intellectuals and some politicians accuse the West of measuring with double 
standards: the 'Western' decision to bomb Iraq ('Islamic') cities was much eas1er to take, than a decision 
to reciprocate likewise by the 'West' agamst Serbian ('Western') aggression  1n  ('Western') Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The decision of the Un1ted  Nations, stimulated by Secretary-General Boutros Ghali, to act 
decisively and sw1ftly in Somalia somewhat corrects this perception. 
23 technological transfer a vague promise. Population growth was omitted from the 
agenda and  the conference failed to adopt a credible strategy to fight poverty. 
The  USA was almost entirely isolated, Japan failed to live up to the expectations 
of it as  a new economic superpower and  paymaster,  and the EC  was on several 
major issues unable to agree on a credible common line.  Equally, the South was 
largely  divided,  the  G77,  due  to its  growing  heterogeneity,  having  enormous 
difficulties in  presenting common views. 
2.2.  The world between multipolarity and multilateralism 
Thus,  the emerging  international geopolitical situation appears to distin-
guish  itself mainly by  its  complex and  untidy nature,  thus defying  attempts to 
characterize it through grand statements,  neat categories and simple formulas. 
Indeed, the new world order is far from being the blueprint of a world in which 
democracy, free market and the rule of international law reign in an era of peace 
and  stability. 1  The  present situation should  rather be  characterized  in  terms of 
oscillation  between  multipolarity (including  polarization  between  regions)  and 
multilateralism  in  which  actors  seek  to  redefine  their  changing  relationships 
against the background of these global trends and challenges.  Both the Gulf cri-
sis and the global security issues at stake at the Rio Conference demonstrate that 
the challenges of interdependence will have to be  met through the continuing 
adaptation of traditional political structures to the increasingly transnational ec-
onomic, social  and environmental realities,  i.e.  by strengthening multilateralism. 
However,  it must be  emphasized  that the  majority of marginalized  urban  and 
rural  poor in  both southern and eastern, and even  in  northern countries, do not 
necessarily  share  the  experience  of a world  in  a transitional  phase:  to these 
people poverty and social exclusion seem permanent and continue to deteriorate. 
2.3.  Opportunities for stability 
Obviously the post-cold-war era  offers greater opportunities for the pro-
motion of stability and global security because the end of the East-West conflict 
in  all  its political, military, economic and  ideological aspects  is bringing about an 
increased capacity to cooperate and jointly face common crises,  define common 
interests, guarantee common security and shape a common future on the basis 
of a common responsibility. 2 The Gulf War has shown that it should be  possible 
for the North and South to act jointly on the basis of a common set of principles 
including,  in  particular,  renunciation  of territorial  expansion  by  violent means, 
giving  democratic and  economic  development first  priority,  involvement of all 
countries with no country being isolated and the abandoning of ideological con-
frontation  in  favour of overall  agreement on  purpose.  The  main  powers that 
largely dominate the so-called  'new world order'- the USA,  the EC  as a whole, 
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on  these  basic  principles.  There  are  some signs that key  countries  in  the South 
such  as  Brazil,  Mexico,  Argentina,  Egypt,  South  Africa, Turkey,  India,  Indonesia 
and  South  Korea  are evolving in the same direction. 
Countries that use force on their neighbours or minorities within their bor-
ders (Iraq, the former Yugoslavia) and countries in which coups d'etats are staged 
(Haiti,  Peru) are increasingly and  more effectively (not necessarily more efficient-
ly) condemned by the international community. The  UN  Security Council has  in-
creased  its capacity to deal  with international crises  and  its security role  is  now 
generally accepted by UN members. Evidence of this is the recent initiatives to in-
stitutionalize  and  strengthen  preventive  diplomacy,  peacekeeping  and  peace 
enforcement.  1 
The  new international context, for example,  has  made  it possible to get 
rid  of the taboos surrounding arms  sales  to, and  military expenditure by,  Third 
World countries. There has been a tendency that, while Northern countries con-
cluded  arms  reduction  agreements (e.g.  USA-Russia),  many Third  World coun-
tries  continued  to  build  up  arsenals  with  the  connivance  of  the  North. 
International security arrangements, such as the UN weapons register,  now seek 
to limit world trade in  military equipment. Increasingly, the IMF, World Bank and 
other agencies and donors look at military expenses in relation to expenditure on 
education  and  health  in  Third  World  countries.  The  discussion  on  peace  divi-
dends  is  thus not limited to reducing  military expenditure in  rich  countries,  but 
also deals with the nature of public expenses  in  poor countries. 
Although  its  success  was  limited, the  Rio  Conference has  demonstrated 
that a global  North-South dialogue  is  possible,  overcoming  the previous  exist-
ence  of two  opposing  blocs  defending  irreconcilable  positions.  But  the  Rio 
Summit is, as said above, far from being the herald of a new world order. Equally, 
the Uruguay Round  has the potential to contribute to increasing global stability. 
A growing number of countries from the South and from the former communist 
world  have  joined  and  thus strengthen  a process  that seeks  to liberalize  eco-
nomic and commercial relations between regions and countries on a global level. 
2.4.  Conflicts, contradictions and tensions 
The post-cold-war era has also demonstrated that conflicts, contradictions 
and tensions in the North and South are gaining ground. The formerly perceived 
image of global security being entirely dependent on  the balance between the 
USA  and  the  former  Soviet  Union,  is  being  replaced  by  a  highly  diffuse, 
fragmented picture of threats to global security. 
'Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping', report of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, June  1992. 
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such  as  Islamic fundamentalism, and nationalism. Apart from 'established' con-
flicts  (e.g.  the Arab-Israeli  conflict,  North-South  Korea,  Cyprus,  Kashmir)  new 
conflicts have developed after the break-up of communist rule in  Europe, involv-
ing the Asian  republics of the former Soviet  Union,  Russia  itself,  Moldova, the 
former Yugoslavia, and possibly other East European countries. The explosion of 
nationalism  and  ethnic tension  in  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union  is,  of 
course,  a direct consequence of the political vacuum that resulted from the dis-
appearance of oppressive but unifying communist rule. These social tensions are, 
however,  not limited to the eastern  part of Europe.  They  also  manifest them-
selves  in  several  EC  Member States,  in  particular in  Germany, but also in  France, 
Italy,  the United Kingdom and others, where they are  the expression  of a more 
general malaise with the way the democratic system functions. 
The idea that the end of the cold war has necessarily brought a universally 
accepted  normative  orthodoxy based  on  liberal  democracy  is  challenged,  not 
only because of strong differences between cultures on how democracy is  exer-
cised,  but also  because  of the continued existence  of powerful countervailing 
forces based on violent ideology in  several Third World countries, such  as funda-
mentalism  in  the  Middle  East,  strong  subversive  movements  like  Sendero 
Luminoso in  Peru  and the Tamil  Tigers in  Sri  Lanka. 
Many smaller countries in  the Third World are  able to buy or build mod-
ern weapon systems (even  nuclear weapons) and are  no longer under the influ-
ence of one of the superpowers who used to play a moderating role in  regional 
conflicts.  The  availability  of  huge  stocks  of  arms  (including  ABC  weapons) 
threatens international stability, especially in  the Middle East  and the Maghreb. 
Although the USA  is  still the main Western actor in this area,  Europe and Japan 
will have to increase their contribution to conflict prevention. 
Second,  growing  international  interdependence also  has  a tendency to 
provoke conflicts as a consequence of population growth, poverty and migration 
movements,  and  the  growing  gap  between  North  and  South  with  regard  to 
economic  performance  and  social  conditions.  Conflicts  are  unlikely  to  occur 
between the North and the South as such,  but rather between individual indus-
trialized  and  developing countries or among developing countries.  Apart from 
the well-known disputes concerning access to non-renewable resources such  as 
oil, problems of food security and access to water could lead to serious regional 
conflicts.  Growing  population  and  migration  pressures  are  likely  to  lead  to 
quarrels over  immigration and  the closed-door policies of richer countries.  For 
example, as the European Community consolidates its emerging common immi-
gration policy, tensions with the Maghreb and Eastern  Europe could very well in-
crease.  Furthermore, conflicts over the environment and public health issues such 
as AIDS  and drugs could easily lead to conflicts between northern and southern 
countries. 
26 3.  The strengthening of multilateralism 
The transitional phase in which the post-cold-war world finds itself is thus 
characterized by the disappearance of the clear-cut East-West division and over-
riding  political  antagonism  between  North and  South.  The  contradictions and 
tensions are sharpening between, on the one hand, the tendencies towards the 
globalization of democratic values and free market economies and, on the other 
hand,  the fragmentation generated  by  nationalism, ethnocentricity and  violent 
ideologies. This situation is  in  constant flux and  the main actors are  in  the pro-
cess of repositioning themselves with regard to what they perceive to be the op-
portunities to build a new global security system,  while safeguarding their spe-
cific interests. This requires renewed efforts to meet the long-term challenges of 
sustainable economic and social  development and the medium- and short-term 
threats  to  an  increasingly  interdependent,  and  therefore  highly  vulnerable, 
system  of international relations. 
The  degree  to which  these  existing  highly  interdependent global  econ-
omic,  social  and  environmental  interrelations can  be  effectively controlled  and 
steered  will  depend  upon  the  existence  and  acceptance  of adequate  political 
structures. The combination of traditional bilateralism between nation States and 
limited  multilateral  arrangements  in  some  specific  areas  no  longer provides  a 
stable  framework  in  which  the  world's  main  challenges  can  be  resolved.  The 
long-term solutions regarding the structural North-South integration can only be 
realized through the adaptation of obsolescent political structures to the realities 
of interdependence,  globalization  and  regionalization  of economic,  social  and 
environmental  forces.  This  implies a much  strengthened  multilateralism,  and  a 
fundamental reform of the United Nations. 
4.  The European Community in a new international 
context 
4.1.  The Community at a double crossroads: 
between introspection and international engagement 
During the cold  war,  the Community mainly concentrated on  its internal 
development,  consistent with its  political  origins  in  the  1950s aiming  towards 
building  peace  among the Member States through economic integration.  Early 
on, the Community developed external policies, but these were largely limited to 
trade and development cooperation linked to the colonial heritage of its Member 
States.  In  the  era  of the  East-West  division,  stability  in  Europe  was  assured 
through the existence of the nuclear protection shield of the USA and NATO's de-
fence  policy.  Since  the  early  1970s,  intergovernmental  European  political  co-
operation  has  progressively  become  an  important  mechanism  in  developing 
27 common positions on  international affairs,  however essentially only in  a limited, 
reactive  manner,  and  generally  not  replacing  the  bilateral  foreign  policies  of 
Member  States.  The  Community  has  gradually  become  an  economic  world 
power, but has kept a low profile in the political and security areas. The profound 
changes of recent years are driving the Community towards assuming a more ac-
tive role  in  international affairs,  as  confirmed by the Maastricht Treaty,  whilst at 
the same time risking  renewed inner divisions among Member States on the di-
rection  and  means  of foreign  policy.  As  a  result,  it  is  likely to remain  heavily 
oriented towards its internal and wider regional problems. The two main exter-
nal  challenges that the Community faces  in  the years  ahead are  likely to be the 
promotion and implementation of policies that stabilize and support the proces-
ses  of transformation  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  northern Africa  and  the 
Middle East,  and the assurance that its vital  interests in  the global political and 
economic context are not eroded. 
To  meet both these  challenges,  the Community has  a strong  interest in 
preventing, in the longer term, the Third World becoming more fragmented and 
marginalized  from  the  industrial  North.  Failure  to  integrate  progressively  the 
southern economies into the international economy is  likely to increase tensions 
and  systemic  political  instability,  both  in  the Community's proximity as  well  as 
further away,  generally affecting the northern welfare States.  It is to be expect-
ed that the Community, more than the USA or Japan,  is the actor in the best po-
sition to take the lead in strengthening multilateral cooperation, which is due to 
its historical links to the South, and the unique nature of the Community model 
based on cooperation between States. 
4.2.  Confronting regional instability 
The  dynamic rebirth  of the Community in  the second  part of the  1980s 
occurred in  a still divided continent. The single market goal of 1993, the imple-
mentation of the Single European Act, the goal of economic and monetary union 
(EMU),  in  short  internal  integration  and  deepening  of the  Community,  were 
driven essentially by economic considerations. 
However, the Community entered a drastically different context after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall.  Europe has since evolved from a relatively stable and safe 
place, guaranteed by the threat of mutually assured destruction, into an  increas-
ingly unstable and  highly turbulent continent, confronted with a revival  of na-
tionalism,  ethnic  minority  problems,  civil  war,  fragmentation  and  dismember-
ment of existing States (Yugoslavia,  Czechoslovakia), the creation of new States 
(former Soviet Union successor States), aggressive fundamentalism and threats of 
mass  migration from Eastern  Europe and  northern Africa,  acute environmental 
threats,  including  malfunctioning  nuclear  power  stations,  proliferation  of 
weapons and even  isolated famine.  Problems that had  been  buried for decades 
in  Europe's  past  and  were  mainly associated  with today's Third  World  are  be-
coming facts of life in  Europe  again,  and  have  brought the problems of North-
South integration much closer to home. 
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countries seek to join or strengthen their relationships with the Community, and 
the traditional political and security frameworks find themselves in  a process of 
transformation or have disappeared, the Community is driven by the maelstrom 
of regional political changes and events in  Eastern  Europe, and northern Africa, 
to play an  active role in  reducing the various risks pertaining to adjacent sources 
of instability. 
However, the Community's means to conduct a more coherent common 
foreign and security policy remain limited. The provisions of the Maastricht Treaty 
are  largely based  on  intergovernmentalism, which, generally speaking, only al-
lows reaction to events rather than the formulation of ex ante common policies. 1 
The  difficulties  in  formulating  and  implementing  strong  common  policies  in 
Eastern  Europe  are  demonstrated daily (e.g.  the former Yugoslavia)  and  it will 
take the Community considerable time to grow into its new role of environment-
maker in  the larger European region. 
The  necessity for stronger common policies in  post-cold-war Europe also 
runs  the risk  of being  eroded  by a creeping tendency towards divergence and 
tension  between the Community's main Member States on fundamental objec-
tives.  The sudden absence of a common enemy has,  paradoxically, widened the 
·possibilities  for formulating  bilateral  policies.  Even  Germany  and  France  have 
demonstrated  important differences over such  policy priorities as  NATO  versus 
the WEU  (Western European Union), Eastern  Europe versus northern Africa, and 
enlargement.  A  more assertive  Germany in  foreign and  security affairs will not 
necessarily follow its  privileged  partner,  France,  on  issues  it considers to be  of 
vital  importance.  France  and  the  UK,  both  permanent  members  of the  UN 
Security Council, are likely to continue to conduct strong bilaterally oriented for-
eign  policies.  Italy and  Spain  are  drawn into more active  foreign  policy  in  the 
Balkans,  the  Mediterranean,  and  Latin  America.  The  Netherlands,  Denmark, 
Belgium, Portugal, Greece,  Ireland and Luxembourg all  seek, to varying degrees, 
to keep  a sufficiently large  room  for manoeuvre in  foreign  and  security policy. 
This  is  not to say that these tendencies will prevail  over trends towards deeper 
foreign policy integration, in view of the fact that the Community is seen by most 
Member States as  a necessary platform for a more effective promotion of their 
foreign policies. 
Moreover, even  if these tendencies towards fragmentation and introspec-
tion in  the Community,  described  by  Cohen-Tanugi  as  an  unidentified political 
object,2  continue to frustrate more coherent and assertive common policies to-
wards  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  northern  Africa,  the  pressure  on  the 
Community to promote actively stability in its wider region will remain strong. 
Within the Intergovernmental structure of NATO coherent politico-military doctrine was only possible 
because of the specific security conditions of the cold war and the particular (nuclear) role of the USA. 
Cohen-Tanugi, L, L'Europe en danger,  Paris,  1992 
29 In  any  event,  there  is  a danger that the Community will, probably for a 
considerable period of time, remain insufficiently equipped to engage in external 
bilateral  policies the way its  Member States,  or,  for that matter, Japan  and  the 
USA, do. It is therefore probable that its comparative advantage will, for the time 
being, remain primarily in the multilateral economic-commercial area. As a result 
of its internal structure and experience in  building on and overcoming the diver-
sity of cultures and national interests, it may also have a comparative advantage 
in the context of interregional dialogue and  cooperation. 
4.3.  Promoting better global management of interdependence 
With the end of the cold war, the importance of political and  ideological 
dividing lines in the world has generally declined while that of economic and so-
cial  dividing lines has grown. Since the Community is the largest and most open 
trading bloc in  the world, and since  it does not dispose of the necessary strong 
bilateral  policy tools that nation  States  traditionally  use  in  the pursuit of their 
interests, it has a strong interest in promoting further (deep) integration between 
the triad economies while at the same time strengthening the multilateral dimen-
sion  in  order to facilitate the progressive integration of the Third World into the 
global economy.  But the balance in the coming years  is  not necessarily in  favour 
of multilateralism,  even  though there  is  increasing  economic  interdependence 
between the main trading blocs. 
Economic  interdependence contains a considerable  potential for conflict 
and tension among industrial countries. Growing tensions between the USA, the 
EC  and  Japan  on  economic issues  could  lead  to rising  protectionism,  managed 
trade or even  the emergence of antagonistic trade blocs, of which the main vic-
tims would be  in  the Third World. As  long as  the communist world served  as  a 
common  enemy,  common  political  and  security  considerations  tended  to  be 
stronger than disagreement on economic issues.  Now that the common security 
threat is largely removed, political relations between the three are increasingly fo-
cusing  on  problems  related  to their economic  interdependence.  The  different 
strategies followed by them in the quest for market shares and technological ad-
vantages  could  become  conflictual  in  case  of  persistent  strong  imbalances. 
Relations between the USA and Japan, for example, are already leading to politi-
cal  tensions, which could,  in the longer term, affect the politico-military alliance 
between the two countries,  in  the sense  that Japan  could  be  tempted to pro-
mote a more assertive  and  independent foreign  policy,  especially towards Asia. 
In order to contain the threat of antagonistic trade blocs, the Community should 
use  its  experience  and  potential  economic  leverage  to strengthen  multilateral 
disciplines and  institutions. 
The institutional framework and the mechanisms of economic regulations 
devised  by the North are  neither adapted to the new forms of global economic 
interdependence, nor to the need to integrate southern countries in the interna-
tional  economy.  Consequently,  global  economic  interdependence  leads  to the 
30 increasing marginalization, if not exclusion of, many Third World countries from 
the  benefits  of the  globalization  of (financial  and  commercial)  markets  and 
threatens in  the long term the viability of North-South economic relations and, 
therefore,  global  economic  security.  To  facilitate  their  integration,  the 
Community should  promote substantial  reforms  in  the management of global 
interdependence assuring, in particular, adequate representation of the divergent 
interests. 
A strengthening of the multilateral dimension is also  necessary to ensure 
adequate sharing  of the financial,  commercial  and  political  burdens which the 
North  needs  to  shoulder  vis-a-vis  the  South.  The  regions  surrounding  the 
Community are arguably both politically less stable and economically less dynam-
ic than the regions bordering on the USA and Japan. If Europe were left alone to 
ensure stability in  its region, this could affect its own well-being and  its interna-
tional competitiveness to a disproportionate extent. 
On  the other hand,  multilateralism  is  a better guarantee of an  adequate 
presence  of the  politically weak  Community in  economically  dynamic  regions 
outside her geographical proximity,  such  as  South-East Asia,  as  compared with 
exclusive reliance on bilateral strength. 
31 II.  The experience 
of North-South relations: 
lessons from the past 
This  chapter builds on  the experience of North-South  relations summar-
ized  in  Annex  1.  It  attempts to  identify shortcomings  and  positive  messages 
resulting  from  the  evolution  of  development  thinking,  domestic  policies  of 
developing countries, development cooperation and the operation of the inter-
national economic system  dominated by the North. It seems  important to try to 
understand this experience in  order to get a grasp on the future. 
1.  Development thinking: a painful learning process 
Looking  back at the evolution of development thinking, one  is  struck by 
the manner in  which theories and strategies have  moved  in  and  out of fashion 
in  a seemingly circular movement and  by the current absence of innovatory ap-
proaches. Modernization theories focusing on rapid industrialization and growth 
imitating Western models were popular in the 1960s, put aside in the 1970s and 
re-emerged in the 1980s under the cover of structural adjustment. Reformist re-
sponses  focusing  on  employment,  redistribution  with growth and  basic  needs 
were promoted in the 1970s, fell victim to the debt crisis and Reaganomics in the 
1980s  and  reappear  now  in  reports  concentrating  on  strategies  centred  on 
people. Structuralist theories which had  explained underdevelopment by exoge-
nous factors and  promoted autonomous strategies such  as  lSI  (import substitu-
tion  industrialization) as  well  as  radical  global  reforms  such  as  the  NIEO  (new 
international economic order) seem  to have  lost their appeal  in  the face of the 
successes  of the newly industrialized countries (NICs)  and the collapse of com-
munism. However, the environment/development debate has revealed that struc-
turalist  approaches  in  favour  of radical  departures  from  the  liberal-capitalist 
paradigm still  have some appeal. 
On  the other hand,  there has  also  been  a considerable  learning  process 
and  a rapprochement of basic  positions.  Neo-liberals today tend to accept the 
existence of social and environmental costs in industrialization and structural ad-
justment processes and  recognize an  important role for the State and for multi-
lateral cooperation to correct market failures.  Reformists today tend to recognize 
the importance of functioning markets and trade liberalization for development. 
Most analysts  now recognize  that the  causes  of underdevelopment are 
neither just home-made nor exclusively attributable to the international system, 
but must be  found  in  a combination of endogenous and  exogenous elements. 
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strategies must be multidimensional and adjusted to the particular situation of a 
country. All this has at least facilitated a dialogue beyond ideological boundaries 
based  on the analysis of socioeconomic realities and country-specific interests. It 
has  led  to what may be  called  a new orthodoxy of development thinking inte-
grating the economic,  social,  environmental and  good  governance dimensions 
into comprehensive concepts, such  as sustainable human development. 
There  is  nevertheless a perception of crisis  in  development thinking or at 
least among development thinkers which can  only be  explained  in  part by  the 
fact that the long-standing bitter controversies between modernizers,  reformers 
and structuralists have come of age.  It relates to the experience that reality has 
kept neither the promise of rapid growth through industrialization, except in very 
few cases,  nor the hope that basic needs can  easily be satisfied through redistri-
bution  strategies  nor  indeed  the  aspiration  for  autonomous  development 
through selfreliance.  As  analysts increasingly recognize that the world is charac-
terized by the seemingly immutable and mutually reinforcing trends of economic 
globalization, social marginalization and environmental degradation, many share 
a feeling of impotence. Many seem to have come to the conclusion that solving 
the  problem  of underdevelopment  is  primarily a  matter of governmental  and 
nongovernmental actors assuming  responsibility with respect to the formulation 
and  implementation of coherent strategies at the different levels.  If so,  the per-
ceived  crisis  is  not so  much  one  of development thinking  but of translating 
concepts into action, i.e.  of the way in  which political systems work. 
2.  Domestic policies of developing countries: 
the importance of strategic choices 
The determining factors which have led to the widely divergent evolution 
of the economies of developing countries must be sought in the fashion that the 
domestic policies of developing countries have been adjusted to local conditions 
and tailored to respond to their situation in the global economy and the geopo-
litical  arena.  In  the past,  governments of developing countries  have  tended to 
seek  the causes  of their poor performance in  unfavourable external conditions. 
Today,  the catchwords of self-reliance favoured  by the South and good govern-
ance favoured by the North contain the same  message,  namely that developing 
countries must assume more responsibility for their own development. 
Searching for a uniform development strategy for all  regions of the world 
is  futile.  Abstract  blueprints,  however  refined,  have  never  worked.  Strategies 
must build  on  the cultural  heritage and  dynamic forces  of individual  societies. 
Similarly, it is dangerous to focus exclusively on one segment of society or on one 
policy area.  Simplistic recipes  for progress only breed  new distortions and  rigid-
ities.  However, past experience teaches us that development strategies should be 
guided  by  three  principles.  They  should  be  centred  on  people,  satisfying  their 
basic needs and enlarging the range of their choices. They should adopt coherent 
34 economic policies  promoting macroeconomic stability and  improving the com-
petitive environment for business through market-friendly policies.  They should 
concentrate on good governance through accountable political institutions, effi-
cient administrations and budgets reflecting consistent development policy prior-
ities. 
2.1.  Investment in human resources 
Experience,  in  particular in  Asia, tells us that the reduction of poverty, the 
management of demographic transition and  long-term development strategies 
require  in  the  first  instance  adequate  and  effective  investment  in  human  re-
sources.  Limited budgetary means should therefore be targeted towards primary 
education, basic health care and the provision of safe water. They should also be 
targeted to effective population policies calling, in  particular, for an expansion of 
female  education,  the reduction  of infant mortality rates  and  an  extension  of 
family planning services. 
People-centred  development  further  requires  strategies  to  increase  the 
economic participation rate of the poorest segments of the population.1 This has 
implications first of all for rural development policies in terms of promoting small-
scale  labour-intensive agricultural activities and better access to land ownership, 
credit and domestic markets. The priority given  in  many developing countries to 
industrial and urban development and large-scale export-oriented agriculture has 
impoverished rural areas and led to massive migrations to the cities, which have 
only a limited capacity to absorb  labour in  formal  employment. The  spread  of 
urban  slums  and  an  informal  sector  of labour-intensive  activities  caught  in  a 
vicious circle of low productivity, low income and low investment in turn calls for 
the improvement of access  to basic services,  credit for small-scale  business  and 
legal  protection.  The  informal sector  accounts for some  50%  of all  economic 
activity in  Latin  America  alone and,  according  to some  researchers,  is  growing 
into  an  increasingly  important engine  for economic  growth,  especially  where 
economic overregulation stifles entrepreneurial enterprise at the micro-level.2 
2.2.  Coherent economic policies 
In  economic terms,  governments which  have  been  most successful  have 
stabilized  the macroeconomic foundation of their economies,  keeping,  in  par-
ticular, fiscal  deficits manageable and  inflation under control, and have adopted 
market-friendly approaches, improving the climate for business and diversifying 
their economic base. 3  In  some  of the most successful  countries transformation 
See,  in  particular, Dutch Government report, 'A world of difference - A new framework for development 
cooperation  1n  the 1990s', The  Hague,  1991, pp.  159 et seq. 
de Soto,  Hernando. El otro sendero, Lima,  1986. 
For a comprehensive analysis of the paths towards econom1c development see,  in  particular, 
the World Bank World development report,  1991, 'The challenge of development'. 
35 processes  have  been  supported by targeted industrial and trade policies on the 
basis of strategic political choices.  However,  in  general,  governments should re-
frain from intervening in areas where markets work and promote competition as 
the most effective means of stimulating an efficient use of resources,  innovation 
and investment. Governments need to concentrate their activities on those areas 
where markets alone cannot be relied upon: the provision of basic services, edu-
cation  and  training,  adequate  infrastructures,  the promotion of indigenous re-
search  and the protection of the natural environment. 
In  order to benefit from globalization, countries should open progressive-
ly  domestic economies to international trade and  investment.  This  is  not to say 
that free trade is or has been the magical solution to development problems. The 
experience of the newly industrialized economies has shown that a certain  level 
of protection of the agricultural sector may  be  necessary to keep  rural  popula-
tions on  the soil  and  guarantee a reasonable  level  of self-sufficiency (see  box). 
Also,  a carefully adjusted degree of protection in  favour of infant industries dur-
ing a limited period may be necessary to manage the transitional phase of indus-
trialization.  However,  the failure of badly managed  import substitution  policies 
has  shown that protracted protectionism  leads  to exclusion  from technological 
progress and  economic marginalization.  Participation  in  economic and  techno-
logical progress requires participation in  international competition. The  interme-
diate step of regional integration, which could have served to strengthen the do-
mestic economic base in order to be better equipped for global competition and 
at the same time reduced the dependence on  North-South trade,  has  not been 
seriously tried by developing countries in the past but would seem to offer good 
potential, in  particular if built around growth poles. 
It also  needs to be  stressed  that specific strategies which have worked in 
one context cannot simply be transposed into another. The success of the 'Asian 
tigers' took place against a particular historical, regional and  sociocultural back-
ground.  The  local  conditions and  the external  environment that allowed these 
countries' economies to take off are  not easily  reproduced.  For  example,  Latin 
American countries with a long tradition of workers' rights would find it difficult 
to adopt, without serious social  upheaval and a weakening of democratic insti-
tutions, the working practices and social conditions that were the lot of the new 
Asian economies. They therefore have greater difficulty becoming international-
ly competitive in  the manufacture of products requiring a high  intensity of un-
skilled labour. In products with greater value-added requiring more skilled labour, 
access to the requisite technology requires the development of professional skills 
and institutional capacities through strong educational, technological and secto-
ral  policies that most of these countries lack. 1 As a result of economic adjustment 
policies,  some  developing countries will embark on the first stage of export-led 
growth, but very few will be able to move on to the second stage without large-
scale  reforms affecting the structure of the State and society as a whole. 
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See  Bustelo Gomez,  Pablo.  'Economfa  polft1ca  de los nuevos pafses industnales as1at1cos', 
Siglo  Veintiuno de Espana,  Madnd,  1990. Agricultural policies 
In all, 60% of the developing world's population rely on agriculture for their living.1 
However, the agricultural sector has fallen victim either to neglect or deliberate dis-
crimination in the development strategies of developing countries which have often 
contained an industrial and urban bias. Where governments introduced agricultural 
policies, it was usually in support of monoculturalists producing export crops which 
yielded,  in the short term, higher export income,  but made farmers and  govern-
ments dependent on  unstable world prices  and  led  to the displacement of food 
crops onto more marginal land. It has been estimated that the negative effects of 
developing countries' policies pursued  in  other sectors  of the economy or at the 
macro-level represented on average a 27% tax on agriculture.2 
The  resulting loss of competitiveness and decline of the agricultural sector,  in the 
context of high population growth, resulted in urban migration and so further in-
creased  urban population pressures.  Low-cost food thus became a political priority 
at a time when the North was becoming an  area  of structural overproduction and 
swamping the world markets with subsidized exports. As competition between the 
agricultural powers (not just in the North) intensified, the real  price of imported 
food for developing countries decreased, undercutting domestic production. 
In the longer term, the effect of importing this subsidized food has  been to alter 
consumer tastes causing a shift in the pattern of demand away from traditional basic 
staples towards other cereals, and especially towards animal products. The net result 
has been a rising import dependence which, when combined with low levels of in-
come  and  'entitlements', has  led to food security problems which are likely to be-
come more acute in the future, despite sufficient production to feed the world pop-
ulation. Developing countries' dependence on food imports is likely to increase, with 
the Organization for Economic  Cooperation  and  Development (OECD)  estimating 
that the import bill will increase  by  143%  for North Africa  and the Middle East, 
293%  in Latin America and 350% for sub-Saharan Africa.3 
The net result for the peasant farmers of the developing world has been one of de-
cline.  Reductions  in  fallow periods  leading to declining  soil  fertility and  erosion 
occur as  farmers try to safeguard their domestic food supplies and  produce more 
food for the market to increase their incomes.  Hence  a vicious  circle  develops  in 
which population pressure makes traditional production techniques environmentally 
and economically unsustainable. Given the challenge of providing adequate employ-
ment for the growing active population in the developing world, the continued ne-
glect of agriculture will cause considerable economic dislocation and continued en-
vironmental degradation. In sum, without a revitalization of the agricultural sector 
in developing countries, their economies will stagger under the burden of feeding 
and employing their growing number of people. 
The number is projected to fall to just over 50% by 2000 and regional differences are strong. 
For example,  in Latin America the agricultural sector employed under 30% of the population as 
compared with over 70% in Africa in  1985. Alexandratos,  N.  '1988 world agriculture: 
Towards 2000', An FAO study. 
Brown, Martin and Goldin, lan. 'The future of agriculture: Developing country implications', 
OECD  Development Centre,  1992, p.  115. 
Ibidem p.  97. 
37 2.3.  Good governance 
With respect to the governance dimension, we may distinguish between 
constitutional, administrative and budgetary aspects.  Human development obvi-
ously requires  respect for universally recognized  basic  human  rights and funda-
mental liberties (in  particular, those of expression, association and movement) as 
well as equality before the law. However, past experience does not provide a con-
clusive  answer to the question of the relationship between democratic govern-
ment and  economic development.  It can  neither be  generally maintained that 
democracy is  a necessary  precondition for economic development nor that it is 
an obstacle to it. In Asia, most regimes steering the industrialization process were 
authoritarian.  In  Africa,  authoritarian  leadership  tended  to  resist  necessary 
change and breed corruption. Latin America suffered from military dictatorships, 
corrupt elites  and  populist regimes.  The  current transition  problems  in  Eastern 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) also show that the 
parallel processes of democratization and economic liberalization are  not neces-
sarily  mutually supportive.  Western  models of democracy cannot simply be  ex-
ported at all stages and imposed on different cultural and social settings. Strong 
central leadership may be necessary for the management of difficult adjustment 
and  transition processes,  but socioeconomic development also  requires  increas-
ing levels of political participation and involvement of all groups of society in the 
decision-making process.  Such  participation requires essentially: 
(a)  access to information concerning decisions to be taken; 
(b)  transparency and reliability in  the decision-making process; 
(c)  opportunity for all groups of a society to express their views and influence 
the decision-making process; 
(d)  the ability to hold the decision-maker accountable. 
In  sum,  political (as well as  economic) participation is  in  principle suppor-
tive  of development.  However,  imposing  Western-style  political  pluralism,  irre-
spective of the cultural traditions and  historical evolution of particular societies, 
is  potentially counterproductive. 
There  is  a more obvious positive correlation  between economic develop-
ment and  'good governance'  in  the narrower sense  of adequate  government 
institutions,  legal  frameworks  and  administrative  capacities. 1  The  role  of 
governments in  providing public goods, establishing rules to make markets work 
effectively and  correcting  market failures  tends to be  even  more  important in 
developing  countries  than  in  developed  countries.  The  symptoms  of  poor 
governance are excessive regulation, misallocation of resources and arbitrariness 
For a detailed analysis of these questions, see the World Bank paper 'Managing development: 
The  governance dimension',  1991. 
38 in  the  application  of laws.  Reforms  of public-sector  management tend  to be 
complex and  slow,  involving  both the parastatal  sector (often calling  for large-
scale privatization) and the civil service (often lacking transparency,  predictability 
and accountability). Technical  assistance  in this area  can  produce lasting positive 
effects provided cultural differences are adequately respected. 
Finally,  a number of recent  major studies have  provided a clearer under-
standing  of the correlation  between  financial  resource  management and  eco-
nomic development.  In  particular, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP)  Human  development  report  1991,  contains  a detailed  analysis  of the 
public spending of developing countries and relates this to an  index merging in-
come with life expectancy and literacy to serve as a measurement for human de-
velopment. It finds that nearly USD  50  billion a year- about 2% of the GNP of 
the developing countries- could be released for more productive purposes. This 
could come mostly from freezing or reducing military expenditure absorbing 5% 
of the GNP of the developing world, halting capital flight, combating corruption, 
reforming public enterprises and reducing internal policing. Moreover, the UNDP 
report gives detailed evidence of the correlation between social  expenditure to-
wards human priority concerns (basic education, primary health care,  safe drink-
ing  water,  family planning  and  nutrition programmes) and  progress  in  human 
development suggesting the need  for considerable reallocations of expenditure 
in  many countries. 1 
3.  Development cooperation: a sense of failure and a 
shift in conditionality 
3.1.  Efficiency of traditional development aid 
In the face of 40 years of development cooperation, many commentators 
express a sense of failure. Most continue to support its necessity even if they criti-
cize that development aid  has not been  sufficiently targeted to the reduction of 
poverty.2 Indeed, development cooperation extending beyond aid remains a cru-
cial  concept and  assistance  has  had  beneficial  effects in  many cases.  However, 
cooperation and assistance do not seem to have had a dominating influence on 
the economic and social evolution of most developing countries, not even those 
which managed to leapfrog into industrialization. Bilateral assistance can even be 
said  to have  had  detrimental effects to the extent that it was designed to meet 
According to the UNDP report, a sounder basis for the reallocation of social expenditure could 
be established through monitoring of the public expenditure ratio (public expenditure as  part of national 
income), the soc1al  allocation rat1o (percentage of public expenditure earmarked for social  services),  the 
soc1al  pnonty rat1o (percentage of social expenditure earmarked for social  priority concerns) and the human 
expenditure ratio (percentage of nat1onal  mcome earmarked for human priority concerns). 
The report concludes that the human expenditure ratio needs to be at least 5% if a country wishes to do 
well on  human development 
See,  1n  particular,  R.  Cassen  & Associates,  Does aid work?,  1986. 
39 the  short-term  or  strategic  political,  security  or  economic  interests  of  donor 
countries, that it was not adapted to the socioeconomic and cultural conditions 
in  the recipient countries and that it stabilized inefficient, if not corrupt, political 
structures.  Moreover,  the  lack  of coordination  among  donors  often  pursuing 
conflicting goals has hampered the elaboration and implementation of coherent 
development strategies by recipient countries. 
There  is,  in  particular,  a growing scepticism  about the efficiency of tradi-
tional  forms  of project  aid  channelled  through  the  governments  of recipient 
countries. This  lack of efficiency is,  on the one hand, due to the duality and  ri-
gidity  of economic,  social,  administrative  and  political  structures  in  recipient 
countries,  which often lack the capacity to absorb the aid  received  and  ensure 
that it translates  into a  lasting  amelioration  of their capacity to develop.  The 
'trickle-down effect' of investments through programmes and  projects has gen-
erally only occurred in environments where the basic conditions necessary for an 
economy to flourish  were  assured  through  coherent  macroeconomic,  sectoral 
and social policies. In countries lacking the political will and administrative capac-
ity  to elaborate  and  implement sound  development strategies,  the  impact of 
outside  assistance  tends  to  be  lost  and  unfortunate  side-effects  in  terms  of 
dislocation, wastage and creaming-off may occur. 
Inefficiencies of development aid are, on the other hand, due to a lack of 
responsible behaviour on  the part of donors.  In  particular,  bilateral assistance  is 
still given largely in the form of tied aid, which according to recent studies reduc-
es  its efficiency by more than  15% of the aid  provided. 1 An  insufficient propor-
tion of aid  is  targeted  to social  priority areas,  while for some  countries  it has 
essentially  been  an  instrument of foreign  policy and  mainly taken the form of 
military aid. While the aid  provided by multilateral institutions tends to be  more 
targeted to the poorest countries, it has  not always been sufficiently adapted to 
local needs. The administration of project assistance by donors often still lacks a 
proper selection  and  follow-through process.  Also,  developed  countries all  too 
often take away with one hand what they have given with the other, as  can  be 
demonstrated by examples of market access  restrictions affecting the export of 
products from factories and farms financed by the country imposing the restric-
tions. Moreover, as  long as the East-West conflict endured, donor countries saw 
little  interest  in  challenging  elites  in  countries  belonging  to  their  respective 
spheres of influence, irrespective of the extent of their corruption. 
Within the wide network of Community cooperation  policies,  the Lome 
system  stands out not merely because  historically it is  the most extensive coop-
erative  relationship  ever  established  between  developed  and  developing coun-
tries,  but also  because  of its  innovative approach  based  upon a collective  and 
multidimensional policy dialogue and a pioneering mechanism for the stabiliza-
tion of export revenues.  However, due to a lack of flexibility, the system  has  not 
always  provided  enough  incentives  for positive  efforts by  Lome  countries and 
See World Bank,  'Global econom1c prospects and develop1ng countnes', 1993, p.  7. 
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stabilize  corrupt  political  leaderships.  The  hesitation  of applying  political  and 
economic conditionalities to relationships with countries having only recently ac-
quired independence was understandable and contrasted positively with the po-
litical interference strategies of the rivalling superpowers.  However,  it had to be 
recognized  that unconditional  assistance  did  not help  developing  countries to 
become  fully accountable for their policies,  allowed  economic  dependence to 
continue under the guise of a convenient safety net and caused  many countries 
to become addicted to aid.  As  a result,  much more emphasis is  put not only on 
economic  and  technical,  but  also  on  political  conditions  under  present 
Community policies. 
The  importance of non-governmental  organizations (NGOs)  in  develop-
ment cooperation has strongly increased during the last decades,  both in  terms 
of intensity and finance. NGOs are often particularly effective because they more 
easily adapt to the local, social  and cultural conditions that are  necessary to im-
plement projects  successfully,  and  because  their projects  are  often small,  con-
crete, precise, and limited in time. However, NGOs can  only be successful  if they 
operate  in  a  general  framework of sound  macro- and  mesoeconomic  policy, 
which  remains  the  responsibility  of governments.  Outside  such  a framework, 
NGOs run the risk of creating no more than limited islands of temporary relief. A 
sound  understanding  of the distribution of tasks  between  NGOs  and  govern-
ments, each  respecting each other's autonomy- which often is  not the case- is 
therefore essential.  Too  much  reliance  on  NGOs  can  have  two other negative 
effects: undermining the national and regional policies of central administrations, 
which are already relatively weak in many southern countries, and reinforcing the 
brain drain from the government to the private sector, in which the NGOs occupy 
an  important place 
In  general,  experience  has  shown that developing  countries who make 
credible  efforts to apply  good  governance  and  sound  economic  policies  may 
benefit from external support for investments which would not otherwise take 
place  and  have  better access  to the international  capital  market.  In  countries 
lacking both good governance and sound economic policies, externally financed 
investments are unlikely to lead to lasting economic development. In these coun-
tries, assistance must concentrate on the satisfaction of basic needs and relief. 
3.2.  Structural adjustment 
Under the guidance of the Bretton Woods institutions, priority has  been 
given to the allocation of available resources to programmes of recipient coun-
tries designed to reform their economic policies. The shift in  focus to structural 
adjustment, technical assistance programmes for training in  public- and  private-
sector management and institution-building points in  this direction. 
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eral institutions have tended to focus more on correcting external and budgetary 
balances  than on  growth (postponed to the second  stage of structural  adjust-
ment) and the special circumstances of the countries concerned. 
The  theoretical  models on  which these  programmes were  based  initially 
were static taking no account of the effects of budgetary and monetary variables 
on  the  level  of activity and  on  the  informal sector,  or of developments  in  the 
international economic environment that call  for a capacity for adjustment and 
responses from economic and political operators and that in  no way correspond 
to the real  situation of the poorest developing countries. 1 
Structural  adjustment  programmes  have  been  particularly  successful  (in 
terms of balance of payments and  export growth) in  countries with adequate 
levels of human capital, physical and social infrastructure and performing institu-
tions (mostly in  Asia  and some Latin America countries), while they have gener-
ally failed in countries facing serious structural problems (in  particular, Africa). 
Moreover,  in  a considerable  number of cases,  structural adjustment pro-
grammes of the past decade have  had  serious negative social  and  environmen-
tal effects and have led to sharp drops in investment, jeopardizing future growth. 
However,  the IMF  and,  in  particular, the World Bank are  becoming more sensi-
tive to such  criticism  and  we now see  the emergence of a new generation of 
structural adjustment programmes that draw on the lessons of past failures. 
In  any case,  adjustment lending should be  linked to changes in the inter-
national environment and the special  circumstances of the countries concerned. 
As  demonstrated  by  the  role  played  by  the  lnteramerican  Development  Bank 
since 1985, a greater role for regional organizations and institutions in the fram-
ing of such  programmes is  helpful from this point of view and also to encourage 
more coordination between adjusting countries in the same  region. 
On  the same  lines, the timetable for the adoption of measures should be 
better tailored to the situation of the country in question and, in particular, trade 
liberalization and  price  liberalization  implemented gradually so  that supply can 
adjust and  producers gear  up  to face  competition.  In  the final  analysis,  adjust-
ment cannot be the result of a narrowly defined blueprint, but only of a compre-
hensive  reform  process  which  takes  time  and  depends  on  the  capacity  of a 
country to design  and  implement reforms  with the fullest  participation of the 
members of its society. 
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The  usual  model is of the Mundeii-Fieming type, which is  essentially a monetary approach to the balance 
of payments backed up wtth a Polack-type of absorption approach. What these approaches have  in 
common  ts  that they potnt the finger at monetary financtng of the budget deficit as the principal cause of 
the external imbalance and leave out of the picture the role of the international environment (openness of 
markets, trends in  the terms of trade, world growth, interest rates,  etc.). 3.3.  Key points 
In  sum,  past experience would favour an  intensified policy dialogue with 
developing countries focusing on  the conditions of good governance,  more ef-
fective  donor coordination and  concentration of economic assistance  on  coun-
tries demonstrating a will and capacity to pursue credible economic, social  and 
environmental policies.  Concessional aid should be concentrated on the poorest 
countries and targeted to people-centred development: education, training, san-
itary conditions, food security,  family planning and the preservation of the envi-
ronment. The procedures for implementing aid should be tailored to a participa-
tory development model with an  emphasis on decentralization and involvement 
of the people concerned. 
4.  The international economic system in the 
quest for regulatory coherence 
The external factors that have most influenced the evolution of the devel-
oping  countries  are  the  political  strategies  employed  by  the two superpowers 
and their allies to gain and maintain influence and the trade and macroeconomic 
policies of the industrialized countries and OPEC coupled with the functioning of 
an  increasingly globalized economy. 
This globalization of the world economy, which gained momentum in the 
1970s and  1980s,  developed spontaneously in  a climate of growing deregula-
tion.  Its  main  effects were of little benefit to most developing countries.  In  its 
third  report on  human  development, the  UNDP  estimates that dysfunctions in 
the structure of global markets (including labour mobility) are causing the devel-
oping countries to lose about USD 500 billion a year,  i.e.  10 times the amount of 
development aid that the industrialized countries grant them each  year. 1 
The so-called North-South dialogue has produced few tangible results be-
cause it was largely conducted on the basis of ideological North-South confron-
tations, countries being  locked into rigid group structures (such  as the Group of 
77  representing  developing countries except China,  and  Group B,  representing 
OECD countries) which did not reflect the diversity of substantive interests. In this 
confrontational atmosphere,  it was  extremely difficult to bridge gaps,  build  up 
majorities of moderates from both sides and come to reasonable and  meaning-
ful conclusions. 
See the UNDP  'Human development report,  1992' p.  6. 
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(a) GATT and the Uruguay Round 
The  multilateral trading system  has  been  relatively successful  in  bringing 
down tariffs and other trade restrictions and preventing trade wars. In the 1980s, 
the value  of merchandise  trade  grew by  4.8% per  year.  However,  developing 
countries exports grew by only 1.6% and their share  in world trade, which had 
risen from 17.9% in  1970 to 28% in  1980, fell back to 21% in  1990, due in part 
to the evolution of the oil price. 1 Moreover, the major portion of trade expansion 
of developing countries  remained  with very  few countries.  Generally speaking, 
there have  been  too many loopholes in  the multilateral trading system  to allow 
developing countries to benefit fully from comparative advantages and the inter-
national division of labour, even though some countries (i.e.  the NICs)  managed 
to profit from the system  as  a consequence of carefully planned policies favour-
ing export-led growth. 
GATI disciplines  applied  essentially  only  among  Western  industrialized 
countries.  Under the shield of special and differential treatment and exemptions 
for balance-of-payments restrictions,  most developing countries remained large-
ly outside international competition.  In  recent years,  many of them have,  how-
ever,  opened their economies unilaterally in  the framework of structural adjust-
ment policies. On the other hand, the GATI did not prevent developed countries 
from heavily protecting their economies against exports from developing coun-
tries. Agriculture and textiles remained essentially excluded from GATI disciplines 
allowing protectionist and distortive market interventions to the disadvantage of 
developing countries. In other areas,  new forms of non-tariff trade barriers (such 
as voluntary export restraints), tariff escalation and anti-dumping measures pre-
vented  developing  countries  from  benefiting  from  comparative  advantages.  It 
has  been  estimated  that developing  countries suffer annual  losses  of USD  75 
billion from trade restrictions.2 
The  Uruguay Round  negotiations have attempted to address these short-
comings,  extend  multilateral disciplines to new areas  (such  as  the protection of 
intellectual  property rights and  the liberalization of trade in  services)  of impor-
tance not only to industrialized countries but also for the integration of develop-
ing  countries  into the  world  economy and  tighten  the  legal  and  institutional 
regime.  However, even  a positive outcome of the Round will leave foreign trade 
regimes widely disparate because market access  remains largely the result of bi-
laterally negotiated concessions  rather than  objective criteria.  These  disparities 
can  produce  serious  economic  and  ecological  imbalances.3  Moreover,  the ab-
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GATI, International trade  1989-90; Unctad, Trade and development report,  1991, 
World Bank World development report,  1991. 
Human development report,  1992, p.  6. 
A case  1n  pomt 1s  the combined effect of low Commun1ty tanff bmdmgs for mamoc (6%) and soya  meal 
(zero) and  h1gh  dut1es on feed grams and cereals,  see von Verschuer,  H. 
The  future world econom1c order,  1991 . sence  of binding international competition rules  leaves  markets which are  out-
side  the  jurisdiction  of  northern  competition  authorities  largely  unprotected 
against international cartels or abuses of companies having a dominant position 
of market power. 
Developing countries are  generally expected to gain from a strengthened 
and extended multilateral trading system.  Universally applicable and enforceable 
rules counterbalancing protectionist forces,  unilateral discriminatory actions and 
bilateral  deals tend to work to the advantage of smaller countries and  weaker 
economies otherwise exposed to the law of the jungle. Asian and Latin American 
countries  are  likely to reap  important benefits from  trade  liberalization,  while 
poor African  countries  may  suffer  in  the short term  from  the erosion  of their 
preferential margins. 1 
The  Uruguay Round  process  also  saw for the first time a more active  in-
volvement of many developing countries in trade negotiations and the formation 
of subject-specific coalitions of interest across  traditional  North-South  dividing 
lines,  such  as  the  Cairns  Group  of non-subsidizing  exporters  of agricultural 
products. 
(b) Terms of trade of developing countries 
In  the  last  decade,  most developing  countries saw  their terms  of trade 
worsen considerably.  If 100 is taken as an  index of the terms of trade of the de-
veloping world in  1979, this index had fallen below 70 by 1990. This trend may 
be ascribed mainly to declining commodity prices (including oil) and most devel-
oping countries' failure to diversify their export base; it is as much a consequence 
of local factors as of the industrialized countries' commercial policies towards the 
developing world. 
The evolution of the relative prices of exports and imports largely depends 
on  the  characteristics  of the  goods  concerned  (e.g.  elastic/inelastic,  inferior 
superior, etc.). For products for which demand is relatively inelastic (tropical prod-
ucts and  most raw materials), and for which world demand is constantly shrink-
ing in the face of substitutes, systems for stabilizing export earnings and  prefer-
ences  granted  by  the  industrialized  countries  to certain  developing  countries 
have  had  conflicting results.  While these instruments have  attenuated the bud-
getary and  balance-of-payments tensions caused  by worsening terms of trade, 
they have also done much to encourage an  overproduction that entrenches the 
erosion of world prices for the products concerned. 
Faced  by  the  pressing  need  to obtain  foreign  exchange  rapidly  (first to 
cover imports and investments and then to repay the debt), the countries on the 
receiving  end  of these  instruments  have  neglected  export  diversification  and 
For a detailed study,  see  Goldmg, J.  and van  der Meersbrugge, D.  'Trade liberalization: What's at stake?', 
OECD  Development Centre policy brief,  1992. The authors estimate 1ncome gain from a 30% trade 
l1beralizat1on of between +2.6% for ASEAN and- 0.2% for sub-Saharan Africa, p.  25. 
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that their competitors were doing the same  and  overlooking the inelasticity of 
demand for these products.1 The inevitable consequences of this behaviour have 
been  falling prices,  the paralysis of export diversification efforts, a worsening of 
the terms of trade of the developing countries concerned, a contraction in  their 
export earnings, the failure of the systems for stabilizing export earnings, and an 
increase  in  the debt problem.  The  financial  resources  currently devoted  to the 
stabilization of export earnings might arguably be better employed as direct sup-
port for the balances of payments of the countries concerned  and  for projects 
aimed at diversifying their export base. 
The  impossibility  of implementing  and  financing  buffer stocks  and  the 
conflicting interests of the different producers have led to the failure and aban-
donment of most multilateral commodity agreements aimed at stabilizing prices 
by controlling supply. 
In the case  of products for which demand is  more elastic,2 the main  rea-
sons  for the failure of the systems  of preferences  granted by  the industrialized 
world must be  sought in  the reduced  margins of such  preferences  and  in  the 
commercial and fiscal  policies implemented by certain developing countries. 
For instance,  in  many developing countries (and this is  particularly true in 
the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific States),  export taxes are a major source 
of budget revenue,  neutralizing the preferences granted, reducing the competi-
tiveness  of national  producers  and  discouraging  investment.  Several  countries 
which benefit from free access to the Community market for most or all of their 
industrial products refuse to accept that trade concessions should be granted to 
other developing countries,  fearing the erosion  of a margin of preference they 
scarcely use. 
In sum, past experience suggests that diversification and export promotion 
are of greater long-term benefit than the granting of preferential margins which 
are,  in  any event, progressively eroded. 
4.2.  Monetary and financial systems 
During the 1980s, the international flow of credit and investment towards 
the developing countries was  negatively affected  by  their worsening  economic 
and political situation (implying a growing political and financial risk  particularly 
for commercial creditor banks and for private multinational corporations), as well 
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The  income elast1c1ty and price elast1c1ty of most raw matenals and tropical products are generally low, 
which means that a reduction 1n  the price of these products or an  increase  1n  the consumers' earnings leads 
to a relatively small mcrease  in  demand that cannot compensate the producers for the loss of earnings 
resulting from the fall  in  prices 
That is  products for wh1ch  a fall  in  pnces or an  mcrease  in  consumers' incomes IS  reflected by a more than 
commensurate increase in  demand and therefore by an  mcrease  1n  producers' earnings, for example most 
industnal products and some top-of-the-range agricultural products. as  by the eruption of the debt crisis  (particularly as  regards  Latin  America  and 
sub-Saharan  African countries).  As  a consequence,  investment lending became 
more prudential, selective and concentrated in those developing countries (such 
as  some  fast-growing  economies  in  South-East  Asia)  showing  more  promising 
growth prospects and offering more interesting profit opportunities. These inter-
connected  phenomena  accelerated  the  progressive  marginalization  of  many 
heavily indebted low- and middle-income countries which not only were cut off 
from the international capital market but experienced declining foreign direct in-
vestment as  well  as  considerable capital  flight.  Further analysis  suggests,  how-
ever,  that the marginalization of many developing countries in the international 
movement of capital  also  results  from  the operation  of the machinery for the 
international allocation of world savings and, ultimately, the monetary and finan-
cial  system. 
(a) International allocation of world savings 
The  dearth of funds for financing economic growth in  developing coun-
tries can  in theory be attributed to a lack of international savings or to a dysfunc-
tion in the way in which such savings are internationally allocated. Although the 
propensity to save  has diminished in  recent years  in  several  industrialized coun-
tries,  it would be  difficult to ascribe the current rationing of productive invest-
ment essentially to a shortage of international savings.  In  1992, world savings 
amounted to 21.5% of GDP,  which is  roughly equal to previous periods (except 
for an  average of 25%>  during the 1976-80 period),  and  reflects a sharp  reduc-
tion in the USA,  a slight decline in the EC  and a considerable increase in Japan. 1 
However, this body of savings  is  no longer invested in the same way. 
The  globalization  of the  international  financial  system  in  the  last  two 
decades was first reflected in a greater integration of the industrialized countries' 
financial markets and of these financial markets and 'off-shore' financial centres. 
For this reason,  and  in  view of the fact that most developing countries do not 
have  international  banks  capable  of  growing  in  this  new  environment,  the 
globalization of the financial system  has  most benefited the industrialized coun-
tries and in particular their public and financial sectors. The increasing mobility of 
capital has in particular allowed a large part of international savings to be steered 
towards financing the budget deficits of certain industrialized countries. 
The  disparities between, and the lack of effective coordination of, the in-
dustrialized countries' macroeconomic, financial and  monetary policies are con-
tributing, through rising  real  interest rates and volatile exchange rates,  to an  in-
crease in economic uncertainty and shortages of resources at reasonable rates for 
developing countries. 
See  IMF,  'World economic outlook', May 1993, p.  193; and also World Bank World development report, 
1991, The challenge of development',  1991, p.  23, Table  1.2. 
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leads  to paradoxical  situations that hinder investment  in  the productive sector 
and  jeopardize economic growth, both  in  industrial  and  developing  countries. 
For example, short-term interest rates  have  been  for a number of years and still 
are  higher than  long-term  ones  and  no-risk  short-term  investments  are  more 
profitable than long-term risks.  Therefore, the international capital  markets op-
erate at present on  a short-term basis  that sometimes favours speculation  and 
often discourages productive investment. This  situation calls  for more effective 
regulation of the financial and  monetary markets (through appropriate pruden-
tial rules),  reduction of fiscal deficits in major industrial countries and closer inter-
national  macroeconomic coordination.  In  view of the globalization of markets 
and  in  order to prevent free-riding, such  measures should  be  set  at world level 
and cover all  markets. 
{b) Financial transfers and debt 
Over the last few years, there has been a radical shift in the pattern of ex-
ternal financial flows to developing countries from debt to equity financing and 
from bank to non-bank sources. 1 Within this overall  pattern, there is  a growing 
gap  between  developing  countries that can  have  access  to the  private  capital 
markets for bank loans,  bonds and  stocks  and those that cannot. Those  coun-
tries which avoided  debt restructuring or which  have  successfully reduced their 
commercial  bank  debt in  the context of the  Brady  plan  provisions  and  in  the 
framework of a comprehensive structural adjustment effort have been able tore-
gain capital  market access,  attract new foreign  direct investment (FDI)  and  en-
courage the repatriation of flight capital. By contrast, severely indebted low- and 
low-middle-income countries with largely official debt (as  is the case  of most of 
sub-Saharan African developing countries) still have little realistic prospects of ac-
cess to long-term private lending for the foreseeable future.  Moreover, the offi-
cial  bilateral and multilateral flows in the 1970s and  1980s to the poorest coun-
tries  remained  insufficient to cope  with the  growing financial  requirements of 
these countries and to offset the consequences of procyclicallending, leading to 
important net financial  transfers  on  long-term  lending  from  the  South  to the 
North.  2 
In  this  respect,  it is  worth mentioning that the economic situation  of a 
number of developing countries (which are  dependent for most of their export 
earnings on  raw materials)  has  seriously  deteriorated due to the fluctuation  in 
the world market prices for these  products.  In  times of strong world economic 
growth, prices  for raw materials  have  generally risen  and  public spending  and 
imports  by  developing  countries  have  tended  to  grow at  a  rate  equal  to or 
greater than  export earnings.  The  return  of harder times  and  lower prices  for 
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World Bank;  'Global economic prospects and the develop1ng countries',  1993, p.  1. 
The  1983-90 average of these transfers was USD  21.5 billion annually; UNDP Human development report, 
1992, p.  50.  However, aggregate net transfers (net flows,  less  interest payments and profit remittances) 
have been positive since  1989 both overall and for most regions except Lat1n  Amenca; World Bank,  1b1dem, 
pp. 4-5. basic  products are  then  reflected in  very substantial budget deficits and foreign 
debt. At the same time, the lenders have based their decisions on current solven-
cy and failed to give due weight to long-term trends or the bankability or qual-
ity of projects. 
Conversely,  in  hard times, when loans are  most needed to restore growth 
and solvency, the donors (fearing insolvency or even default) apply much stricter 
bankability criteria.  In  other words,  the international  financial  operators  apply 
non-dynamic risk criteria and do not always manage to distinguish between the 
risks of illiquidity, insolvency or default. 
Cancelling the debt could in these conditions have perverse side-effects: it 
would not re-establish  the creditworthiness of the countries concerned  and  in 
the long term  make  possible  a new debt cycle.  A  lasting  solution to the debt 
problem  therefore would  have  to go to the  root of the  phenomenon  of pro-
cyclical  lending. 
(c) The role of the international financial institutions 
The IMF and the World Bank are no longer acting as regulators of the debt 
cycle,  their loans in  the 1980s having already matured. They contributed to the 
financial outflow from developing countries to the tune of nearly USD  8 billion 
per  annum  during  the  period  1987  to  1989  in  the  case  of  the  IMF  and 
USD  500 million in  1991  in the case of the World Bank. 1 The debt cycle that re-
sults from the procyclical behaviour of the private commercial banks and nation-
al  public lenders is aggravated by the lack of additional resources stemming from 
those  institutions,  given  the financial  constraints to which they are  themselves 
subject. The World Bank which, according to its terms of reference, was intend-
ed to act as an  intermediary between the international financial markets and the 
developing  countries  so  as  to secure  for them  financing  on  favourable  terms, 
only partially fulfils this role since it is itself subject to the ups and downs of a dis-
orderly world financial  market. The  IMF,  whose original function was to guaran-
tee the stability of the International Monetary System and to limit fluctuations in 
the financial cycles,  lacks resources and  powers to monitor and  control interna-
tional liquidity. 
The  lack  of mechanisms  to regulate  the  international  financial  markets 
tends to render the debt phenomenon procyclical, a feature that cannot be miti-
gated by the IMF and the World Bank.  Lacking the resources that would enable 
them to operate such  regulatory machinery, these institutions have focused their 
efforts  on  stabilization  and  structural  adjustment  programmes  which  have 
helped to stabilize the international financial system, but partly at the expense of 
the developing countries' long-term prospects. 
Source:  UNDP Human development report,  1992, pp  5 and 51. 
49 (d) Direct investment 
Many experts, and  in  particular those of the IMF and World Bank,  rightly 
emphasize the crucial  role that foreign direct investment could play in the resto-
ration of a positive balance in North-South financial transfers. It should, however, 
be  noted that in  the period  1980-90 most direct investment flowed into the in-
dustrialized countries.  If an  index of 100 is  ascribed to the average annual flow 
of direct  investment  in  the  five-year  period  1975-79, this  index  had  by  1989 
reached  767  for the  industrialized  countries  compared  with only  356 for the 
developing world. 1 
In  1991, FDI  made a positive contribution to the developing countries of 
roughly USD 7 billion (in  net terms: new investment less repatriated profits).  2 The 
bulk  of these  positive  transfers,  - which  follow  many  years  in  which  profit 
repatriation exceeded  new investment (a  USD  2.4 billion deficit in  1970, a 5.2 
billion deficit in  1980 and  a USD  0.2 billion deficit in  1985) - concerns only the 
most dynamic South-East Asian  countries and,  to a lesser  extent,  some  of the 
highly indebted countries of Latin  America. 
In  the case  of the newly industrialized countries of South-East Asia,  such 
investment  has,  in  fact,  created  new  production  capacity.  By  contrast,  in 
Latin  America  it has  largely taken  the  place  of existing  debt (debt for equity 
swaps) or has been  used to acquire existing firms without creating new produc-
tion capacity and without involving any actual transfer of foreign exchange. The 
remaining developing countries continue to receive no or very little foreign direct 
investment. 
Moreover, in several developing countries, many opportunities to make in-
vestments of which the strictly economic return would in  theory be  guaranteed 
are  neglected owing to the political risk which discourages foreign investors. 
In  any event, and even  in the case of those countries that are currently in 
receipt of a positive flow of foreign investment, profit repatriation is  likely to in-
crease  more rapidly than  new investment. The  Overseas  Development Council3 
takes the view that in  the year 2000 repatriation of profits from the developing 
countries could amount to USD  50 billion (as compared with USD  17.4 billion in 
1991 ),  while new investment would amount to roughly USD  55  billion (as com-
pared  with  USD  24.5  billion  in  1991 ).  A  net balance  of approximately  USD  5 
million  would,  quite  clearly,  not  be  enough  to  offset  the  negative  transfers 
stemming from commercial debt and the other mechanisms referred to earlier. 
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Source  Turner,  P.  'Cap1tal flows in the 1980s. A survey of maJor trends', 8/S Econom1c Papers,  No 30, 
Basle,  1991. 
A modest amount that 1s  more or less equ1valent to the cost to the developing countries of a 1% Increase 
1n  1nternat1onal Interest rates. 
Overseas Development Council,  'Debt reductions and North-South resource transfers to the year 2000', 
Pol1cy  Essay No 3,  Wash1ngton  DC.  February 1992. Foreign  direct investment brings other more important benefits that can-
not be  assessed  in  terms of the balance of payments,  namely transfers of tech-
nology and increased exports. An analysis of the effects of foreign investment on 
the balance of payments,  however,  especially when the phenomenon of profit 
repatriation  is taken into account, shows that foreign direct investment is  not in 
itself  enough  to guarantee  the  financial  transfers  needed  by  the  developing 
countries, and,  in  particular, those which are  heavily in  debt. 
5.  The need for reform 
In  sum,  the  increased  poverty and  marginalization  of many  developing 
countries are the result of inadequate policies in these countries, detrimental pol-
icies of developed countries and costly failures of the international system. Efforts 
towards  more  efficient  development  cooperation  policies  on  the  basis  of in-
creased conditionalities and policy dialogues should not serve as a pretext for ig-
noring the necessity for the adjustment of other policies of industrialized coun-
tries,  such  as  agricultural, trade,  financial,  monetary and  energy policies which 
may  have  destabilizing  effects  on  developing  countries.  A  better  performing 
North-South dialogue would need  to cover all  areas  of interdependence which 
determine the global environment and  result both in  more effective support for 
long-term domestic development strategies and correction of systemic failures in 
the international system.  Such a global dialogue would seem to require a consid-
erable reform and strengthening of the international institutions ensuring both a 
better representation  of the interests of developing countries and  more coher-
ence  in  global management. 
51 Ill.  Development prospeds, 
interdependencies and risks: 
lessons from the future 
Whereas  the  last chapter aimed  to draw lessons  from  past  experiences, 
this  chapter aims  to trace  the  principal  factors which will  shape  future North-
South relations. It begins by looking at how the deeper underlying trends in pop-
ulation growth, poverty and environmental degradation will interrelate and influ-
ence the future of both the North and South. 1 These deep trends will in turn be 
affected by the prospects for economic growth in  developing countries and the 
wider world economy which are also outlined in the chapter.  Finally, the chapter 
closes by elaborating two scenarios for the future, business as  usual and a move 
to sustainable economic and social  development, which, drawing on the lessons 
of the first three chapters,  present a series of stark choices. 
1.  Deep trends in population growth and poverty 
1.1.  Population growth 
The post-war period has been a population watershed but the most opti-
mistic scenarios of demographers still suggest a rise in world population from its 
current level  of 5.3  billion to around 8 billion  by 2015 and  possibly to 12.5 bil-
lion  by the middle of the next century.2  A combination  of factors - economic 
growth,  improvements  in  living  standards  and  stringent  population  policies  -
have brought reductions in the overall rate of population growth. However,  the 
young  age  structure of these  populations means that population growth has  a 
substantial in-built momentum. 
As the graph below illustrates, the highest population growth rates are to 
be found in the poorest regions of the world where 1.2 billion people are barely 
See,  in  particular, the World Bank World development reports of 1990,1991, and  1992; World Bank reports 
'Global economic prospects and the developing countries',  1991  and  1992; the UNDP Human development 
reports,  1990, 1991  and 1992; The  Dutch Government report 'A world of difference- A new framework for 
development cooperation in the 1990s', 1991; the Netherlands Central Plann1ng  Bureau  report 'Scanning 
the future. A long-term study of the world economy', 1992; the report of the Centre d'etudes prospectives et 
d'informations internationales 'Economie mondiale 1990-2000: L'imperatif de croissance',  1992; 
'World resources  1992-93- Towards sustainable development- A guide to the global environment', 
1992; the OECD  report 'Long-term prospectives of the world economy', 1992; communication of the 
European  Commission 'Development cooperation in the run-up to 2000', 15 May 1992. 
The  less-optimistic predictions suggest f1gures of upwards of 15 billion people. World development report, 
1992, p.  26 
53 surviving  in  absolute poverty.1 These  population growth rates  place pressure on 
the already strained economic infrastructure of developing countries and stretches 
the capacity of these economies to generate employment (particularly in the rural 
areas),  so  exacerbating  existing  social  and  environmental  problems. De  facto, 
these  population  growth rates  require  economic growth to at least  match the 
rate of  growth of  population  which  in  some  cases  means growth rates  greater 
than 3%. High  rates of population growth increase the propensity of migration 
both within countries (from rural  areas to urban slums) and across frontiers - an 
important consideration for Europe's southern flank. 
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Abbreviations 
LAT:  Latin  America:  South  America,  Central  America  and  the Caribbean;  AFR: Sub-Saharan Africa;  ME:  North 
Africa,  Arabian  peninsula,  Iran, Iraq,  Jordan,  Lebanon  and  Syria,  not including Israel;  CHI:  China;  DAE: Dynamic 
Asian economies: Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan,  South Korea,  Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand;  CIS: 
Commonwealth of Independent States; CE: Central Europe: Poland, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary,  Bulgaria 
and Albania; WEU:  Western, northern and southern Europe, including the former Yugoslavia, Israel and Turkey, but 
not Albania;  JAP: Japan; NAM: North  America: USA,  Canada,  also  including Australia,  New Zealand  and  South 
Africa;  rASIA:  Rest of Asia,  including Melanesia,  Micronesia and Polynesia. 
Sources:  The  medium variant projections. United  Nations,  'World population prospects  1988', New York,  1988; 
'Scanning the future. A long-term study of the world economy' 1992, pp. 240 and 225. 
Human development report,  1992, p. 14. 
54 Population growth needs to be  understood in  its social,  religious and cul-
tural context. Policies aiming at breaking the vicious circle of population growth, 
poverty and environmental degradation must be framed in  this context.  In  gen-
eral, increasing the income of poor households, reducing child mortality rates still 
further,  expanding education and  employment activities (especially for women) 
and  improving access to family planning seem  to reduce the rate of population 
growth.1 Expanding economic opportunity is another crucial variable.  It is there-
fore abundantly clear that population growth and poverty are inextricably linked 
and must be tackled concomitantly. 
1.2.  Poverty 
Whilst the  proportion of those  in  absolute  poverty  is  falling,  the actual 
numbers are  still  rising  due to high  rates  of population growth in  low-income 
countries; the 1992 UNFPA (United Nations Fund for Population Activities) report 
showed a fall  from  52% in  1970 to 44% by  1985 in  the proportion but an  in-
crease from 944 to 1 156 million in  the numbers. The  balance sheet on  human 
development in  Annex 2,  produced  by  the  UNDP,  assesses  more  generally the 
progress made to date. 
Number of poor (million) 
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Source: World Bank World development report,  1990, p. 5. 
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Forecasts on the number of poor in  2000 (shown below) show a region-
ally  diverse  picture  of poverty.  In  this  scenario,  poverty  in  sub-Saharan  Africa 
Education, particularly of women, is a powerful cause of reduced fertil1ty,  netting out other Important 
factors such  as  income, a secondary education compared w1th  three years of pnmary education reduces the 
number of children born to a woman from seven to four. World development report,  1992, p.  29 
55 could account for more than 30% of the developing countries' poor by 2000, as 
against 16% in  1985.1 Alternative projections based on slower growth and pol-
icies  less favourable to the poor show an  additional  150 million poor,  mainly in 
India. 
Food security problems already affect over 1 billion people and are predict-
ed  to become  more  acute,  despite the fact that globally there will  be  enough 
food for the rising  world  population.  Poverty  in  low-income countries  is  at  its 
worst in the rural areas and shows no sign of abating, whilst that of urban areas 
is on the increase. 
One particular trend is towards what the Dutch development report refers 
to as  the 'feminization of poverty'.  Due to the vulnerable position of women in 
the economy and the complexity of their tasks and  roles within the household, 
recession  and  the  disappearance  of a number of basic  social  amenities  under 
structural adjustment programmes have disproportionately affected them. 
More generally, there is a trend of increasing inequality in living conditions 
in  the world.  In  income terms alone, the richest 20% of the world's population 
are  estimated to have  received  some  60 times more than the bottom 20% by 
1990 (compared with 30 times in  1960). Taking  disparities at national level  into 
account, the gaps are even  larger. 2 Increasing gaps in the levels of human devel-
opment frustrate the chances of many developing countries to compete in world 
markets and  'catch up'. 
2.  Global challenges presented by poverty 
and population growth 
The  poverty outlined above  relates  with other factors to present a series 
of challenges for these societies and the wider global system  to deal with. The 
challenges from disease,  drugs and migration are  highlighted below. 
2.1.  Disease 
Poor access to education and health services not only encourages high lev-
els  of fertility and  infant mortality but helps  the spread  of diseases,  especially 
when  poor standards  of living  and  levels  of nutrition compound the situation. 
Infectious parasitic and  diarrhoeal  diseases  continue to account for 45% of all 
the cases of mortality in the developing world, despite gains in  reducing the rate 
itself. Contaminated drinking water and poor sanitation cause 62% of all deaths 
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World development report, 1990, p  5. 
Developing countries as a whole account for 77.1% of the world population but only 15.8% of global 
GNP and  19.3% of world trade. Human development report,  1992, p.  37. in  sub-Saharan Africa.  Rising worldwide rates of HIV infection will have a major 
social  and  economic  impact,  particularly among  the worst  hit countries,  with 
600 000 deaths from AIDS  having so far been  reported worldwide.1 
2.2.  The drug trade 
The value of illicit drugs sold  in  the USA and  Europe  has  been  estimated 
at USD  122 billion in  1989.2 This internationally specialized trade generates such 
huge amounts of hard currency that drug traffickers can  act as  central  bankers 
in  several  countries.  It  is  estimated that in  the USA  alone 60% of commercial 
banks handle drug money. 3 The  drug trade is  an  acute social  problem with glo-
bal  ramifications  due  to the  complex  linkages  between  areas  of supply  and 
demand. Thus strategies must address all sides of the problem: law enforcement, 
money laundering,  political linkages,  demand, trafficking, drug production and 
alternative sources of income. Indeed, if  such  strategies are to be effective, they 
must tackle wider structural  questions such  as  the situation of farmers within 
these regions,  drug consumption and the political establishment. 
2.3.  Migration and refugees 
People move when there are large differences of relative income to act as 
a magnet, when there is  unemployment, depravity, poverty, squalor and the ab-
sence  of opportunities. The  first major trend to recognize  is  rural-urban  migra-
tion due to the lack of opportunities in  rural areas.  On average, between 20 and 
30 million people move to the towns every year;  one projection estimates an  in-
crease  in the proportion of Third World populations living in towns from 17% in 
1950 to 46% by 2010.4 Developing country cities as a group will grow by 160% 
over  this  period,  whereas  rural  populations will  grow by  only  10%.  By  2000, 
there will be  21  megacities  in  the world with more than  10 million inhabitants 
and  17 will be  in  developing countries. 
Migration is  not normally an  irrational flight to the first major metropolis 
or port. It usually occurs on a chain principle with information, money5 and people 
flowing along established lines.  However, famines,  natural disasters,  political re-
pression  and war can  cause  migratory shocks;  for example, the Gulf War alone 
Over half the 5 to 10 million infected people are estimated to live m sub-Saharan Africa. It 1s  also spreading 
rapidly through Asia,  the Asian Development Bank estimating that by 2000 the majority of the 40 million 
HIV infections and  10 million adult AIDS  cases worldwide will be  m Asia. 
See  European Parliament Report on the spread of organized crime linked to drugs trafficking in the Member 
States of the European Community, 1992. 
Ibidem. 
Nothcott, Jim and Christie, lan. 'Shaping factors and business strateg1es in the post-1992 European 
Community', paper by the UK's Policy Studies Institute, Apnl,  1992. 
In  1989, developing countnes rece1ved  around USD 25 bill1on  1n  off1cial  remittances. 
Human development report,  1992, p.  56 
57 displaced  2.8 million  people  in  a matter of months, the figures for the former 
Yugoslavia  being similar. 
In the short term, the principal challenge for the North and Europe in par-
ticular comes from these migratory shocks, given the political, economic and en-
vironmental tensions  in  the surrounding  regions.  In  the longer term,  migration 
levels  will  be  distinctly influenced  by  demographic and  economic disparities  in 
the  regions  surrounding  the  European  Community and  compounded  by  high 
rates of unemployment, unfavourable agricultural options and limited water re-
sources.  The  graph below1 shows population pressure to the south of the EC  is 
set to rise.  However,  the decline in  Western  Europe's  population  may generate 
demand for migrant labour in  the longer run. 2 
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With regard to the current decade J.  C.  Chesnais and C.  Seibel  foresee an 
extra  1 million immigrants per year for the EC  as  a whole in  the next decade.3 
With regard  to Eastern  Europe  and  the CIS,  migratory flows will  depend  upon 
the containment of ethnic tensions and whether or not economic reforms take 
hold.  The  magnitude of the dangers can  be  seen  from the catastrophe  in  the 
former Yugoslavia,  where  more  than  3  million  people  have  already  been  dis-
placed. 
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Figures from Bertelsmann Foundation 'Challenges 1n  the Mediterranean-
'The European response',  Research  Group on European Affa1rs,  1991, p.  11. 
See  'Population trends and Europe', report of the Forward Stud1es  Un1t of the European Comm1ss1on,  1990 
Chesna1s,  Jean-Claude and Se1bel,  Claude. L'evo/ut10n sooodemographtque: Elements prospectifs. Cumulative international migration, 1990-2015 
(assuming economic stagnation in the regions of origin)1 
(million people) 
North America  Western Europe  Total 
CIS  1.8  4.2  6.0 
Central Europe  0.9  2.1  3.0 
Africa  1.5  3.5  5.0 
Middle East  0.9  2.1  3.0 
Total  5.0  12.0  17.0 
'Scann1ng the future  A long-term study of the world economy', 1992, p.  225. The figures are based on the 
global sh1ft and global cns1s  scenarios of the authors. 'In the global shift and global cns1s  scenarios, the 
reg1ons of or1g1n  (Afr~ca, M1ddle East,  Central Europe and the CIS)  are charactenzed by econom1c 
stagnation', p.  225 
Migration also represents a brain drain as it is often the most skilled or ed-
ucated  who  move  to where  they  see  opportunities.  Taking  figures  from  the 
UNDP,  by  1987 Africa  had  lost nearly one third of its skilled  people.  More than 
removing skilled people, this emigration also reduces developing countries capa-
city to train and pass on knowledge to a new generation of professionals, a task 
which increasingly falls to expensive foreign experts. 1 
3.  The environmental challenge: between the Scylla of 
rising poverty and the Charybdis of overconsumption 
'It is futile to deal with environmental problems without broader perspec-
tives that encompass the factors underlying world poverty and  international in-
equality.'2 
Without the necessary  means  and  security for survival,  poor people and 
countries have little choice but to overuse and destroy their natural resources re-
sulting  in  ecological  deterioration  and  a sacrifice  of the future to salvage  the 
present.  Even  when poverty is  not a cause of environmental decline,  it is  a tick-
et to suffer the environmental abuses caused  by archaic production methods.3 
On the other hand, most global environmental threats, from groundwater 
contamination  to  climate  change,  are  the  by-products  of affluence.4  This  is 
illustrated by the fact that per capita consumption of energy from fossil fuels is 33 
times higher in the USA than in  India and  10 times higher in the OECD than de-
Research  suggests th1s figure IS  as  h1gh  as  150 000 fore1gn  experts. Van  Dam,  F. 
'Noord-Zuid balans van veertig Jaar'  1n  lnternationa/e Spectator;  June 1992 
Brundtland report, 'Our common future'. 
Dunnmg, Allan  B.  'Poverty and the environment" Reversing the downward spiral', Worldwatch Paper 92, 
1989, pp. 40-54 
Ibidem,  p.  40 
59 veloping countries on average. If the North continues in its present pattern of re-
source  consumption and the developing world follows the same  historical  pat-
tern  and  approaches  these  northern patterns,  then the world's ecological  bal-
ance  is  likely to change dramatically with only partly foreseeable consequences. 
Economic growth rates (for the world) have remained constant at around 
3% since  1950. If they continue at this rate, then the world economy will be five 
times larger in the year 2050 than it is now, by which date the population of the 
world  is  projected  to  have  doubled.1  The  critical  question  then  is:  how can 
natural resource  use and the ecological damage of production practices be  lim-
ited, whilst substantially improving the standards of living of the poorest 1 billion 
of the world's population and  providing  adequate conditions for the projected 
5. 7 billion extra people who will join the world by the year 20507 In order to pro-
vide a clearer picture of the order of magnitude underlying this question some, 
of the major global challenges to the world's environment on  the basis  of the 
continuation of current patterns are outlined below. 
3.1.  Atmospheric pollution 
Current economic behaviour is  altering the precarious balance of atmos-
pheric  gases  which  make  life  on  earth  possible.  In  cumulative terms,  the rich 
countries  are  responsible  for  more  than  90%  of the  increase  in  greenhouse 
gases. 2 The size of this greenhouse effect remains unclear but the best estimate 
of the International  Panel  on  Climatic Change shows a rise  in  temperature of 
3°C  by the end of the next century under a business as usual scenario.3 The pos-
sible  alteration  of  climatic  zones  could  have  profound  effects  on  ecologies, 
societies, economies, agricultural ecosystems and water supplies. 
The future trends in energy consumption, shown below, will play a central 
role  in this process. The projected energy consumption increases in the develop-
ing world could be offset to some extent by the development of new renewable 
energy technology and energy-saving techniques if appropriate policy measures 
are  taken  by  these  countries  and  the  North.  The  overall  responsibility  of the 
OECD remains clear not only because it will still represent the largest energy con-
sumption share in  2005, but also because  it is  largely responsible for the histor-
ical  concentration of greenhouse gases. 
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'Scanning the future. A long-term study of the world economy',  1992, p.123. 
'A world of difference. A new framework for development cooperation in  the 1990s', 1991, p.  73. 
World development report,  1992, p.  7. Primary energy demand by world region  1 
1990  2005 
Region  Million toe  %share  Million toe  %share 
OECD  4112  50  4 935  44 
Former 
Soviet Union  1 359  16  1 581  14 
Central and 
Eastern Europe  366  4  415  4 
Developing 
world  2 459  30  4 210  38 
World  8 295  100  11  141  100 
European Commissison,  'Energy 1n  the future- A view to the future', September.  1992, p.  51. 
Pollution of the air itself is  also  a problem the world over.  An  estimated 
1.3  billion  people  worldwide  live  in  urban  areas  not  meeting  World  Health 
Organization (WHO) standards. 1 
3.2. Water pollution and degradation of the marine environment 
Rising  industrial, agricultural and domestic demand for water is  chasing a 
declining and increasingly polluted supply.  Consumption is  outstripping supplies 
in northern China and consumption could reach  crisis proportions in the Middle 
East and North Africa. 
With regard to world fish  stocks,  the Food  and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO)  estimates that four of the world's 17 major marine fishing areas are over-
fished.2 Coastlines are not exempt from pollution, as countries develop them for 
urban, commercial and industrial uses.  Available figures indicate that most trop-
ical  countries have  lost more than one half of their coastal  mangrove forests. 3 
Pollution  is  especially severe  in  estuaries and enclosed  seas,  such  as  the Baltic, 
Mediterranean and Aral  Sea.  In  the Mediterranean, the pressure from growing 
coastal urban populations and a rising number of tourists will pose significant fu-
ture problems arising from pollution of scarce water supplies and the sea  itself. 
3.3.  Land degradation 
Overintensive land use by the industrial and developing countries is caus-
ing serious environmental degradation. Population stress in developing countries 
often leads to growing energy requirements and pressure to bring more marginal 
World development report,  1992, p.  5. 
The  Mediterranean, the Pacific coast off Latin Amenca, the Pacific coast of Japan and the eastern coasts of 
the Indian Ocean.  FAO,  'Recent developments in world fisheries', April1991. 
'World resources  1992-93- Towards sustainable development- A guide to the global environment', 1992, 
p.  175. 
61 land  into agricultural  production  so  leading  to deforestation  and  the  loss  of 
biological  diversity. 1  Desertification,  detectable  through  satellite  imagery,  is 
spreading at a very fast rate in Africa, stripping topsoils and reducing future land 
use. 
With few possibilities to bring new land under cultivation, most observers 
look to increasing yields  rather than expanding the area  farmed to increase the 
quantity of food production. Technological  innovations, especially the use of in-
formation technology and  biotechnology,  might transform world agriculture as 
in the 1960s and 1970s.2 However, such technology optimism must be tempered 
with a realization  that genetically engineered varieties  may  have  unpredictable 
effects upon biological diversity and long-term disease resistance. 
The actions of landless peasants, mineral speculators, timber firms and the 
energy needs of developing countries are contributing to a rate of deforestation 
which has grown from its 1976-80 level of 0.6% per year to 0.9% in the 1980s.3 
If deforestation continues at this rate,  further reductions of biological  diversity, 
the displacement of indigenous peoples  and  a negative  impact on  the green-
house  effect can  be  expected.  Biological  diversity  is  essential  for not only the 
maintenance  of the  hydrological  cycle  and  the  right  balance  of atmospheric 
gases,  but also the future productivity of agricultural crops. Decline in genetic di-
versity at the rate  of 4 to  10  000 species  every  year  represents  an  irreversible 
decline in  the stock of genetic diversity. 
3.4.  Environmental interdependence 
The  deep  interdependence  between  the  developing  and  industrialized 
nations based  on the exploitation of a common ecosystem  is  at the core of the 
development  and  environment  debate.  It  is  complicated  by  the  lack  of 
precise knowledge about the effect of our actions upon environmental processes. 
However,  it is  clear that nations face  a complex web of ecological  prob-
lems extending beyond their national borders, that present growing regional and 
global security threats.  Environmental migration has already been  recognized  as 
a problem and will increase  as  climatic changes destabilize still  further ecologi-
cally  marginal  communities.  A  future rise  in  world sea  levels  would cause  im-
mense  problems in  low-lying areas  of both the South  and  North, with parts of 
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Research  by the International Soil  Reference and  Information Centre 1n  the Netherlands has shown that 
about 1 200 million hectares of land worldwide are  degraded as  a result of Improper agricultural manage-
ment and graz1ng.  Oldeman, L R.  Hakkeling, R T.A and Somebroek W.G.,  'World map of the status of 
human-mduced soil  degradation -An explanatory note', IS RIC,  Wag1n1ngen,  1991. 
Brown, Martin and  Goldin, lan  'The future of agriculture: Developing country impl1cat1ons',  OECD 
Development Centre,  1992 
As1a's  deforestation rate  is the highest at 1.2% per year for 1981-90, Latin Amenca  IS  second with 0.9% 
and Afnca a close third with 0.8%  'World resources  1992-93- Towards sustamable development- A gu1de 
to the global enwonment', 1992, p  118 Western  Europe  particularly at risk.  Thus  the first challenge that irreversible en-
vironmental change will pose will be to the ability of governments to cope with 
the human costs associated with such  radical  alterations of the natural environ-
ment.  Although fears of resource  wars may be  exaggerated,  it seems  probable 
that tension over disputed natural resources  (e.g.  water in  the Middle East) will 
rise.  Trade sanctions for environmental reasons which could result in trade wars 
are  already on  the international agenda.  Thus  the world could  be  facing  major 
future crises in the near to medium term over the management of change in, and 
access to, the environment's resources. 
4.  Economic outlook: diverse futures, fragile hopes 
The deep trends outlined in the previous section will be influenced by the 
prospects  for economic  growth  in  developing  countries  and  the wider  world 
economy. The future economic performance of developed and developing coun-
tries will condition their ability to shift to sustainable development paths. 
The  1990s began badly for developing countries with aggregate real  GOP 
per capita declining in the first two years.  Globally, economic recovery is  not just 
a political priority for the OECD,  but an  economic necessity for many developing 
countries.  A 1% increase  in  OECD  growth sustained over three years  is  project-
ed to raise  developing countries' exports by  USD  60 billion. 1 
Reading  from  the economic  projections for developing  regions  to 2000 
and  beyond  (see  box),  it is  clear  that the divergence in  their performances will 
continue. Worse still, the marginalization of a greater number of the world's pop-
ulation appears likely. 
Regionally,  sub-Saharan Africa  is  likely to experience further stagnation if 
not regression,  as economic growth rates struggle to keep pace with population 
growth.  Prospects  in  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  depend  upon  political 
stability, the continuation of economic reforms and the containment of tensions. 
Latin America  is expected to arrest its economic stagnation, although it will ex-
perience considerable variation in  relative economic performance. 
An  analysis  of comparative  strengths  among the world's  regions  shows 
that Latin America and Africa have a slight advantage in only 3 of 12 central driv-
ing  forces,  namely  natural  resources,  incentives/property  rights  and  individual 
adaptability.  Otherwise they are  deficient in  their savings  rates,  price formation, 
autonomy of the economic sphere,  invention  and  innovation,  collective  adap-
tability,  cooperation,  quality  of  government,  infrastructure  and  education.2 
Eastern  Europe  is  perhaps  the  hardest  region  for  which  to  make  forecasts. 
However,  both the Centre d'etudes prospectives  et d'informations internation-
World Bank,  'Global economic prospects and  the developing countnes',  1992, p.  2. 
'Scanning the future. A long-term study of the world economy',  1992, p.  182 
63 ales (CEPII) and the World Bank predict that if the economic reform plans are im-
plemented then there may be a move back to growth after 1995. While the pros-
pects  for most developing  regions  look fragile,  the  buoyant Asian-Pacific  area 
seems  set  to continue its  integration  into the world economy and  remain  the 
most economically dynamic region in  the immediate future. 
ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS  FOR THE  PERIOD TO 2000 AND BEYOND (I) 
Centre d'etudes prospectives et d'informations 
internationales1 
Sub-Saharan  Improved performance in 1990s. Although the problem of debt 
Africa  (17 African countries fall into the category of severely indebted) 
might be resolved by the end of the century, that of the finance 
of development will certainly not. GNP  growth rate of 3.1% 
(1990-95) and 3.5% (1995-2000). Stagnation predicted. 
Latin America  Better economic growth than in the 1980s. The relatively good 
performance of some countries in the region will mask the poor 
performance of the others. GNP growth rate of 3.0% (1990-95) 
and 3.8% (1995-2000). 
East Asia  In  a rather lifeless international environment, only the Asiatic 
zone should be  able to pursue a path of rapid growth. South-
East Asia should harvest the benefits of progress from its inter-
national  insertion and the advantages of a dynamic regional 
environment.  GNP  growth rate  of 6.4%  (1990-95)  and  7.0% 
(1995-2000) for the four Asian NICs. 
Eastern Europe  Two phases.  1990-94: A first phase of transition in which the ef-
fects of moving away from the central planning system adverse-
ly affect the economy with a deep fall in industrial output and 
balance-of-payments problems. International aid (4% of GNP in 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  1.5%  of GNP  in  the former 
Soviet Union) predicted. GNP growth of -1.7% (1990-95). 1995-
2000: A progressive move back into growth determined princi-
pally  by the rate that the residual  stock  of old equipment is 
downgraded and the flow of new investment. GNP growth rate 
of 2.6% (1995-2000). 
Middle East and  With an  increased savings ratio and economic reforms leading 
North Africa  to  a  better  mobilization  of these  investment  resources,  the 
region's GNP is expected to grow at 3.5% (1990-95) and by 4.0% 
(1995-2000). However, the main obstacles to growth remain the 
increase  in population and the political tensions generated in 
the  reform  process,  which  will  continue  to  make  investors 
hesitant. 
South Asia  The availability of cheap capital will be the crucial factor in this 
region in the coming decade, along with the progression of the 
reform processes . Figures for GNP growth contained in the rest 
of Asia figure of 5.8%  (1990-95) and 6.8% (1995-2000). 
Centre d'etudes prospectives et d'mformat1ons internationales, 'Economie mond1ale  1990-2000: 
L'imperatifdecro1ssance', 1992, pp.  14,260,309,311,313,314,361. 
64 ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS  FOR THE  PERIOD TO 2000 AND BEYOND (II) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Latin America 
East Asia 
Eastern Europe 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
South Asia 
World Bank1  Central Planning Bureau2 
Economic reforms in several countries  GOP  growth  rates  range 
expected  to  raise  region's  GOP  from 2.9  to 4.9%  {1990-
growth to 3.5%. Not high enough to  2015)  under  the  CPBs 
keep  pace  with  population  growth.  four  scenarios  of global 
Growth of GOP  per capita  0.3%  p.a.  crisis,  balanced  growth, 
European  Renaissance 
and  global  shift.  Labour 
supply  to  grow  by 
between  3  and  3.4%  in 
same time period. 
Latin  America's  economic  perfor- GOP  growth  rates  from 
mance will improve sharply, based  on  2.8  to  5.6%  under  CPBs 
a continued resolution of the debt cri- scenarios  {1990-2015). 
sis and a significant shift toward mar- Labour  supply,  1.8  to 
ket-friendly policies. GOP growth rate  2.1 %. 
of 4.2%. Per capita, 2.2%. 
East  Asia  is  unlikely to repeat its  im- GOP  growth rates from 6 
pressive economic performance of the  to 7.3%  under CPBs  four 
past  decade;  nevertheless,  it will  re- scenarios  {1990-2015). 
main the fastest-growing developing  Labour  supply,  1.5  to 
region,  and  per  capita  incomes  are  1.7%. 
projected to rise at a rate of over 5% 
per  year.  GOP  growth  rate  of 7.1% 
projected. Per capita, 5.7%. 
Prospects  for  growth  in  Eastern  GOP  growth  rates  from 
Europe and  the former Soviet Union  -1.6%  to  2.7%.  {1990-
are  highly uncertain,  but if commit- 2015).  Labour supply,  0.5 
ment  to  economic  reforms  remains  to 0.6%. 
steadfast,  the  economies  of the  re-
gion can  be  expected to stabilize  in 
the near future,  laying the basis  for 
recovery and growth in the remainder 
of the decade. Projected GOP growth 
rate  of  1.9%.  Per  capita,  1.6%  for 
decade {-14.2% in 1991). 
Region was adversely affected by the  GOP  growth  rates  from 
Gulf War.  However,  it is  expected to  3.2  to 3.8%  {1990-2015). 
average  4.5%  GOP  growth,  most of  Labour supply, 3 to 3.3%. 
this growth being concentrated in the 
second  half of the  decade.  This  as-
sumes  that economic reforms initiat-
ed  in  the  region  will  continue.  Per 
capita GOP growth rate, 1.6%. 
Structural reforms in the major South  GOP  growth  rates  from 
Asian  economies  will  serve  to  keep  4.5  to 6.5%  {1990-2015). 
aggregate GOP  per capita growth at  Labour  supply,  1.4  to 
around  3%  a  year,  near  the  rate  1.7%. 
achieved in the 1980s. Per capita GOP 
growth rate, 3.1 %. 
World Bank,  'Global economic prospects and the developmg countries 1992', pp.  1,  2,  10 and  11. 
Netherlands Central Planning Bureau,  'Scanning the future. A long-term study of the world economy',  1992, 
pp.  187,  194, 200 and  204. 
65 4.1.  Factors influencing these forecasts 
In addition to the deep trends in  population growth, poverty and environ-
mental degradation, a number of other factors, which are listed below, could in-
fluence these economic forecasts. 
(a)  Access to capital 
In the 1990s, access to investment resources may prove to be problematic 
due to the northern economies' growing needs, for example for financing bud-
get deficits (in  particular in  the USA  and  Germany) and economic growth. The 
North then may well continue to drain the lion's share  of world savings,  whilst 
the  competition  for  what  remains  will  become  fiercer  as  the  East  European 
economies' demand for capital spirals upwards and the Gulf region reconstructs 
its economies and  Germany needs to cover the rising  costs of unification. With 
real  interest  rates  remaining  high,  investment resources  will  remain  costly  and 
debt repayments high for severely indebted countries. 
(b)  Market access 
Developing  countries face  a volatile trading situation,  with no assurance 
of increased  access  to northern markets.  It has  been  estimated that a 50% re-
duction in  EC,  Japanese and  US  trade barriers could raise  developing countries' 
exports by  USD  50  billion.1  Clearly an  open  and fair trading system  is  essential 
for the future of developing countries'  economies,  although some  may experi-
ence  negative  side-effects  from  greater  trade  liberalization  in  the  short  to 
medium term (notably in sub-Saharan Africa). 
(c)  Demand pull from industrial countries 
Developing countries' growth has been closely linked to growth in  manu-
facturing exports. The influence this will have upon developing countries will de-
pend  upon the import elasticity of demand for their products. So without diver-
sification away from agricultural products and commodities for which demand is 
relatively  inelastic,  developing  countries  (especially  in  sub-Saharan  Africa)  will 
find it difficult to increase their export revenues.  For instance, it will be the more 
dynamic  manufacturing  exporters  who will,  along  with  European  companies, 
benefit from the removal of internal barriers, scale economies and the free move-
ment of factors which the single  market provides.  Overall,  the single  market is 
not estimated to have a major impact in trading terms on developing countries 
- the  trade  creation  and  trade  diversion  effects  may  cancel  each  other  out. 
However,  some  investment diversion  effects  at the expense  of third  countries 
have been  projected.2 
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In  1991  pnces.  See  'Global economic prospects and the developing countnes',  1992, p  3. 
See World Bank 'The impact of EC-92  on  developmg countries' trade: A dissenting view' 
International Economics Department, 1992 and Davenport, M1chael and Page,  Sheila  'Europe 1992 and the 
developing world', Overseas Development Institute,  1991. (d)  The avoidance of energy shocks 
Similar quantum increases  in  energy and oil  prices to those which aggra-
vated  worldwide recessions  in  1974/75 and  1980/81  would hurt,  in  particular, 
the poorest developing countries. 
(e)  Peace dividends and political stability 
The  containment of ethnic, nationalist and  religious tensions will be  cru-
cial  in securing a stable climate for economic rejuvenation and the realization of 
peace dividends. These could be  important not only for the NATO countries and 
the former Warsaw Pact which account for 80% of world military expenditure, 
but also  for developing  countries  whose spending  as  a percentage  of GNP  is 
sometimes very high (see  graph below). Whilst military expenditure declined  by 
3.0%  worldwide  between  1987  and  1990,  the  expected  massive  cutbacks, 
which  could  yield  some  USD  1.5  trillion  by  2000,1  have  yet  to  materialize. 
Without a stable  geopolitical  climate,  restructuring  of arms  industries  in  both 
North and  South and  reduction of arms trade, this potential will  remain  largely 
unfulfilled. 
Military expenditure as a percentage of GNP in  1987 
Middle East 
Latin America 
Sub-Saharan-African 
Far East 
South Asia 
Ex-Warsaw Pact 
All NATO 
World 
- -- -
=- -
-
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(f)  Adjustment to globalization 
15  20 
In  the longer term, the prospects of developing countries depend  upon 
their relationship with the deep trend towards globalization  in  the world econ-
omy  and,  in  particular,  in  world  trade.  Those  outside  or  peripheral  to these 
processes  of globalization  and  regional  integration  in  the northern economies 
Human development report,  1992, p.  86. 
67 have tended to lose ground. Efforts to update or create a modern infrastructure, 
develop a modern skilled and educated workforce, and integrate technology and 
know-how in  production  processes  are  crucial  future  competitiveness  vectors. 
For  those  countries on  the peripheries,  which  are  not well  integrated  into the 
world trading and without niche markets and some system  comparative advan-
tage, times are  likely to be very tough because the competitive 'ante' conditions 
in  order to participate are  becoming ever more stringent. 
5.  Scenarios for the future 
5.1.  Business as usual scenario 
In the table below, possible implications of a scenario of a continuation of 
certain current trends are sketched in terms of some of the principal risks for the 
world as a whole, and the European Community in particular. It is,  of course, ex-
tremely  difficult if not impossible  to attach  probabilities  to any  of these  out-
comes.  There  will  be  unpredictable  shocks  which  the  current system  may  be 
unable to manage (natural  catastrophes  and  conflicts of variable  intensity and 
duration)  and  positive  surprises.  However,  the  weight  of expected  bad  out-
comes under business as usual scenarios should be of sufficient concern to urge 
alternative and  new approaches. 
68 Extrapolation of the status  Risks for North and South 
quo trend 
Over 5.8 billion people  •  Large increase in poverty and starvation. 
by the year 2050  •  Further environmental destruction 
•  Possible epidemics/new diseases 
•  Mass migration pressures 
•  Deepening North-South alienation, possible conflicts 
•  Greater competition for natural resources and 
primary energy sources,  driving up their prices 
Environmental destruction  •  Irreversible change in the ecosystem with incalculable 
continues  costs 
•  Changes in climatic zones with negative effects on 
agricultural production. 
•  Desertification/water shortage/sea-level rise/species loss 
•  Accelerated migration 
•  Violation of the rights of future generations 
•  Increased propensity for conflict over scarce resources 
Slow economic growth in  •  Maintenance of indebtedness and threats to stability 
LDCs  of the world financial system 
•  Inability to eradicate poverty and redress the unfair 
distribution of income 
•  Underdevelopment of huge new markets 
•  Inability to attract private FDI for LDCs 
•  Unending pressures to accelerate development aid to 
the South with the Community, for reasons of proximi-
ty and history in the front line 
•  Increased competition for aid funds 
(South versus East) 
•  Greater numbers of migrants 
Political systems in LDCs  •  Perseverance of substantial outflows of corrupt 
remain unresponsive to  capital 
the needs for change  •  Proliferation of the supply of drugs 
•  LDCs maintain excessive levels of military expenditure 
and purchase a share of the hardware from the EC 
•  Confrontational North-South politics remain 
•  Increasing social tensions within the LDCs and in the 
North due to rising immigration leading to the danger 
of escalating racism 
•  Investments in LDCs remain high risk and technology 
transfer minimal 
•  Economic progress in the South paralysed 
Unchanged military ex- •  Dangers of nuclear proliferation and diffusion of 
penditure in the North,  weapons of mass destruction 
South and East  •  Enhanced probability of conflicts and environmental 
destruction 
•  Scrabbling among northern arms producers to sell in 
the South 
•  The potential of an unlimited quantity of uprooted 
refugees 
69 5.2.  A gradual change to a sustainable future scenario 
In the second scenario, the consequences of shifting social, economic and 
political policies on to a more sustainable basis are  highlighted. The central con-
clusion is that the long-run benefits of such  policies will lessen the probability of 
the worst case  scenario and,  ceteris paribus,  lead  to substantial benefits.  It is  a 
positive sum  game. 
Sustainable  Possible gains 
development 
Sustainable population  •  Decreased migratory pressure 
levels and reduction of  •  More manageable levels of poverty to address 
poverty  •  Less pressure on natural resources 
•  Lower consumption of environmental capital 
•  Lower chances of conflict 
•  Opportunity tore-equilibrate distribution of income 
Protecting environmental  •  Diminished chance of irreversible ecological damage 
capital through  •  Respecting intergenerational equity 
sustainable development  •  Improved long-run economic performance 
policies  •  Contribution to reducing poverty 
(e.g. by protecting water resources) 
Accelerated, but  •  Reducing Third World indebtedness and global 
sustainable economic  financial risks 
growth paths in  •  Progressive LDC integration in the world economy and 
developing countries  new market opportunities in the South for the North 
•  Reduced migratory pressure 
•  Private-sector capital flows develop to the South 
•  Diversification of economies 
•  Increased North-South cooperative efforts on 
alternative energies 
•  Availability of capital to maintain environment and 
social projects 
Reforming political  •  Reduction of waste, corruption 
systems (governance)  •  Optimal chance for long-run political and social 
stability 
•  Reduction of military expenditure, drugs 
•  Decrease in refugees/migrants 
•  Essential trigger for economic progress 
•  Political integration into new world order of 
governance 
•  New opportunities for global partnership and 
cooperation 
Reduced military  •  Decrease in global security threats 
expenditure and arms  •  More optimal allocation of world resources, capital 
trade  and labour 
•  Decreased propensity for local conflicts 
•  Fewer refugees 
70 These two opposing scenarios offer contrasting visions of the future. The 
first entails risks and the bottling-up of future problems. The  real  issue  is whether 
these  risks are worth taking. This  report, like many before, argues that they are 
not. The expected gains of policy adjustments towards sustainability criteria will 
certainly outweigh the costs.  This  requires from politicians long-term vision  and 
the courage to lead  and convince public opinion on the need for some sacrifice 
to  offset  the  imminent  risks  and  dangers  building  up.  Without  such  vision, 
history's judgment of our generation may be severe. 
71 IV.  A global strategy for the 
promotion of sustainable economic 
and social development 
The  preceding chapters have shown that there is  an  increasing  need  and 
perhaps a window of opportunity for strengthening  multilateralism  in  order to 
define and  implement more coherent global strategies for sustainable develop-
ment. First, the changed geopolitical situation resulting in the end of bipolar he-
gemony provides both new opportunities for stability and  new risks of conflicts, 
contradictions  and  tensions  which  are  ideally  handled  multilaterally.  The 
European  Community,  in  view of its  economic strength,  political weakness and 
strategic vulnerability should have a particularly strong interest in  promoting bet-
ter  global  management  of  interdependence  within  multilateral  frameworks. 
Second, the disappearance of ideological confrontation in  global East-West and 
North-South  relations  has  contributed  to  a  greater  convergence  of thinking 
about the conditions for development and  the shortcomings of governance at 
the domestic and  international level.  This should facilitate overcoming apparent 
short-term conflicts of interests in favour of globally beneficial longer-term strat-
egies  agreed  in  multilateral frameworks.  Third,  an  increasing  awareness  of the 
deep global trends of population growth, rising  poverty and depletion of natural 
resources which can  be expected to result in  increased  migratory pressures,  en-
vironmental threats and  other global security risks  provides  incentives for more 
vigorous initiatives at the international level  to modify the patterns of develop-
ment. In sum,  governments should now be  in a better position to respond more 
adequately to the global challenges. 
However,  this  requires  their  readiness  to  assume  responsibility  for  the 
internal and external long-term consequences of their policies, their acceptance 
of the challenge of globalization in terms of more effective global management 
of interdependencies and a commitment to a comprehensive approach towards 
the  promotion  of  sustainable  economic  and  social  development  worldwide. 
Following the clarification of the conceptual basis in this sense, the chapter out-
lines a number of strategic orientations in terms of promoting deep integration, 
stimulating sustainable economic growth, reorienting development towards en-
vironmental  sustainability  and  establishing  long-term  development  contracts 
between donors and poor countries. The chapter finally contains some  ideas for 
the transformation and strengthening of international institutions. 
73 1.  The concepts of good governance, 
global governance and sustainable development 
1.1.  Good governance: an enlightened self-interest 
After decades of blaming the colonial  heritage or the northern domina-
tion of an  unjust international economic system for most of their problems, deve-
loping countries now increasingly accept that development depends primarily on 
the policies they adopt and  implement. The fundamental elements of policy or-
ientation and good governance of developing countries in  the South or East are 
thus becoming part of a more and more universal acquis.  While elites and pres-
sure groups in  many developing countries still resist necessary changes, they are 
no longer protected by a benevolent superpower and face  increasing  pressures 
from both their own populations and the international community to face up to 
their responsibilities. 
The problems of good governance of the industrialized countries in terms 
of the external and  boomerang effects of their policies are  not as  clearly recog-
nized.  Under pressure  from  electorates  defending a privileged  way of life and 
strong special  interest groups seeking economic advantages, Western democra-
cies  have  so  far proven  incapable of living  up to the standards of good behavi-
our which their leaders preach  to others. The Western rhetoric about the bene-
fits of free trade and  division  of labour is  thus contradicted by the many trade 
distortions and market access restrictions facing products of developing countries 
whenever they have gained, or are about to gain, comparative advantages. The 
insistence of representatives of affluent societies on  the necessity of protecting 
the global environment and fighting poverty is not matched by adequate efforts 
to reduce energy consumption and share resources more equitably. Presently, the 
international community disposes of insufficient means to induce industrialized 
countries to modify their policies in  the interest of global welfare. 
In  the  present  international  climate  of economic  slowdown,  distrust  of 
established  leaderships  and  re-emergence  of strong  nationalist,  ethnocentric, 
fundamentalist and  inward-looking currents,  decisive  progress  towards the as-
sumption of shared responsibilities for global problems may appear unrealistic. 
However,  industrialized countries are  becoming increasingly aware of the 
consequences  of incoherent  policies  and  inaction  in  terms  of mounting  risks 
threatening  the  security of their own populations  as  a result,  in  particular,  of 
eruptions of violence,  migratory pressures and ecological catastrophes. The end 
of hegemonic bipolarity has reduced the possibility of imposing solutions unilat-
erally and  shown  that splendid  isolation  behind  a protected  fortress  is  an  un-
realistic option in  an  interdependent world.  It  is  therefore increasingly a matter 
of self-interest for northern countries to reorient their policies and  initiate new 
global strategies for the solution of global problems. 
74 1.2.  Global governance: a concept of managing 
interdependencies 
The world economy has  long been  characterized  by a trend towards glo-
balization driven primarily by international companies pursuing planetary strate-
gies  and  accelerated  by  the  technological  developments  and  deregulation  of 
international  markets,  more  recently  in  the  financial  and  monetary  area. 
Economic  globalization  means  rapid  diffusion of innovations around the world 
and translates into higher growth rates for trade than for production and,  in  par-
ticular,  rapid growth of foreign direct investment. Economic globalization, there-
fore,  potentially offers better opportunities for rapid  development than  in  the 
past. 
An  important effect of globalization  is  that economic development is  in-
creasingly difficult, if not impossible, outside the world economy.  Economic iso-
lationism and de  facto  marginalization mean  losing access to new technologies 
and  financial  resources,  diminishing competitiveness and  forgoing developmen-
tal possibilities. The collapse of the communist bloc which had fallen far behind 
in  key technological evolutions demonstrates this as  much  as  the failure of au-
tonomous and  inward-looking development strategies  pursued  in  parts  of the 
southern hemisphere.· Resisting the process of globalization is therefore quixotic 
and suicidal for any country.  Countries are  better advised to adapt to this inevi-
table process and adopt development strategies which allow them to participate 
in the world economy and  benefit from globalization. 
However,  we are  also  witnessing  a globalization  of risks  resulting  from 
market failures and other systemic shortcomings. Rising  inequalities and structu-
ral poverty, environmental degradation threatening the global ecosystem, uncon-
trollable drug traffic and arms sales,  spread  of epidemics and  massive  migratory 
movements are,  above all,  signs  of failure of the systems  of government at all 
levels and of a crisis  in  international relations. 
There  is thus a rising  discrepancy between the globalization of economic 
opportunities and of societal risks on the one hand, and the evolution of govern-
ance  on  the other.  Globalization  means  that realities  at the national  level  are 
increasingly influenced by external decisions or events and out of the control of 
national governments. This  does  not diminish the crucial  role  of domestic gov-
ernments for adequate policies.  However,  the new interdependencies resulting 
from globalization require actions at the regional  or multilateral level  to render 
domestic policies  effective.  Bilateral  cooperation  remains  useful  in  many cases. 
Nevertheless,  with respect  to an  increasing  number of issues,  bilateralism  can 
only lead to coherent and lasting solutions if they are embedded and implement-
ed  in  a multilateral context. Regionalism, at least in the case of the Community, 
has  proven to be  the most effective way of dealing with economic interdepen-
dence and  can  be  seen  as  an  important phase  in  facilitating the integration of 
countries into the world economy while respecting  and  preserving the diversity 
of models of development.  Regional  integration also  constitutes an  important 
75 building block towards coherent global management. However, it is not an alter-
native to multilateralism. There  is even a risk that the absence of effective multi-
lateral disciplines and institutions could lead to the constitution of regional blocs 
pursuing aggressive or protectionist policies under which developing economies 
would suffer most. 
The fact remains that the trend towards the globalization of economic op-
portunities  and  social  and  environmental  risks  is  not matched  by  an  equally 
powerful trend towards the globalization of governance  in  terms of providing 
political guidance and adequate legal frameworks for the globalization processes. 
The main reason for this lies in the refusal of governments and electorates- and 
especially those of relatively  powerful countries- to accept the implications of 
globalization  in  terms of limiting the traditional concept of sovereignty and  re-
quiring  solutions  on  the  basis  of common  reference  points  rather  than  mere 
brokering of national interests. Intergovernmental cooperation at the multilater-
al  level has certainly increased enormously since the war but national bureaucra-
cies  and  political  leaders  have  generally  resisted  sharing  responsibility  - and 
sovereignty- in  the interest of solving common problems and  managing inter-
dependencies. 
Marginalized Third World populations are those who suffer most from the 
inadequacy of coherent global governance. However, it is now becoming increas-
ingly evident that the security of developed northern societies is also threatened 
as a consequence of the absence of adequate responses to the global challenges 
and  risks  by the international community.  It is,  in  the first instance, the respon-
sibility of the northern powers which dominate the international system to exer-
cise  leadership and take initiatives to guide globalization processes and  manage 
interdependencies and global risks. 
The  Community,  as  the  living  model  of integrated  governance  beyond 
intergovernmental cooperation, would be best placed to attempt to convince its 
partners,  in  particular the USA and Japan,  to accept the challenge of globaliza-
tion in  terms of the deeper integration of national policies and the strengthen-
ing of global institutions. 
Global governance in the post-Yalta era can no longer take the form of an 
imposition of a dominant model of society in the name of a hegemonic concept 
of world order.  It requires the full respect of cultural diversity in the context of a 
collective exercise of soft power with respect to the management of interdepen-
dencies and  global risks.  It may imply new forms of conditionality and interven-
tion  into what has  traditionally been  considered  the  internal  affairs  of States. 
However,  it must be based on the rule of law and legitimized within fully repre-
sentative institutional structures.  As  a consequence,  international law will have 
to be  developed considerably. 
In  the final analysis,  assuming global responsibility means the acceptance 
of the concept of a global society in which each actor has to make his contribution 
76 towards the promotion of common welfare and collective security in accordance 
with such  universal values as  peace, justice and equity, the protection of human 
rights, the preservation of the natural environment and respect for cultural diver-
sity. 
1.3.  Building on a comprehensive concept of sustainable 
development 
The evolution of development thinking, the lessons drawn from the expe-
riences  in  North-South  relations  since  the war and  the  analyses  of the social, 
economic and environmental trends suggest that development policies and mul-
tilateral strategies must be based on a comprehensive development concept. This 
concept should encompass, on the one hand, the economic, social, environmen-
tal, cultural and  political dimensions of development as  they interact. It should, 
on  the other hand,  cover  the  interrelationship  between  internal  and  external 
forces,  i.e.  the interdependence of evolutions at the domestic, regional and glo-
bal levels. Various recent studies and reports, 1 as well as academic writings reflect 
a considerable  degree  of convergence of development thinking.  These  reports 
analyse the various dimensions and  interdependencies comprehensively without 
reducing  the  complexity  of challenges,  interactions  and  strategic  options  to 
simplistic and  ideologically predetermined blueprints. 
There  are obviously important differences in  emphasis and  wording. The 
1987 Brundtland Commission report entitled 'Our common future' defines sus-
tainable development as development that 'meets the needs of the present with-
out compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'. 2 
The emphasis here  is on environmental sustainability in the interest of intergen-
erational equity. The UNDP uses the concept of sustainable human development 
defined  as  'the process  of enlarging the range  of people's  choice - increasing 
their opportunities for education, health care, income and employment, and cov-
ering  the full  range  of human  choices  from  a sound  physical  environment to 
economic and  political freedoms'.3 This  definition focuses on the social  aspects 
of development in the spirit of intragenerational equity. The IMF and the OECD's 
Development Assistance Committee refer to the concept of sustainable econom-
ic  growth in the context of an  analysis of the meso-,  macro- and  microeconomic 
conditions for the integration of developing countries into the world economy. 
For example, the 1990, 1991  and  1992 World development reports of the World Bank,  the 1991  and  1992 
Human development reports of the UNDP,  the Development cooperation reports of the OECD  Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC), the 1990 report of the South Commission 'The challenge to the South', 
the Dutch Government report 'A world of difference- A new framework for development cooperation 1n 
the 1990s', the 1992 communication of the Commission 'Development cooperation policy in the run-up 
to 2000', the 1992 report of the Committee on  Development and Cooperation of the European Parliament 
on the new global partnership by Henri  Saby. 
World Commission on  Environment and  Development,  Our common future, 
Oxford University Press,  1987, p.  8. 
Human development report,  1992, p.  2 
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development strategies (1991) and  development and  environment (1992),  has 
attempted  to combine  the  various  elements  under  the  heading  of sustained 
and equitable development. 
Negotiators  of the  Treaty  on  European  Union  (Maastricht  Treaty)  have 
finally chosen the notion of sustainable economic and social development as the 
basic objective of development cooperation. This  results from Article 130 of the 
EC  Treaty which also contains the objectives of the smooth and progressive inte-
gration  of developing  countries  into  the  world  economy  and  the  campaign 
against poverty as the main poles of a double strategy to achieve the wider goal 
of sustainable development. According to Article 130u, these objectives have to 
be  taken  into account  in  the context of other Community policies.  They  also 
serve for the purpose of coordination with the policies of Members States (Article 
130x) and cooperation with third countries and competent international organ-
izations (Article 130y). The  Maastricht Treaty will thus give constitutional quality 
to a concept of development and development cooperation which is multidimen-
sional  in  terms of objectives,  policies  and  levels  of political  action  and  which 
seeks policy coherence. 
Important divergences of opinion and sometimes bitter controversies also 
exist and will continue to exist about particular approaches and policies, such  as 
structural adjustment. There remain tensions between economic efficiency, social 
justice and ecological sustainability which cannot be fully resolved  at the theoreti-
cal  level  and,  in  any event,  reflect important conflicts of interest.  However,  be-
yond the differences in  emphasis,  priorities and specific messages,  a remarkable 
convergence of view with respect to analytical  parameters,  basic  concepts and 
general messages in the various publications can  be observed. Moreover, the im-
portance of the concept of sustainable social  and economic development does 
not so much lie in the provision of a blueprint for social, economic, environmen-
tal  and cooperation policies,  but rather in  its contribution to the clarification of 
the full range of issues,  conflicts of interest, trade-offs and options. It serves to 
focus  attention on  the conditions and  the process  for making  rational  choices 
with respect to the formulation and implementation of coherent long-term de-
velopment strategies at the domestic as  well as  at the regional and multilateral 
levels. 
2.  Strategic orientations for the promotion of 
sustainable social and economic development 
It would be futile and counterproductive to attempt to spell out in any de-
tail the global strategies which need to be  pursued to reverse the unsustainable 
deep trends threatening the survival of mankind. They can only result from a co-
incidence of vision between the major players and a complex process of negoti-
ation.  However, the reflections on past experience and prospective evolution of 
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orientations which  seem  to impose  themselves  if a serious  effort to deal  with 
global medium- and  long-term problems is to be undertaken. 
2.1.  Promoting deep economic integration 
The lessons from past experience lead to the conclusion that a strategy of 
deep  economic  integration through the establishment of more comprehensive 
regulatory frameworks  for economic activities  and  government policies  at the 
multilateral level would be the adequate response to the challenge of economic 
globalization in order to reap the full benefits of this natural process and correct 
global market failures.  This should  be  in  the particular interest of weaker coun-
tries  and  economies,  which  are  otherwise  left at the mercy  of the  law of the 
jungle  and  risking  further  marginalization.  Such  a strategy  requires  new and 
stronger multilateral disciplines and rules affecting domestic policies and govern-
mental as well as  non-governmental actors in the global economy. 
(a)  Towards a comprehensive regulatory framework for 
trade and investment 
The  Uruguay Round  - focusing  in  particular on  better integration of de-
veloping countries into the international trading system,  stronger disciplines on 
agricultural  policies,  reintegration of textiles and  clothing into the GATI,  estab-
lishment of multilateral rules in the new areas of trade in services and  intellectual 
property protection, strengthening of multilateral dispute-settlement procedures 
(with the implication of reducing the potential of unilateral  pressures and  sanc-
tions)  as  well  as  the establishment of a multilateral trade organization (MTO) -
will, when concluded, represent a milestone towards a more comprehensive and 
stronger trading system.  However, the results will still  be far from constituting a 
satisfactory and  coherent regulatory framework for international trade and  in-
vestment.  In  some respects- such  as the inclusion of restrictive business practic-
es  and  commodity agreements- the MTO  will not even  extend to all  areas  in-
cluded in the 1948 Havana Charter for an  international trade organization. 
In  general terms, an  adequate response to globalization would consist in 
promoting deep  integration within a multilateral framework beyond  the tradi-
tional forms of liberalization of foreign trade regimes.  It would require adequate 
mechanisms  and  disciplines for the adjustment of domestic  policies  regulating 
economic behaviour.  In  view of the large and  growing number of countries in-
volved  in  the  multilateral  context  and  the  differences  between  them,  the 
method and scope of liberalization, cooperation and integration would obviously 
be different from those of the Community model. The Community experience-
which  is  not limited to the integration of countries at the same level of develop-
ment,  but extended  to a  relatively  successful  North-South  integration  - can, 
however,  provide  some  guidance  as  to the  orientations to be  pursued  in  the 
global context. 
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alization  formula  ensuring  that economically  strong  and  weak  countries  alike 
enjoy the  benefits  of their comparative  advantages  and  that overly  protected 
countries progressively  integrate into the world economy.  This  would require a 
shift  in  traditional  methods  of bilateral  market access  negotiations  based  on 
negotiating power towards a rule-based  approach.  In  this context, the specific 
conditions of particular sectors within countries should be taken into account as 
far  as  a  reasonable  level  of protection  and  time-frames  for  liberalization  are 
concerned.  However,  no  sector  should  be  excluded.  Preferential  treatment  in 
favour of poor countries should take better account of the characteristics of the 
products and  markets concerned and  be  limited in  time,  in  accordance with an 
approach  based  on  the  concept  of  infant  industry  protection  during  a 
transition period. 
Second,  there should  be  more emphasis on  regulatory convergence,  i.e. 
the approximation if not harmonization of essential public policy requirements at 
the  multilateral  level  in  order to enhance  the efficiency  of policies  protecting 
common goods, reduce distortions in  competition and permit market access on 
the basis of mutual recognition. The  emergence of conflicts between trade and 
environment policies and the difficulties of liberalizing trade in services both illus-
trate  the  orientation  of this  proposition.  However,  the  standards  used  in  the 
international context must also  reflect differences in  the stage of development 
and should be  multilaterally agreed,  rather than unilaterally imposed. 
Third, a multilateral framework for investment should establish disciplines 
for domestic investment policies and encourage investment flows and the diffu-
sion of technological know-how. Of particular importance for the stimulation of 
foreign  investment  would  be  the  harmonization  of  prudential,  fiscal  and 
accounting regulations in the banking and other financial sectors. 
Fourth,  the  behaviour  of  private  companies  operating  in  international 
markets should  be  subject to harmonized  rules  and  enforcement mechanisms. 
For  example,  important  differences  in  domestic  competition  policies  or  the 
absence  of such  policies  in  many  regions  of the  South  entail  serious  trade 
distortions,  often to the disadvantage of developing  economies.  In  the longer 
run, an  international competition authority should be established. 
Fifth,  the  possibility  of coordinated  actions  to correct  conjunctural  and 
structural problems in  certain commodity markets should be reconsidered in  the 
light of the failure of most commodity agreements and the characteristics of the 
goods and markets concerned. In particular, the possibilities of price stabilization 
through long-term agreements between producers and consumers as well as of 
reorienting funds targeted for stabilization of export earnings towards diversifi-
cation and commercial promotion of exports should be examined. 
On  a more  general  level,  it should  be  more clearly  recognized  that free 
trade  is  by  no  means  sufficient  to  achieve  sustainable  economic  and  social 
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equal  importance in solving the structural problems of the different regions and 
does not itself provide the solutions for the common goods. Therefore, it will be 
necessary to interconnect the multilateral trading regime with global monetary, 
financial and environmental mechanisms in  order to ensure policy coherence. 
(b)  Strengthening the international monetary and financial mechanisms 
The  financial  cycles  and  disorder that exist in  the monetary and financial 
system  often  result  in  a misallocation  of financial  resources  which jeopardizes 
economic prospects in  both North and  South  and  lead  to major outflows of fi-
nancial resources from developing countries. A strategy that seeks to bring about 
greater harmony in the global economy must aim to ensure that the developing 
countries benefit from the globalization of the international monetary and finan-
cial  system.  On  this  basis,  and  in  the short term,  measures should  be  taken  to 
break  the financial  cycle  and  ensure  a stable  transfer of financial  resources  to 
low- and  middle-income  developing  countries,  thus  helping  them  to achieve 
adequate rates of growth. 
This  would imply,  firstly,  the stabilization and  limitation of debt servicing 
repayments  (principal  and  interest)  to  a  level  compatible  with  the  economic 
growth of the developing countries concerned, as well as a reduction of the debt 
stock for the heavily indebted low-income countries. To this effect, existing facil-
ities  (e.g.  the  IDA  debt  reduction  facility)  should  be  strengthened  and  more 
ambitious debt reduction initiatives taken in the context of the Paris Club. 
Secondly,  prudential, fiscal and accounting rules affecting financial opera-
tors  would  need  to be  improved,  for instance  by  building  on  the agreements 
reached  in the framework of the Bank for International Settlements and extend-
ing them to other financial operators and a maximum number of countries. 
Thirdly,  the existing  arrangements for multilateral  monetary cooperation 
should be strengthened to ensure macroeconomic stability and predictability and 
provide extra liquidity for countries in  adjustment. 
In  the longer term, the international financial  community should  provide 
new regulatory mechanisms to influence international liquidity working both on 
deficit and  surplus countries and  smooth out the financial  cycle.  This  could  be 
initiated within the G7 and institutionalized in the IMF. 
The  World Bank system,  and  in  particular the International Development 
Agency (IDA) and regional development banks, should be  provided with the ad-
ditional resources  needed to enable it to channel  more effectively concessional 
aid  and  to act  as  an  intermediary between  the international financial  markets 
and  developing countries,  guaranteeing the latter financing on  favourable and 
stable terms. Its advisory and coordinating role with respect to the establishment 
of and support for adjustment and  long-term development strategies should be 
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er say in the orientation of the Bank's policies, which must also be better coordi-
nated with the policies of a revitalized United Nations. 
2.2.  Stimulating sustainable economic growth 
The  success  of the Uruguay Round,  the measures  designed to break the 
financial cycle in the short term and the further reforms of the trading, monetary 
and  financial  system  suggested  above will  not be  enough to ensure  adequate 
rates of growth in the developing countries. Moreover, greater access to the mar-
kets of the industrialized countries may be difficult to realize  in  a period of eco-
nomic slowdown. Therefore, additional mechanisms that could stimulate sustain-
able growth in  both industrialized and developing countries should be exploited. 
As far as the industrialized countries are concerned, coordination of mac-
roeconomic policies through the G7  (and  in  the long term more representative 
institutions) should be ameliorated and the implementation of policy recommen-
dations  supervised.  This  concerns,  in  particular,  the  establishment  and  super-
vision of fiscal and budgetary convergence criteria as well as monetary disciplines 
in  order to bring  down interest rates  and  prevent competitive devaluations.  In 
particular, growth strategies in periods of slowdown need to be better coordinat-
ed  within  the  triad.  Industrialized  countries  should  also  take  appropriate 
measures to avoid additional growth resulting in additional pollution and stimulate 
investments  (e.g.  through  coordinated  fiscal  incentives)  in  environmentally 
friendly sectors,  some of which already have strong growth potentials. 
As far as the developing countries are concerned (as well as the countries 
of Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  the  CIS),  a source  of additional  economic 
growth could  lie  in  exploiting the economic relationships between them. It is  a 
question  here  of  placing  on  a  solvent  footing  the  economic  relationships 
between people that account for roughly 85% of mankind and who, up to now, 
have accounted for less than 25% of world trade. The decline and even collapse 
of the interregional trade of many of these countries stem, apart from the obvi-
ous  political  factors,  from  the excessive  vertical  integration of their economies 
with industrialized countries and the lack of financial  resources  that would en-
able  settlement of the trade  balances  between countries whose  currencies  are 
not convertible.  The  need  to secure  foreign  exchange  and  the impossibility of 
granting credit to potential  purchasers  often condemn these  countries to limit 
trade with one another or to confine themselves to barter operations. 
A  number  of  measures  could  help  to  strengthen  the  economic 
South/South, South/East and  East/East links,  provided there is  a political will for 
regional cooperation and  integration between such  countries which is still  lack-
ing in  many regions,  in  particular in  Africa: 
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as through economic incentives (e.g.  cumulative rules of origin, regional-
ly oriented structural adjustment programmes and  development projects, 
in  particular with respect to the establishment of regional  infrastructure 
networks); 
(ii)  the  establishment  and  financing  of  a  clearing  system  covering  trade 
between these countries (on  the lines  of the European  Payments  Union, 
which made it possible to revitalize trade in Europe in the post-war years), 
which could ultimately make their currencies convertible; 
(iii)  the facilitation of triangular technological cooperation and,  more generally, 
the promotion of interregional technological networking; 
(iv)  the financing of triangular trade transactions involving two of these coun-
tries and an  industrialized country. 
Finally,  the international community could help to overcome some of the 
major obstacles to private investments  in  developing countries,  such  as  uncer-
tainties related  to the political evolution and  prohibitive costs  for,  in  particular, 
small  and  medium-sized companies concerning the identification of investment 
opportunities and  the creation of joint ventures.  On  the one hand,  reinsurance 
schemes to cover foreign investments against political and  legal  uncertainties at 
the multilateral level  should be  reinforced and  extended taking the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency as a starting point. On the other hand, the devel-
opment of a multilateral  facility along  the  lines  of the  ECIP  (EC  International 
Investment Partners) could be envisaged. 
2.3.  Reorienting development towards environmental 
sustainability 
Even  though  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Environment  and 
Development has failed to provide adequate answers to the global threats result-
ing from the present development trends, important framework conventions (cli-
mate  change,  biodiversity)  were  signed,  principles  agreed  (Rio  Declaration  on 
environment and development, forest principles) and a 500-page programme for 
action at the local,  national and  international levels  (Agenda  21) adopted. The 
parameters of a global strategy for the promotion of environmentally sustainable 
development have thus been established. The challenge lies in proper implemen-
tation  of the  new  range  of policies  outlined.  Firstly,  this  requires  convincing 
recalcitrant countries,  regions  and  local  authorities in  the North and  the South 
that attaching permanent value to, and protecting, the environment makes eco-
nomic  sense  in  the  medium  and  long  terms,  apart from  being  imperative  for 
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their interest to take the lead  in  terms of modifying their production and  con-
sumption patterns and generating resources and technologies that are transfer-
able and that can  be equally targeted to help poor countries to attain sustainable 
development paths.  Thirdly it requires  more effective international mechanisms 
for the integration of the environmental dimension into all  areas of policy-mak-
ing and the coordination of initiatives in  order to avoid unreasonable distortions 
of competition. 
Convincing  policy-makers and  public opinion of the benefits of environ-
mental sustainability requires,  in the first instance, a sound knowledge of the ec-
ological costs and benefits of various development patterns and policies.  To this 
effect, comprehensive inventories of natural capital stocks should be established 
and their evolution systematically monitored. Secondly,  cost/benefit calculations 
of major development projects should  include environmental capital,  using  ex-
plicit valuation methodologies. Shadow restoration projects can  provide a useful 
proxy approach for such cost measurements. Thirdly, attempts to draw up 'green' 
national economic accounts which  include the evolution of the natural  capital 
stock should be encouraged to give policy-makers a more accurate real  econom-
ic barometer for measuring sustainable economic patterns. In  addition, informa-
tion campaigns and  an  integration of environmental  questions  in  primary and 
secondary education  programmes may  help to change the attitudes of all  age 
groups. 
Changing unsustainable patterns of behaviour requires primarily appropri-
ate pricing of all  goods or services whose production or consumption affects the 
natural  capital  stock.  In  accordance with the 'polluter (or user)  pays'  principle, 
this should lead to the progressive integration of environmental externalities into 
the price system, thereby reflecting, in  particular, the scarcity,  resilience and non-
substitutability of natural resources  used.  One promising approach in  this regard 
lies  in  incremental ecological  tax reforms leading to progressive  price  increases 
for fossil  fuels,  nuclear  power,  water,  timber,  certain  minerals,  etc.  In  certain 
areas, this approach needs to be combined with the establishment of multilater-
ally agreed quantitative emission, production or consumption limits. In particular, 
the possibilities of introducing tradable permit mechanisms at the international 
level  should be considered. 
A comprehensive sustainability strategy must finally contain important re-
distributive  elements.  In  view  of  the  discrepancies  of  consumption  patterns 
between the North and the South, this is  not only a question of fairness but of 
global sustainability and  risk  prevention. In  order to induce developing countries 
to follow different development patterns in  terms of the consumption of non-
renewable  natural  resources,  significant transfers  of resources  combined  with 
technological  know-how will  be  necessary  in  economic transition  phases.  This 
concerns,  in  particular, the provision of clean water, sanitation, locally produced 
food crops,  new and  renewable energy sources  (wind, solar,  biomass),  energy-
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logical  cooperation,  including  the  financing  of North/South  and  South/South 
joint ventures and  regional cooperation projects and the encouragement of de-
centralized technological networking, have to play a much  more important role 
in  this  context.  This  requires  additional  financial  resources  for poor countries, 
which can  only in  part be provided through a reorientation of existing assistance 
policies or debt rescheduling  and forgiving techniques (such  as  debt for nature 
swaps).  The  Global  Environment  Facility  (GEF)  will  have  to be  considerably  in-
creased  if these  long-run  aims  are  to be  achieved.  Ideally,  these  funds should 
come from international energy and pollution taxes. 
2.4.  Supporting sustainable development in poor countries 
through  development contracts 
Development cooperation  has  evolved  from bilateral  and  mostly tied aid 
conditioned largely by geopolitical considerations to structural adjustment loans 
conditioned by rigid economic reform policies.  To  be effective, cooperation and 
assistance presuppose a supportive domestic environment and policies which are 
credible  in  terms of orientation,  political  backing  and  capacity of implementa-
tion.  In  the longer term, success  depends on whether domestic (local,  national, 
regional)  authorities  establish  development  strategies  corresponding  to socio-
economic realities and make them work. Donors, rather than imposing solutions 
unilaterally,  should  concentrate on  giving  adequate policy advice  and  reaching 
agreement on  a coherent policy framework with the recipient country.  This,  in 
turn,  requires  more  structured  efforts of coordination  and  consensus-building 
among donors at the source and on the spot than in  the past, where such exer-
cises  were more sporadic,  limited to the Bretton Woods institutions and  a few 
like-minded donors, and generally lacking a serious policy dialogue with the re-
cipient country. 
This  process  could  lead  towards  quasicontractual  long-term  relations  of 
partnership between, on the one hand,  individual or regional  groupings of de-
veloping countries involving also non-governmental organizations in these coun-
tries, and, on the other hand, the major donors including governments, interna-
tional  agencies  and  non-governmental  organizations.  The  reward  for  such  a 
cumbersome process of establishing development contracts should be more pre-
dictability  and  increased  confidence  in  development  strategies  which  actually 
work in  a sustainable manner. 
The development contracts, building on the experience gained under both 
the Lome  Convention and the policy framework programmes (PFPs)  and  letters 
of development policy/intent of the World Bank and the IMF, should contain flex-
ible policy frameworks adjusted to the particular situation of the individual coun-
tries. They should avoid imposing a particular model of society and fully respect 
cultural diversity. In the light of the lessons drawn from past experience (Chapter 
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commitments  by  recipient  countries  concerning  the  respect  of  basic  human 
rights, fundamental liberties, the rule of law, participatory political structures and 
social,  economic, environmental and administrative reform programmes (includ-
ing,  for instance,  the orientation of budgetary expenditure towards human de-
velopment priorities). They should also contain commitments by donor countries 
with respect to specific policy instruments affecting the recipient countries, such 
as  GSP  (generalized  system  of preferences) status,  debt alleviation and  conces-
sional  aid.  Their aim  would be to ensure secure  financial  and technical support 
for policies ranging from family planning, development of human resources and 
capacity-building to the stabilization of the macroeconomic foundation, structu-
ral  adjustment,  rural  development and  the protection of natural  resources.  The 
overall priorities should be the eradication of poverty, the facilitation of a smooth 
integration into the world economy through the implementation of sustainable 
development policies and the stabilization of democratic societies. 
In the absence of credible and broadly agreed cooperation frameworks of 
the kind described above, assistance would essentially be limited to humanitarian 
aid and the prevention of common security risks. 
3.  Transforming the international institutions 
to provide global governance 
In  order to facilitate global governance with respect to the promotion of 
sustainable economic and  social  development, existing international institutions 
will have to be  gradually transformed. They still  largely reflect power structures 
and  a concept of sovereignty  predominant at the time they were  established. 
Their number and scope of activities have increased tremendously since the war, 
but they  lack  effective  mechanisms  to ensure  policy  coherence.  Their  internal 
procedures are  generally based  on  consensus  diplomacy and  lack  efficiency.  In 
the economic and social area,  the United Nations and its specialized agencies, as 
a consequence of the North-South but also  East-West confrontation, have  lost 
much  of  their  influence  to  the  Bretton  Woods  institutions,  the  GATI  and 
informal  coordination  mechanisms,  such  as  the  G7  dominated  by  the  North. 
The  result  has  been  a  lack  of legitimacy in  global  economic  policy-making.  In 
addition,  regional  organizations have  generally been  too weak to play a major 
role  in  either security or economic matters. 
It would be  unrealistic to expect radical  reforms of existing institutions or 
the establishment of new major institutions in  the near future. However,  gradu-
al  reforms in terms of a clarification of tasks, more efficient procedures, increased 
participation of underrepresented actors and interinstitutional coherence may be 
envisaged even  in  the short and medium term. 
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legitimization and implementation 
The  functions  of initiation,  legitimization  and  implementation  of global 
policies need to be reassessed.  Initiation requires a degree of coherent leadership 
which can either come from a core group of influential players- such  as the per-
manent  members  of the  Security  Council,  the  members  of the triad  or some 
future configuration combining  influence and  a degree of representativeness -
or from appointed heads of international institutions representing a commonal-
ity of interests.  Such  kinds  of leadership are  not only necessary to launch  new 
global  policy initiatives but also  to overcome  blockages  in  multilateral  negotia-
tions. To this effect, the functions of heads of international institutions and in  par-
ticular that of the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be strengthened. 
Policy initiation is helped by sound and internationally recognized scientific 
analysis  and  by  policy advice  from  independent and  highly credible experts.  To 
this effect, on the one hand, the analytical capacities of international institutions 
need to be strengthened. On the other hand, the establishment of a world coun-
cil of wise men and women (also representing the interests of future generations) 
could be envisaged. 
In  the spirit of the universal  principle of participatory democracy,  an  ade-
quate and  representative  number of governmental and  also  non-governmental 
actors (NGOs,  representative organizations of social partners) should be involved 
in  a transparent global policy dialogue.  However,  in  order to combine efficiency 
and legitimacy, it will be necessary to resort more often to a representation of re-
gional or substantial interests through delegation, reconsider traditional consen-
sus  procedures for decision-making and  rely on  instruments of soft law. 
The execution and implementation of global policies should be carried out 
at the appropriate level in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. The inter-
national institutions should focus on  ensuring transparency and  providing posi-
tive incentives for implementation at the local level. They should upgrade moni-
toring and collective review procedures applying to countries from the South and 
the  North  (such  as  the new GATI trade  policy  review  mechanism).  Moreover, 
credible third-party dispute-settlement procedures on the basis of the rule of law 
are  necessary.  In  particular, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 
should be extended. 
3.2.  Ensuring global policy coherence 
The international system consists of a multitude of subsystems with differ-
ent constituencies (e.g.  foreign, defence, finance, trade,  development coopera-
tion,  environment  ministries)  and  different  power and  decision-making  struc-
tures. They operate largely in  an  uncoordinated manner.  It would be  Utopian to 
envisage  a radical  reform  in  terms of the establishment of some  kind  of world 
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tutional basis where necessary upgraded and, above all, the mechanisms of co-
ordination and global policy orientation strengthened. 
In  the  area  of trade  and  investment the establishment of a multilateral 
trade organization (MTO) points in  the right direction provided the interlinkages 
with the Bretton Woods institutions and the UN are strengthened. The tasks and 
the policy orientations of the IMF and the World Bank need to be clarified, their 
internal  functioning  made  more  transparent  and  coordination  both  between 
them and with the GATI/MTO and the UN strengthened. In this context, the con-
vening of a new Bretton Woods conference should be  considered. 
The  greatest  challenge  is  the  revitalization  of  the  role  of  the  United 
Nations in the economic and social areas. There are essentially two options: a re-
definition of the mandate, composition and functioning of the Security Council 
and the establishment of a separate UN structure for global sustainable develop-
ment policy orientation. The  first option would require the adoption of an  en-
larged concept of security extending to economic, social and environmental risks, 
a more representative membership as far as  permanent members are concerned 
and an  abandoning of absolute veto powers. The second option could consist in 
a reform and upgrading of Ecosoc (Economic and Social  Council) in terms of the 
establishment of a body which could be named the UN Sustainable Development 
Council with limited representative membership consisting possibly of some per-
manent members  (e.g.  Brazil,  China,  EC,  Egypt,  India,  Japan,  Russia,  Nigeria, 
USA), some rotating members and the heads of relevant international institutions 
(IBRD,  IMF,  MTO).  This  body should  meet on  a permanent basis to monitor the 
functioning of the global economic and social system, provide guidance for over-
all  policy orientation,  including with respect to the Bretton Woods  institutions, 
and propose and decide actions to deal with crisis situations. The recently agreed 
establishment of a Sustainable  Development Commission  could be  the nucleus 
for an  upgraded  political  body of this kind.  Failing  progress  in  either direction, 
the G7  process would have to continue to attempt to fill the global policy orien-
tation  vacuum  and  both  deepen  its  institutional  structure  and  modify  its 
membership to become more representative. 
3.3.  Promoting regional cooperation and integration 
The  potential  of regional  and  subregional  mechanisms  of cooperation, 
policy  coordination  and  integration  for the  promotion  of peace,  stability and 
mutually  beneficial  development  is  increasingly  recognized,  but  insufficiently 
exploited in  many regions.  In  some regions there is a proliferation of overlapping 
regional  initiatives  in  terms of mandate and  membership,  while many existing 
regional  institutions have  been  inefficient even  in  terms of the limited purposes 
for which they were set  up.  Regional  mechanisms can,  however,  be  better at-
tuned to the specific needs and features of proximity reflecting cultural traditions 
and specific models of society.  The  Community experience has also shown that 
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els  of managing  interdependencies and  serve  as  precursor  of wider efforts of 
i  nternationa  I cooperation. 
Regionalism  and  multilateralism are thus in  principle complementary and 
mutually supportive.  They  should  not be  seen  as  alternative or conflicting  ap-
proaches  but need  to be  adjusted  to each  other.  The  international community 
should  therefore encourage  more  strongly efforts of regional  cooperation  and 
integration and strengthen the links between regional organizations and interna-
tional institutions. 
Blueprints for regional  institutions cannot be  established  in  abstracto  in 
view of the diversity of historical experiences,  political driving forces  and socio-
economic potentials.  However,  a major global initiative to review obstacles and 
potentials for the establishment and strengthening of regional institutions would 
be  an  important contribution towards the  encouragement of more  ambitious 
initiatives in  regions lacking efficient cooperative mechanisms. 
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Community and its Member States 
This chapter attempts to identify strategic priorities and policy orientations 
for the European  Community in  the light of the analysis of Chapters I to Ill  and 
the  orientations for a global  strategy  proposed  in  Chapter  IV.  In  this  context, 
existing  Community policies as well as the provisions of the Treaty on  European 
Union  are  taken  as  given  rather than  being  analysed  in  any  detail.  Finally,  the 
question  of necessary  changes  in  the value  system  of European  society  is  ad-
dressed  and  suggestions  are  made  to  increase  public  awareness  and  involve 
European citizens in  bringing about these changes. 
1.  The parameters of a geopolitical strategy for the 
Community 
The adoption and  implementation of the global strategy proposed in  the 
previous chapter going far beyond traditional multilateral action would require 
strong  efforts of conviction,  both within the Community and  in  relation  to its 
international partners. As  has been argued in  Chapter I,  the Community and  its 
Member States should have a strong geopolitical interest in  contributing to the 
design  of such  a strategy.  In  considering this option, the specific  nature of the 
Community- its  possibilities and limitations- must be taken into account. 
The  Community,  while  having  a  growing  weight  in  the  international 
system, has never clearly defined its basic geopolitical interests and priorities, due 
to disagreement among  Member States  and  inadequate  institutional  support. 
Moreover, the Community has had (and still has) only a reduced scope of action, 
as  well  as  limited competencies  and  means  to intervene  in  global  affairs.  The 
Member States  of the  Community,  on  the  other hand,  in  particular the  large 
ones,  have acted as full participants .in  international affairs on the basis  of their 
own geopolitical interests and means, while their capacity as individual countries 
to influence the international system  has been on the decline. 
The  discrepancy between the potential and  reality of European  influence 
in  world affairs was of secondary importance as  long  as  the East-West conflict 
predominated. The  changing  nature of the international system  and  of the ex-
ternal  challenges which the Community and  its  Member States  face,  however, 
force the Community to clarify its  external  identity and  priorities.  It  also  offers 
new options for doing so in a manner which reflects its hybrid nature. 
As  described  in  the first  chapter,  the  emerging  poles  of the  post-Yalta 
system interact in a different manner compared to the cold war period. Economic 
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flicts spread. Hegemonic relations between States are no longer a viable basis for 
dealing effectively with global challenges and security risks.  Even  powerful coun-
tries,  including  the  USA,  can  no  longer  meet  challenges  everywhere  on  the 
planet and are increasingly forced to cooperate in  coalitions and at the multilat-
eral level. The nature of the new challenges calls for a global agreement between 
international actors on an  enlarged concept of cooperative security,  more effec-
tive mechanisms of cooperative management of interdependencies and a more 
reasonable sharing of power and burdens.  In  short, it is  a manifestation of soft 
power that is  likely to characterize increasingly the international system. 
The  European  Community should be  in  a good position to contribute to 
the design of a viable multilateral strategy in  the new geopolitical context.  It is 
itself the expression of soft power, not only because of the acquis communitaire, 
but also  because of the wider system  of cooperation among Member States.  It 
is also gradually moving from an  international organization sui generis,  in which 
consensus is  primarily based on a brokerage of national interests, towards a po-
litical entity, in  which consensus  is  based  on the perception of a common inter-
est.  However, this political entity cannot be based on a unitarian model. It  must 
respect  the continued existence of national  identities and  interests  and  reflect 
this in  its internal division of powers and tasks. 
The  previous chapters have demonstrated that North-South relations can 
no longer be  based primarily upon (bilateral) development cooperation between 
northern  donors  and  southern  recipients,  but  require  more  permanent  and 
systemic  multilateral  policies  in  the economic,  social,  humanitarian,  ecological 
and demographic domains. The participation of all  major actors is a precondition 
to formulate and implement such  policies.  In view of its internal experience, the 
Community  would  seem  particularly  well  equipped  to  initiate  such  policies. 
Moreover,  no  single  actor  has  the  means  to  assemble  the  critical  mass  of 
resources to deal with structural problems adequately everywhere in  the world. 
The  establishment  of geographical  priorities,  based  on  fundamental  interests 
and  means,  is  therefore  inevitable,  including  for the  Community taking  into 
account the necessity of an  effective internal division of tasks. 
These  basic  considerations  on  the  profoundly  changing  international 
system,  both outside and within Europe,  provide the parameters for the estab-
lishment of geopolitical priorities allowing the Community to assert  itself as  an 
international actor in  promoting sustainable social  and  economic development, 
as agreed in the Maastricht Treaty. They should also help to provide the basic cri-
teria for a division of competences and  tasks  between the Community and  its 
Member States.  In the past, this division of competences and tasks has not been 
based  on  a  coherent  philosophy  and  a  long-term  view  on  the  role  of  the 
Community in  the world. The geopolitical priorities of the Community may best 
be  defined  in  relation to the major challenges  and  risks  that affect the global 
system as well as those affecting the Community, more specifically. This has geo-
graphical and systemic implications for the means and  levels of intervention of 
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hindered  by  structural shortcomings occurring at the global,  regional  and  local 
levels. 
2.  External policy orientations 
Relations between the Community sensu stricto and the developing countries 
have  been  largely the result  of post-colonial  history and  specific  ties  between 
some  Member  States  and  their  former  colonies.  They  have  been  gradually 
extended and diversified in  response to external and  internal pressures in  partic-
ular from new Member States wanting to see their geographical priorities better 
reflected. Their rooting in  paternalistic interests has resulted  in a somewhat arbi-
trary and  inflexible acquis.  This  has had two consequences. 
First,  the present  Community policies towards the developing  world  do 
not seem  to be  based  on  a real  consensus  within the Community on  priorities 
and  means.  They tend to be  the result of political brokering between Member 
States  lacking  a comprehensive  common  vision.  Consequently,  they are  often 
short of addressing  identified challenges  in  accordance with the Community's 
interests and  in  a coherent manner. This  has frustrated, to a certain extent, the 
degree of commitment to these policies in  some Member States. 
Second, a range of specific instruments and financial appropriations have 
been created,  mostly as a result of short-term political compromises rather than 
of a far-reaching  and  coherent Community strategy.  These  instruments also  do 
not always  reflect  a demonstrable  added  value  vis-a-vis  the development co-
operation policies of individual Member States. 
The  pursuit of the overall  goal  of promoting a coherent framework for 
North-South  relations  and  sustainable  social  and  economic  development does 
not require that the Community substitutes itself for its  Member States  in  this 
area.  The  Community should, on  the other hand,  be  much  more than simply a 
13th donor. It should pursue policies that clearly bear a value-added element and 
are  not perceived  as  competing  with the  cooperation  policies  of its  Member 
States.  Furthermore, too wide a geographical and instrumental spread of means 
weakens the ability of the Community to set  priorities and  respond to systemic 
challenges and risks  related to geographical proximity. 
What then and where is the added value of the Community in implement-
ing a geopolitical and  geoeconomic strategy?  How can  an  adequate division of 
tasks between the Community and its Member States be defined with a view to 
strengthening  the  Community  in  such  a way that  it  is  better  able  to  use  its 
advantages as  a soft power in  promoting sustainable social  and  economic  de-
velopment globally? The answers to these questions should be based on efficien-
cy and coherence. 
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orities should  be  twofold,  namely  multilateral  strategies to deal  with systemic 
issues and  regional strategies concerning its geographical proximity. 
2.1.  Multilateral and systemic priorities: 
managing global interdependencies 
With  regard  to  the  management  of  economic  globalization,  the 
Community, building on its role in  GATI, should aim to become a full participant 
in  all  multilateral  organizations  that govern  international  trade,  financial  and 
monetary relations. This would allow the Community to use its full potential and 
weight as a soft power in order to reinforce the coherence of international econ-
omic relations, which is essential to the promotion of sustainable social and econ-
omic development.  As  a matter of priority,  and  also  as  a logical  and  necessary 
consequence of the eventual implementation of the European  monetary union, 
the Community should become a full member of such  institutions as the future 
Multilateral  Trade  Organization,  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  the  World 
Bank and the Bank for International Settlements and speak with one voice. 
The Community should also extend its participation in the G7 and use this 
forum to initiate new policies and  institutional reforms as outlined in  Chapter IV. 
However, in the longer term, its aim should be to make this type of intergovern-
mental arrangement limited to a few northern countries obsolete,  by  bringing 
the issues at stake with regard to global governance back to the proper multilat-
eral  institutions  where  they  belong.  Indeed,  the  Community should  promote 
deep integration at the global level, both as a condition for sustainable develop-
ment and  as  a consequence of the implementation of international good gov-
ernance.  This  requires  close  cooperation within the triad,  which  inevitably will 
have to assume a leadership role.  However, the twin risks of economic marginal-
ization and free-riders call for a multilateralization of deep integration strategies. 
The other global priorities, such  as peace and security, democracy, protec-
tion of human rights, demography, environment, migration, poverty,  pandemics 
and drugs, equally require concerted international action and call for Community 
leadership  and  participation  as  such  in  the  relevant  multilateral  institutions.  In 
these areas,  the added value and strength of the Community would seem  to lie 
primarily  in  policy definition and  initiation,  negotiation,  coordination  and  rule-
making,  while  implementation  could  be  essentially  left to Member States.  Of 
particular importance in  this context will be the reinforcement and  extension of 
the political and  economic dialogue of the Community and  its  Member States 
with regions  of developing countries (e.g.  Rio  Group, ASEAN,  San  Jose  Group, 
Gulf Cooperation Council). 
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motion of horizontal and systemic policies to deal more effectively with structural 
shortcomings occurring at the global, regional and local levels.  It would need to 
increase  its  budgetary means  for common  actions  in  support of such  policies. 
However,  taking into account the know-how and  specific priorities of Member 
States and the proposition that the Community should not act as a 13th Member 
State in development cooperation, the Community may well limit its involvement 
in  geographically defined development cooperation policies essentially to ques-
tions of orientation, coordination and negotiation  of policy frameworks, such  as 
the development contracts described in  Chapter IV.  It could also devolve the im-
plementation  of  common  actions  to  domestic  or,  where  appropriate,  multi-
lateral agencies. 
Specific common actions related to systemic challenges (as well as  devel-
opment  cooperation  programmes  of  multilateral  agencies  and  EC  Member 
States)  would thus  be  continued  and  extended  in  the  different regions  (sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America, Asia).  In  budgetary terms, this could mean a pro-
gressive  transfer of funds from the current regional apportionment of develop-
ment cooperation  budget lines  to systemic  and  horizontal  budget lines.  These 
systemic budget lines should be  substantially extended inter alia to cover multi-
lateral  organizations  and  facilities  (e.g.  the  World  Bank's  Global  Environment 
Facility).  Equally,  their endowments should be considerably increased.  Moreover, 
the external activities of the European  Investment Bank should  be  progressively 
reoriented towards the financing of systemic objectives. An additional advantage 
of the  proposal  to define  more  clearly  the  Community's  geopolitical  priorities 
would thus be  more coherence  of the Community's financial  framework with 
regard to external actions. 
Since sub-Saharan Africa is particularly afflicted by structural problems and 
systemic challenges, the international community, both multilateral and bilateral 
donors, will have to assume a special and increased responsibility in  political and 
financial  terms  towards this  region,  with a strong  emphasis  on  'development 
contracts' as described in Chapter IV.  The multilateral engagement for Africa will 
have  to  be  of a  larger  magnitude  than  in  other  regions,  encompassing  the 
Community and  its  Member States,  the USA,  Japan  and  other OECD  Member 
States,  as  well  as  Latin  American and Asian  States and,  of course,  the interna-
tional financial  institutions. The fundamental objective of a multilateral strategy 
should be to generate and  implement structural solutions for Africa's profound 
problems.  An  important element of such  a strategy could be  a regional  system 
of payments anchored on a multilateral monetary facility.  The successful  imple-
mentation of such  a mechanism will also  depend on the reform of the Bretton 
Woods  institutions as  outlined in  Chapter  IV,  in  which the Community should 
play a major role. 
The  Community could  assume  a leading  role  both  in  promoting such  a 
multilateral approach and in ensuring a smooth transition from the Lome scheme 
to the implementation of multilateral development contracts. Together with the 
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African countries. The  budgetization of the European Development Fund  would 
help to reorient the Community's policy towards sub-Saharan Africa and make it 
more accountable. The  next revision  of the European  Development Fund  to be 
completed in  1995 could be an  appropriate occasion to consider such a reorien-
tation. 
Community and  Member States'  action  in  the area  of development co-
operation would thus over time become internally more coherent, be integrated 
in  a  multilateral  framework  with  all  major  agencies  and  individual  donors, 
including  NGOs,  and  be  enshrined  in  development  contracts  as  described  in 
Chapter IV.  An  important element in  this context would be the establishment of 
clear  Community  rules  on  untied  aid,  as  a  fundamental  step  towards  the 
establishment of binding  rules  on  such  aid  at the multilateral  level.  This  could 
also  serve to strengthen South/South and South/East commercial flows. 
2.2.  Regional responsibilities: managing geographical proximity 
The  Community's second  main interest is  to promote peace,  stability and 
development in  its direct neighbourhood. The end of the East-West conflict and 
the declining involvement of the USA in  Europe's security,  drive the Community 
to define itself in terms of a political entity and assume  an  increasing role in  fill-
ing the emerging power vacuum  in  its wider region. 
Moreover,  the long-term developments in  the Community's  direct prox-
imity contain uncertainties that could affect its internal cohesion and capacity to 
act.  Its  interests  and  responsibilities  go  beyond  those  of  individual  Member 
States.  This  means that the Community should  give  the highest priority to the 
promotion of sustainable social and economic development in these regions. The 
instruments that are  needed to reach  these goals will have to be adjusted to the 
specific  requirements  of the  different  regions.  In  these  regions,  the  Member 
States will, of course, continue to be active individually. However, to be efficient, 
their policies  should  be  subject to an  overall  and  coherent Community frame-
work. 
A coherent policy approach towards Central,  Eastern  and  South-Eastern 
Europe and the non-Community countries of the Mediterranean region,  includ-
ing Turkey and the Middle East, will have to respond to the challenges of demog-
raphy,  environment, and economic and  political instability. It would seek to pro-
mote peaceful integration within and between these regions. The establishment 
of  regional  security  regimes  (such  as  the  Conference  on  Security  and 
Cooperation in  Europe (CSCE)  and  a CSCE  for the Mediterranean) should be an 
integral part of a comprehensive European doctrine of geographical proximity. 
Vis-a-vis the countries of Central,  Eastern  and South-Eastern  Europe,  the 
policy priorities set out in the Commission's reports to the Lisbon  and  Edinburgh 
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creation of a wider European free trade area) and the orientations agreed by the 
Copenhagen  Summit concerning,  in  particular,  the conditions for membership 
could  be  complemented  by  the establishment of pan-European  infrastructural 
networks and the promotion of cross-border region-to-region and town-to-town 
cooperation, including in the relations between these countries. Further deep in-
tegration should  be fostered to facilitate the progressive  implementation of the 
four freedoms and  eventually full  membership.  In  addition, initiatives towards a 
pan-European security order need to be vigorously pursued. 
With regard to the non-Community southern Mediterranean countries, in-
cluding Turkey, the Maghreb and the Mashrek countries, the Community should 
aim  to create  an  economic cooperation zone  based  on  the recent Commission 
proposals on cooperation with the Maghreb countries, progressively leading to a 
free trade area with the Community. This would require substantial financial and 
technological transfers in  order to lay the foundations of internal cohesion  and 
sustainability in  the region.  The  overall  objectives of this approach would be to 
alleviate political, security, demographic, migratory and environmental pressures. 
The  establishment of free trade areas,  customs unions and other types of 
regional cooperation zones among the countries of Central, Eastern and South-
Eastern  Europe (as crucial  phases on their way towards full  EC  membership), on 
the one hand, and among CIS and non-Community Mediterranean countries, on 
the other hand, would constitute building blocks towards their integration into 
the economy of the Community.  For  these  regions,  a regional  system  of pay-
ments linked to the Community,  as  a support for intraregional trade,  could  be 
considered.  Moreover,  the existing  budgetary lines and  financial  protocols des-
tined to these countries could  be  gradually replaced  by structural funds,  an  ap-
proach which is  more in  line with the Community's cohesion  policies than with 
traditional development cooperation strategies. Access to these structural funds 
could  be  applied  in  a manner similar to the current rules  governing  the intra-
Community  Structural  Funds  (cofinancing).  Concerning  private  investments, 
which  are  to a large  extent hindered  because  of political  risks,  a Community-
wide risk  reinsurance system concerning certain legal changes should be consid-
ered. 
3.  Internal policy coherence 
Divergences  between  policies  of Member States  and  inconsistencies  of 
Community policies often lead to contradictory signals with regard  to the goals 
of sustainability and produce negative repercussions both inside and outside the 
Community. Too often these policies are dictated by short-term views that do not 
take into account the environmental and social dimensions of economic growth. 
First,  divergences  in  macroeconomic policies,  such  as  different monetary 
and  fiscal  policies,  hinder  economic  growth  both  inside  and  outside  the 
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adequately adjusted to the objective of promoting the sustainability of economic 
and social  development both in  the EC  and  beyond.  Some  Community policies, 
in  particular the common agricultural policy (CAP),  are  widely believed to have 
been fundamentally in  contradiction with this objective. 
Second, the access to the Community markets for agricultural and indus-
trial products from developing countries is a key part of any structural policy pro-
moting sustainable  social  and  economic development. This  means  that further 
and  deeper reforms of the CAP  and  commercial  policies will be  unavoidable in 
order to reduce trade restrictions and  distortions. However,  in  order to avoid se-
rious political, social and economic problems in the Community, such reforms will 
have to be  implemented in  parallel with credible adjustment policies.  In  particu-
lar,  targeted  policies,  including  incentives  for  investments  in  environmentally 
friendly sectors,  aiming to restructure economic activities  in  exposed  zones will 
have to be  devised.  This  calls  for appropriate industrial,  R&D,  agricultural, fiscal 
(ecotaxes  as  well  as  tax  exemptions),  environmental  and  consumer  policies  in 
terms of stimulating  renovation  and  modernization of new economic opportu-
nities, as well as temporary adjustment of sunset sectors. 
The  further opening of Community markets to developing countries' ex-
ports also  provides additional leverage to encourage the environmental and so-
cial  dimensions of economic growth in  the South in  terms of adequate commit-
ments of developing countries  in  the framework of development contracts,for 
example by linking the granting of specific advantages to special efforts in these 
areas.  From the side of the Community, substantial transfers of appropriate tech-
nology, as well as the means to diffuse it, will be  required. 
In  order to promote the goal of sustainable social  and economic develop-
ment, the following measures could be  considered by the Commission: 
(i)  a general  review of how the various  Community policies affect develop-
ment in  the South; 
(ii)  the establishment of procedures for the assessment of the impact of major 
new policy proposals by the Commission on  the goals of social  and eco-
nomic sustainable development and,  in  particular, their consequences for 
developing countries. 
The  financing  of the required  common actions and  strategies aiming to 
provide the South,  in  particular Africa,  with better development perspectives 
cannot be implemented without additional resources which could come from en-
ergy taxes,  coordinated Community efforts to reach  the 0. 7% of GDP ODA ob-
jective,  reduction  of military expenditure,  a Community 'solidarity'  loan  and  a 
reallocation  of financial  means  including  import  duties.  Moreover,  additional 
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and  financial  system  described  in  Chapter IV,  as  well  as  the implementation of 
the economic and monetary union. 
4.  European society and the world's 
long-term challenges 
The  implementation of the geopolitical  strategy proposed  for the Com-
munity- while improving conditions for sustainable social  and economic devel-
opment in  the short to medium term and  providing a politically realistic  margin 
of flexibility  - does  not sufficiently  address  the  seriousness  of the  long-term 
global interdependencies and  risks analysed  in  Chapter Ill. 
Nothing less  than a reorientation of production and  consumption  habits 
and patterns and the underlying social values will be sufficient in the longer term. 
In  other  words,  the  basic  aim  is  to  encourage  a  development  of  industrial 
societies that is compatible with sustainable social and economic development. 
Changes in societal values usually emerge as a result of pressures from civil 
society in interaction with political authorities, and not from unilateral imposition · 
of measures by those authorities. Because of the complexity of such  interaction, 
the room for manoeuvre and  the power of public authorities at local,  regional, 
national or Community level to impose changes from above are limited. Also, the 
necessary comprehensive legislation at Community level can  at best be adopted 
over time. 
Therefore, the short- and medium-term strategies proposed above would 
have  to be  accompanied  by  actions of public authorities that aim  to stimulate 
and  support  existing  and  emerging  trends  in  civil  society,  pave  the  way  to 
sustainable social  and  economic development and  permit the progressive  intro-
duction of comprehensive legislation.  Public action should gather support for a 
reorientation of consumption and production patterns by contributing to the de-
velopment  of public  awareness  of the  risks  of an  unlimited  continuation  of 
present global trends. 
The nature of these global trends is such  that, without profound changes 
in  northern patterns of consumption and  production and a deeper understand-
ing of the complexity of North-South interdependencies, authoritarian measures 
by political authorities could become unavoidable in case of acute aggravation of 
political,  environmental  and  demographic  incidents  and  pressures.  A  deeper 
awareness of the nature of these global trends could also contribute to the pre-
vention of the emergence or strengthening of extremist and irrational ideologies 
which constitute a threat to democracy. 
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ening the awareness of civil society with regard to the necessary reorientation of 
the Western model of society: 
(i)  The  encouragement of an  active  involvement of national, European  and 
international non-governmental organizations in the social and, especially, 
political debate, and their formal and regular participation in the different 
stages of the decision-making process on issues relating to sustainable de-
velopment.  In  this respect,  consultation procedures, such  as  public parlia-
mentary  hearings,  could  be  considerably  developed  within  the 
Community. At the international level,  the Community could support an 
active participation of NGOs  in  international forums and  bodies,  such  as 
the Sustainable Development Commission, the World Population Summit 
in  1994 or the World Social  Summit to be  held in  1995. 
(ii)  Community-wide planning to prepare for the adoption and  implementa-
tion of long-term strategies in  favour of alternative development patterns 
at times when risk  awareness  in  the public is  high (e.g.  in  the aftermath 
of an  ecological or development disaster). 
(iii)  The formation of a voluntary Community service in which qualified young 
citizens of all  Member States could serve together in developing countries 
that  have  concluded  development  contracts  with  the  community  of 
donors.  If this were done on  a reasonably  large scale,  Europeans would 
not only  get a better  understanding  of North-South  interdependencies, 
but also  strengthen their awareness of the need to change Western pat-
terns of production and consumption. 
(iv)  The  establishment  of European  media  and  educational  programmes to 
raise  public awareness of global interdependencies and  risks. 
(v)  The establishment of a code of conduct for EC  companies, including sub-
sidiaries of foreign companies in the EC  and subsidiaries of EC  companies 
in foreign countries, to encourage promotion of sustainable social and ec-
onomic development. 
(vi)  The floating on the European financial markets of a Community-wide soli-
darity loan. It would aim to finance projects and programmes in  develop-
ing countries aiming to replace  natural capital  stock.  The  shareholders in 
this solidarity loan could benefit from a guaranteed minimum return and 
fiscal  advantages,  including a reduction of succession  duties. This  would 
emphasize  the  intergenerational  solidarity that this  loan  would  seek  to 
provide. 
(vii)  Twinning  between  EC  and  southern  cities  supported  by  substantive  co-
operation funds. 
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Europe's citizens of the need to fundamentally change the Western way of life 
do not constitute sufficient ground for a comprehensive strategy.  Much more is 
needed. The shift towards new patterns of consumption and production will be 
greatly  aided  particularly  if new technological  choices  and  economic  analysis 
tools become available. 
(i)  Strong action, supported by adequate financial means,  needs be taken in 
order to direct basic and applied technological research towards social and 
economic sustainability. This means not only supporting the existing lines 
of research  on  new environmentally friendly  materials and  reduction  of 
energy consumption for physical  output, but further reinforcing the cur-
rent trend towards a post-industrial society based on more immaterial pat-
terns of production and consumption, as well as  anthropocentric systems 
of production with an  emphasis on human skills and training as a means 
of curbing overcapitalization. On  the same line, a more collective energy-
saving-pattern  of consumption  for physical  goods  should  be  promoted 
(e.g.  collective transport). 
(ii)  The Community should build on its geographical, cultural and climatic di-
versity to develop environmentally appropriate technologies that are suit-
able to be transferred and diffused in  developing countries, thus strength-
ening their sustainable economic and  social  development, particularly in 
the field of urban planning, energy,  transport, agriculture and  protection 
of natural capital stock. 
(iii)  Last,  but not least,  in  order to promote successfully sustainable economic 
and social development on a global world scale,  it is imperative for policy-
making' and for convincing public opinion to develop specific tools which 
would adequately measure the relationship between the environment and 
the economy, as well as the social consequences of economic activities. In 
this context, efforts should  be  made to integrate the environmental and 
social  costs  of economic  activities  in  the  national  accounting  systems. 
Moreover,  analytical  tools  will  have  to be  developed  to ameliorate the 
understanding of physical  processes of environmental degradation. 
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ANNEX 1 
The evolution of North-South relations and 
development thinking since the war 
1.  1945-60: The construdion of a liberal universal system 
and the emergence of the South 1 
The institutional and conceptual framework for North-South relations has 
conditioned the experiences of countries since the political and legal foundations 
were laid at the end  of World War II.  Institutionally, three events stand out: the 
Bretton  Woods  Conference  of  1944  establishing  the  International  Bank  for 
Reconstruction and  Development (World  Bank)  and the International Monetary 
Fund  (IMF),  the  San  Francisco  Conference  of  1945  establishing  the  United 
Nations and the General  Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI) which entered 
into force (provisionally) in  1947. Conceptually, these institutions were based on 
liberal  thinking, namely the recognition of the equality of sovereign  States  and 
the  promotion  of peace  and  security,  human  rights  and  economic  freedoms. 
Politically,  they were a response  both to the experience of the war and  to the 
breakdown of the monetary, financial and trading order in the 1930s. 
Procedurally, the exercise of influence within these organizations was con-
ditioned in different manners affecting their operational capacities and evolution. 
The  simple majority rule on the basis of one country/one vote allowed develop-
ing countries, whose numbers were increasing  as  decolonization progressed, to 
impose  their  views  in  the  context  of nonbinding  resolutions  adopted  by  the 
United  Nations  General  Assembly.  The  same  was  not possible  in  the  Security 
Council  because  of the veto powers of its  five  permanent members.  The  influ-
ence  of developing countries  remained  marginal  in  the  Bretton Woods  institu-
tions where voting rights are  based  on capital  shares  and  the GATI where the 
major trading  partners dominate the negotiations and  decisions taken  by  con-
sensus. 
The presentation draws on Comeliau, C.  Les relations Nord-Sud,  edit1ons  La  decouverte,  1991  as well as the 
Dutch Government report 'A world of difference- A new framework for development cooperation in the 1990s', 
The Hague,  1991. The observations on development thinking are inspired by Oman, C.  and WignaraJa,  G.  'The 
post-war evolution of development thinking', OECD  Development Centre,  1991. 
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few outside Latin America at the time, into a system of their construction. In  re-
sponse, the independent southern States emerging in  the era  of decolonization 
tried  to  adopt  common  positions  under  the  aegis  of  the  Non-Aligned 
Movement.1 Their initial approach was to focus on  political sovereignty and  in-
dependence with little perception of divergent economic interests between the 
technologically  advanced  North  constructing  its  war-hit  economies  and  their 
economically  dependent  South.  The  prevailing  mood  of the  period  was  that 
poor countries should  copy the model  of northern  industrial society  by  rapidly 
constructing  an  industrial  base  - rivalry existing  over the choices  between and 
within the capitalist and Marxist paths. 
2.  1960-73: Between imitation and autonomy 
During the 1960s North-South agreements and institution-building at the 
bilateral, regional and multilateral levels followed decolonization as the ex-colo-
nies were tied  into the evolving global framework.2 The  philosophy of benevo-
lent assistance and cooperation pervaded these agreements with the problem of 
development perceived  as  overcoming  obstacles to the full  realization  of these 
countries' economic capacities.  However, as early as  1969 the UN commissioned 
Pearson  report concluded that development assistance was in  a crisis  due to its 
orientation  towards  the  short-term  political,  strategic  and  export  interests  of 
donor countries. The 1970 General Assembly Resolution 2676 committing devel-
oped  countries  to  allocate  0.7%  of  GDP  for  official  development  assistance 
(ODA) contained no deadline and  has only been  respected  by the Scandinavian 
countries and the Netherlands. 
In  this  period,  the  newly  independent  developing  countries  were  still 
defining  their  position  in  a  bipolar  world.  Those  closer  to the  Western  bloc 
favoured  the  development  strategies  offered  by  writers  such  as  Rostow  who 
thought  imitating  earlier  Western  policies  could  foster  a  'take-off'  in  their 
societies'  productive  capacities.3  In  gearing  the economy to industrial  growth, 
the spread  of welfare was believed to come from the trickle-down effect.4 
Those  in  the ambit of the Eastern  bloc adopted Marxist-Leninist central-
ized  planning models inspired  by Soviet and, to a lesser extent, Chinese experi-
ences  in  which  the  State  controlled  by  a  single  party  dictated  all  economic 
decisions. 
As a pol1tical  not1on,  the 'South' came into be1ng  at the Bandung Conference of 1955 as a consequence of 
a shared philosophy of anti-colonialism and non-alignment. 
For example, the Yaounde Association Agreement between the European Community and 18 African 
ex-colon1es,  Kennedy's all1ance for progress with Lat1n  America, the creation of the Development Assistance 
Committee of the OECD  and the establishment of Unctad. 
Rostow, W.W.  'The stages of economic growth: A non-commumst manifesto', 1960. 
See,  in  particular, Leibenstein,  H.  'Investment mtena, product1v1ty and economic development', 1955. 
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prompted Third World intellectuals and political leaders to question the relation-
ship  of  developing  countries  to  the  world  economy.  Raul  Prebisch  and  the 
Economic Commission for Latin America's work in the 1950s influenced govern-
ment policy especially in Latin America towards the adoption of strategies of im-
port substitution industrialization. The rationale for their strategy was that given 
the  deteriorating  terms  of trade  for  primary  products  against  manufactured 
goods,  a long-term transfer of income would only occur if indigenous industry 
was  developed behind tariff and  quantitative trade barriers.  More radical  alter-
native  development  theories,  under  the  heading  of 'dependencia',  explained 
underdevelopment as a consequence of dependence on  industrialized countries 
rather than inadequate integration into the international economy and  pleaded 
either in  favour of autonomous socialist development strategies or at least self-
reliance. 
In  all  these  strategies  and  theories,  the development of the agricultural 
sector,  human  resources  and  adequate  institutions  were  widely  neglected. 
Indeed,  the  agricultural  sector was  often  discriminated  against,  in  both  policy 
and  development thought. 1 
3.  1973·82: Between economic crisis and the search 
for a new international economic order 
The  beginning of the 1970s was economically marked  by the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods exchange-rate system  and  the first oil  crisis.  The  mounting 
monetary instability, the fall in the value of the US dollar, in which most raw ma-
terials were priced, and the sharp rise in oil prices led to rising  revenues of OPEC 
countries but low if not negative per capita growth rates for poor oil-importing 
developing  countries.  Some  newly industrializing  countries (NICs),  especially  in 
East Asia,  continued to enjoy economic growth. Their success lay in the encour-
agement given  through the interplay between  the State  and  business  to their 
maturing industries to produce goods for export, their governments' support for 
the agricultural sector and their commitment to education and training.  In  con-
trast, agriculture and education were neglected, particularly in Africa, and the in-
dustries of Latin America and Africa faltered in their attempts to replace imported 
goods behind government-imposed trade barriers. The  result was a growing di-
versity of development patterns in  southern hemisphere countries. 
The  example  of the  oil-price  cartel,  the  easy  availability  of financial  re-
sources and  ideas of structural imbalance in  world trade, lent weight to the de-
mand for a new international economic order (NIEO).  The  request for the NIEO 
was  in  terms  of an  action  programme and  a Charter of Economic  Rights  and 
Duties of States adopted at the sixth special session of the UN General Assembly, 
after formulation by the Non-Aligned Movement in Algiers in  1973. In  particular, 
See,  for example, Lewis.  W.  A.  'Economic development w1th  unlimited supplies of labour', 1954. 
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imbalance of the world economy. 1 Responses from industrialized countries, who 
were generally opposed for ideological and economic reasons,  were either low 
key (the USA digesting the Vietnam war) or paternalistic (the Community con-
cluding the first Lome agreement).  Responses from multinational organizations 
reflected  this  new thinking, with the World  Bank  promoting a 'redistribution 
with growth' approach (under McNamara) and the ILO a 'basic needs' strategy. 
Both approaches criticized the traditional growth strategies in  the light of per-
sisting  inequalities and  rising  poverty,  favouring  instead  more  Keynesian  poli-
cies. 
The  global North-South negotiations nevertheless remained  largely a dia-
logue of the deaf.  Developing  countries turned -at least conceptually- to the 
idea of South/South cooperation and collective self-reliance (Arusha 1979) as the 
second oil-price shock further weakened their economies.  However, the internal 
causes  of underdevelopment (overemphasis on  industrialization through import 
substitution, exclusion of large parts of the population, inadequate government 
structures) were still  not seriously addressed  in  most countries.  Neither the first 
report of the Brandt Commission of 1980 entitled 'North-South: A programme 
for survival'  nor the 1981  North-South Summit in  Cancun  calling for a massive 
transfer of resources managed to revive the North-South dialogue in view of the 
slowdown  in  world  growth,  rising  Third  World  debts  and  a  neo-conservative 
supply-side deregulation ideology in  the North which also  influenced the direc-
tion of the Bretton Woods institutions in the 1980s. 
4.  1982-91: From the debt crisis to the end of the 
East-West conflid 
Mexico's inability to meet its debt obligations and  its subsequent suspen-
sion of debt servicing  in August 1982 triggered off an international financial crisis. 
Rising  debt resulted  from the hidden costs of import substitution policies (after 
the initial 'easy' stage), lenient lending, a sharp rise  in  interest rates,  a deteriora-
tion of the terms of trade and trade protectionism.  In  particular, Latin  American 
and African economies were strongly affected by the sudden decline of financial 
transfers having overexposed their economies. As a consequence,  from this pe-
riod to the present day, these regions have suffered from net financial transfers 
to the lending countries and  international institutions despite various  plans for 
debt rescheduling or reconversion (Baker  1985, Brady 1989). 
The action programme promoted concepts such as economic sovereignty, trade liberalization and structural 
adJUStment of developing countnes, increased technology transfer and control of multinational companies, 
stabilization of commodity pnces at higher levels (integrated commodity programme and common fund), 
reforms of the monetary system towards more stable exchange rates and better cred1t facilities,  increases in 
ODA, debt rescheduling and better developing country representation in  the international economic 
organizations. 
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internal policies in the name of structural adjustment. These policies represented 
a watershed  in  development cooperation. They  moved away from conditioning 
assistance largely on the grounds of political allegiance.  Under the leadership of 
the IMF and the World Bank,  financial assistance was now conditioned on  radi-
cal  reforms of internal  economic policies within developing  countries with the 
emphasis on more realistic exchange rates,  balanced budgets, freeing of domes-
tic prices,  export promotion and opening-up of internal markets to international 
competition. The adjustment policies were designed to strengthen the competi-
tiveness  of the affected  economies.  However,  at  least  in  the short term,  they 
tended to lead to very low and, in  many cases,  negative growth rates,  a deteri-
oration of living conditions for the poorest population groups and  environmen-
tal  degradation.  The  social  fraction  and  societal  transformation  produced  by 
these policies were heavily criticized and not just by the 'dependencia' theorists. 1 
As a consequence,  in  recent years  more attention has been  given to the allevia-
tion of the social  costs of structural adjustments.2 Within the ascendant liberal-
capitalist paradigm, the realization that poverty was taking a structural nature in 
some countries provoked a shift of emphasis onto family planning, educational 
and  infrastructural  deficits and  strategies to overcome the persistence  of dual 
economies and marginalization.3 
The  1980s are widely considered to have been  a 'lost decade' in terms of 
development for the  majority of southern  hemisphere  countries  even  though 
some  regions  continued to experience fast  growth rates  and  despite the 'new 
realist' arguments that the decade had  been characterized by a necessary learn-
ing process.  In  any event, the result was a further increase  in the heterogeneity 
of the 'South', raising  questions about the continued justification of this notion. 
The  trend  to further  marginalization  of many  developing  countries  was  rein-
forced while the international system  has come to be increasingly dominated by 
the triad  of economic powers - Europe,  Japan  and  the USA.  The  North-South 
dialogue was dead and the focus of international attention drifted further away 
from the UN  bodies to the Bretton Woods institutions, the GATI (embarking on 
the  Uruguay  Round  multilateral  trade  negotiations)  and  the  G7  economic 
summits. 
The decline and fall of the Soviet imperium at the turn of the decade were 
widely perceived as opening a new window of opportunity for North-South rela-
tions  as  developing  countries  would  no  longer  be  the  victims  of hegemonic 
struggles over spheres of influence. It also led to an  increasing acceptance of the 
values of democratic government and market-friendly economic policies, so long 
See,  for example, Dornbush, R  'Stabilization 1n  developing countries: What have we learned?' 
World Development, Vol.  10, No.9 1982; Fishlow, A.  'EI estado de Ia  ciencia econ6mica en  America Latina' 
in Progreso Econ6mico y Social en America Latina,  1985. 
See  Unicef study 'Adjustment with a human face' (eds G.  A.  Gomia,  R.  Jolly,  F.  Steward),  1987; 
World Bank report 'Social dimensions of adjustments', 1987; World Bank report 
'Sub-Saharan Africa -from crisis to sustainable growth: A long-term prospective study',  1989. 
See,  for example, the chairman's report of the OECD  Development Assistance Committee, 
'Twenty-five years of development cooperation',  1985. 
107 pushed by the West. This has mixed with a perception of exponential population 
growth, environmental threats and structural poverty to produce a new aware-
ness  of  international  interdependences  and  shared  responsibilities.  This  new 
awareness  has,  in  particular,  been  promoted  by  the  1989  report  of  the 
Brundtland Commission  'Our common future' which led  to the United Nations 
Conference on  Environment and Development in  June  1992 in  Rio.  However, as 
the  international  economy staggers  and  the industrialized  countries  shift their 
focus to the transformation process in the East,  developing countries are becom-
ing increasingly worried that development assistance  may be  diverted and their 
market access affected by the integration of the East into world markets. 
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Balance sheet of human development - developing 
countries1 
Progress 
Average life expectancy is  now 63 years-
17 years more than in 1960. 
Two thirds of people have ready access to 
health services. 
Access  to safe water has  increased  in the 
past 20 years by more than two thirds. 
Public expenditure on health as  a propor-
tion of GNP increased by nearly 50% in the 
past 30 years. 
Daily calorie supply is now about 110% of 
the  overall  requirement  (compared  with 
90% some 25 years ago}. 
The  adult  literacy  rate  has  increased  by 
more than one third since 1970. 
Nearly  three  quarters  of  children  are 
enrolled in school. 
More than 2%  of GDP  is  spent on social 
security benefits. 
Employee earnings grew some 3% annual-
ly in the 1980s, twice the rate in the 1970s 
and more than that in industrial countries. 
The  mortality rate of young children  has 
been halved in the last 30 years. 
The  immunization  rate  for  one-year-old 
children has increased from one quarter to 
more than three quarters during the past 
10 years. 
The  male-female gaps  in  primary educa-
tion have decreased  by a half in the past 
20 to 30 years, and in literacy by one third 
in the past 20 years. 
Deprivation 
14  million children die every year  before 
they reach the age of five. 
Nearly 1.5 billion people still lack access to 
health services. 
1.3  billion people still  lack  access  to safe 
water. 
2.3 billion people lack access to sanitation. 
More than a quarter of the world's people 
do not get enough food, and  nearly one 
billion go hungry. Over 100 million people 
were affected by famine in 1990. 
Over  300  million children  do not attend 
primary or secondary school. 
Nearly  one  billion  adults  are  illiterate, 
nearly 600 million of them women. 
1.2  billion still  barely survive  in  absolute 
poverty. 
About  half  the  people  in  sub-Saharan 
Africa are below the poverty line. 
Infant mortality figures in the poorest na-
tions are 115 per 1 000  live births. Nearly 
one million children in sub-Saharan Africa 
are infected with HIV. 
180  million young  children  are  still  mal-
nourished. 
Women  receive  on average only half the 
higher education  of men.  Female  repre-
sentation  in  parliament is  only 14%  that 
of males. 
1 Source: UNDP Human development report, 1992, p.14 
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'North-South forward studies' - Study brief given to 
the Forward Studies Unit 
The  increasing  inequality  between  the  situations  of the  rich  and  poor 
countries of the world is  a threat to balanced  North-South relations,  and  in  the 
years to come it will be exacerbated by population growth and deterioration of 
the environment. The importance of the changes which have occurred in  Eastern 
Europe must not be allowed to obscure these global trends which, over the next 
10  to  20  years,  are  certain  to  transform  relations  between  northern  and 
southern countries. 
Against this background, the Forward Studies Unit is  requested to submit 
a report by June  1992 setting out an analysis and strategic guidelines. 
Firstly,  a forward description must be made of the new shape of relations 
between North and  South with particular reference to the diversification of the 
southern countries, the emergence of the East European countries and the main 
aspects of world interdependence, which, apart from the basic  'currency-trade-
finance' triangle,  must henceforth include the environment, population growth 
and greater population mobility. This description must be followed by guidelines 
for improving the world institutional system  in the light of a shared  North-South 
objective of 'sustainable development'. 
Secondly,  on this basis,  the Unit must define geopolitical priorities for the 
European Community and guidelines for achieving them. The Community will be 
perceived  as  an  'active contributor', either as  an  active participant in the defini-
tion of rules of the multilateral system compatible with its interests, or as a part-
ner in  international cooperation or,  lastly,  as  an  initiator of internal policies with 
major external implications. 
The report must suggest practical ways of interesting the European public 
in these long-term objectives. The Unit must work in close collaboration with the 
Directorates-General concerned, which will be  invited to take part in  the meet-
ings  of  an  open  working  party  to  gather  the  ideas  of  experts  or  external 
witnesses.  No recourse will be made to consultants. 
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116 What is the Forward Studies Unit? 
The  Forward  Studies  Unit was  set  up  in  1989  as  a department of the 
European Commission reporting directly to the President. 
It consists of a multicultural, multidisciplinary team of some  15 members 
who are  responsible for monitoring the forward march of European  integration 
while identifying structural trends and  long-term prospects. 
The Commission decision setting the unit up gave it three tasks: 
•  to monitor and evaluate European integration to 1992 and beyond; 
•  to establish permanent relations with national bodies involved in forecasting; 
•  to work on specific mandates. 
The Forward Studies Unit has, to date, produced wide-ranging reports on 
new  issues  which,  as  a  result,  have  frequently  found  their  way  into  the 
mainstream of the Commission's work, developing a house style which applies a 
research  method designed to bring out the diversity of Europe (shaping factors, 
shaping actors),  developing an  all-round and/or long-term view which  makes it 
easier  to  secure  consensus  above  and  beyond  particular  national  interests, 
keeping a watching brief on and an ear open to movements in Europe's societies 
by  setting  up  links with research  and  forward studies  institutions, and  holding 
regular seminars  on  specific themes  which  are  attended  by  prominent figures 
from  the  arts,  the cultural  sphere  and  universities  and  representatives  of civil 
society, together with the President or a Member of the European Commission. 
The  futurological  function  has  gradually  developed  outside  the  Unit, 
within several of the Commission's Directorates-General which are keen to adopt 
a strategic approach.  The  Unit serves  as  a point where  all  the various  future-
oriented think-tanks inside the Commission can  meet together. 
For some years now, the need for a forecasting function having grown as 
the work of the European Union has become wider and more complex, the work 
programme for the Forward Studies Unit has  been  updated each  year so that it 
can  be  reoriented  to meet specific  needs  and  towards  maximum  cooperation 
with all  the Commission departments concerned. 
Information  about the  Unit's  current  work  is  available  in  the  quarterly 
newsletter Lettre des Carrefours and on an  Internet site. 
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